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ABSTRACT
FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS OF
COVERT COMMUNICATION
FEBRUARY 2015
BOULAT A. BASH
A.B., DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Donald F. Towsley
Traditional security (e.g., encryption) prevents unauthorized access to message
content; however, detection of the mere presence of a message can have significant
negative impact on the privacy of the communicating parties. Unlike these standard
methods, covert or low probability of detection (LPD) communication not only pro-
tects the information contained in a transmission from unauthorized decoding, but
also prevents the detection of a transmission in the first place. In this thesis we
investigate the fundamental laws of covert communication.
We first study covert communication over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels, a standard model for radio-frequency (RF) communication. We present
a square root limit on the amount of information transmitted covertly and reliably
over such channels. Specifically, we prove that if the transmitter has channels to the
intended receiver and the warden that are both AWGN, thenO(√n) covert bits can be
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reliably transmitted to the receiver in n uses of the channel. Conversely, attempting
to transmit more than O(√n) bits either results in detection by the warden with
probability one or a non-zero probability of decoding error at the receiver as n→∞.
Next we study the impact of warden’s ignorance of the communication attempt
time. We prove that if the channels from the transmitter to the intended receiver
and the warden are both AWGN, and if a single n-symbol period slot out of T (n)
such slots is selected secretly (forcing the warden to monitor all T (n) slots), then
O(min{√n log T (n), n}) covert bits can be transmitted reliably using this slot. Con-
versely, attempting to transmit more than O(√n log T (n)) bits either results in detec-
tion with probability one or a non-zero probability of decoding error at the receiver.
We then study covert optical communication and characterize the ultimate limit of
covert communication that is secure against the most powerful physically-permissible
adversary. We show that, although covert communication is impossible when a chan-
nel injects the minimum noise allowed by quantum mechanics, it is attainable in the
presence of any noise excess of this minimum (such as the thermal background). In
this case, O(√n) covert bits can be transmitted reliably in n optical channel uses
using standard optical communication equipment. The all-powerful adversary may
intercept all transmitted photons not received by the intended receiver, and employ
arbitrary quantum memory and measurements. Conversely, we show that this square
root scaling cannot be circumvented. Finally, we corroborate our theory in a proof-
of-concept experiment on an optical testbed.
x
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy are critical in modern-day wireless communications, with con-
ventional cryptography [67, 80], information-theoretic secrecy [90, 22], and quantum
cryptography [7] offering progressively higher levels of security against the unautho-
rized access to transmitted information. Widely-deployed conventional cryptography
presents the adversary with a problem that he/she is assumed not to be able to solve
because of computational constraints, while information-theoretic secrecy presents
the adversary with a signal from which he/she cannot extract information about the
message contained therein. Quantum key distribution (QKD) lets two distant parties
generate a shared secret key that is secure from the most powerful adversary allowed
by physics. This key, when used as a one-time pad [76], yields an unconditionally-
secure cipher. However, while these approaches address security in many domains
by protecting the content of the message, they do not mitigate the threat to users’
privacy from the discovery of the very existence of the message itself.
Indeed, transmission attempts expose connections between the parties involved,
and recent disclosures [6] of massive surveillance programs revealed that this “meta-
data” is widely collected and often used for nefarious means. Furthermore, the trans-
mission of encrypted data can arouse suspicion, and many cryptographic schemes can
be defeated by a determined adversary using non-computational means such as side-
channel analysis. Anonymous communication tools [23] such as Tor resist metadata
collection and traffic analysis by randomly directing encrypted traffic through a large
network. While these tools conceal the identities of source and destination nodes in
1
Figure 1.1: Our vision of a “shadow network” assembled from “friendly” nodes. Re-
lays (each indicated by a filled red circle with lines expressing active connections to
other relays) generate, transmit, receive, and consume data, while jammers (each in-
dicated by a filled red circle with a concentric red circle) generate artificial noise that
impairs the ability of wardens (indicated by the blue crosses) to detect the presence
of communication. Inactive friendly nodes (indicated by filled red circles with nei-
ther connections to other nodes nor the concentric circles) are capable of receiving,
transmitting and jamming, while the neutral nodes (indicated by empty green cir-
cles) produce background interference but do not participate in the shadow network
nor assist the wardens. Most of this article focuses on the scenario involving only
three nodes: transmitter Alice, receiver Bob, and warden Willie, as indicated in the
diagram.
a “crowd” of relays, they are designed for the Internet and are not effective in wire-
less networks, which are typically orders of magnitude smaller. Moreover, such tools
offer little protection to users whose communications are already being monitored
by the adversaries. Thus, secure communication systems should also provide covert,
or low probability of detection (LPD) communication. Such systems not only pro-
tect the information contained in the message from being decoded, but also prevent
the adversary from detecting the transmission attempt in the first place and allow
communication where it is prohibited.
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While traditionally covert communication received relatively little attention, our
recent work [4] on its fundamental limits has spurred a revival of interest. The
overarching goal of covert communication research is the establishment of “shadow
networks,” an example of which is depicted in Figure 1.1. However, to create such
networks, we must first learn how to connect its component nodes by stealthy com-
munication links. Therefore, in this thesis we focus on the fundamental limits of such
point-to-point links and address the following question: how much information can a
sender Alice reliably transmit (if she chooses to transmit) to the intended recipient
Bob while hiding it from the adversary, warden Willie?
The contributions of this thesis are:
• The development of the fundamental theory of covert communication over
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels (Chapters 4 and 5):
– We show that Shannon capacity [75] does not apply to quantifying the lim-
its of covert communication. Unlike standard secure communication (e.g.,
encryption and information-theoretic secrecy) that only protects the mes-
sage content, covert communication is subject to the square root law : when
both Bob and Willie have AWGN channels from Alice, she can reliably
transmit O(√n) covert bits in n uses of her channel to Bob; attempting to
transmit more information either results in detection with high probability
or unreliable communication [4]. Since Shannon capacity is the number of
bits that can be transmitted per channel use as the number of channel uses
approaches infinity, our result implies that the Shannon capacity of covert
communication over AWGN channel is zero.
– We also demonstrate that ignorance on the part of Willie as to when Alice
might transmit can be used to increase the covert communication through-
put [5].
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• The development of the fundamental theory of covert optical communication
(Chapter 6): Since modern high-sensitivity optical components are primarily
limited by noise of quantum-mechanical origin, we employ quantum informa-
tion theory to derive the ultimate limit of covert communication that is secure
against the most powerful adversary physically permissible. This is the same
benchmark of security to which quantum cryptography adheres for encrypted
communication. As in the AWGN case, the standard result on the limits of com-
munication over a quantum channel (the Holevo capacity [43], a generalization
of Shannon capacity to quantum channels) does not apply to quantum-noise
limited covert optical communication. We demonstrate that a square root law
similar to the one for AWGN channels holds for covert optical communication as
long as there is a positive amount of non-adversarial noise (e.g., thermal back-
ground). We also show that non-adversarial noise is critical as covert commu-
nication is impossible in its absence, which also sharply contrasts the standard
quantum cryptography results [3].
• Experimental validation of the square root law for covert optical communication
(Chapter 7): We corroborate the theory developed in Chapter 6 in a proof-of-
concept experiment. This is the first known implementation of a truly quantum-
information-theoretically secure covert communication system that allows com-
munication when all transmissions are prohibited [3].
This thesis is structured as follows: we begin with a high-level overview of covert
communication in Chapter 2, including both the intuitive treatment of our results as
well as the related work. We provide the mathematical prerequisites in Chapter 3, in-
cluding the rigorous definition of covert communication. In Chapter 4 we study covert
communication over the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, establish-
ing the fundamental square root limit. In Chapter 5 we relax the assumption that
Willie knows when to monitor his AWGN channel from Alice for a possible transmis-
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sion and show that this increases the covert communication throughput. We employ
quantum information theory to analyze covert optical communication in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 7 we describe our proof-of-concept experiment that corroborates the the-
ory developed in Chapter 6. We conclude the thesis in Chapter 8 by summarizing
our contributions and discussing both the ongoing research and the potential future
work in covert communication.
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CHAPTER 2
OVERVIEW OF COVERT COMMUNICATION
The objective of this chapter is to frame the thesis in the context of previous work
on covert communication as well as to intuitively sketch the results of the technical
chapters that follow. We limit the prerequisite mathematical knowledge for this chap-
ter to the basic asymptotic notation (which is formally defined in Section 3.1). We
begin by briefly reviewing the ancient field of steganography in Section 2.1. Steganog-
raphy is the practice of hiding messages in innocuous objects. It is important because
not only was the first covert communication system based on steganography, but it
also was the subject of the first information-theoretic investigation of stealthy com-
munication.
However, the use of steganography for covert communication requires the trans-
mission of objects containing the hidden messages, which is challenging when all
transmissions are prohibited. Thus, in Section 2.2, we discuss covert communication
over noisy channels. The focus of the bulk of Section 2.2 are analog radio frequency
(RF) channels, where the information is hidden in the channel artifacts such as ad-
ditive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). After a brief overview of the classical spread
spectrum methods, we introduce our work on the fundamental limits of covert com-
munication over AWGN channels. Our presentation in Section 2.2 is largely intuitive
and we defer the technical details to Chapters 4 and 5. At the end of Section 2.2
we discuss covert communication over digital communication channels, where the
progress by other research groups was inspired by our work, as well as briefly touch
upon the covert broadcast scenario.
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Optical communication has intrinsically high resistance to detection, however,
analysis of optical systems demands the use of quantum mechanics. We outline our
results on covert optical communication in Section 2.3 while deferring the technical
details to Chapter 6. At the end of Section 2.3 we touch on the experimental work
from Chapter 7. We conclude this chapter in Section 2.4 by discussing the relationship
of this thesis to other work in communication.
2.1 Steganography
The first known description of covert communication is by Herodotus circa 440
BCE in The Histories [42], an account of the Greco-Persian Wars: in Chapter 5
Paragraph 35, Histiaeus shaves the head of his slave, tattoos the message on his
scalp, waits until the hair grows back, and then sends the slave to Aristagoras with
instructions to shave the head and read the message that calls for an anti-Persian
revolt in Ionia; in Chapter 7 Paragraph 239, Demaratus warns Sparta of an imminent
Persian invasion by scraping the wax off a wax tablet, scribbling a message on the
exposed wood, and concealing the message by covering the tablet with wax. This
practice of hiding sensitive messages in innocuous objects is known as steganography.
Modern digital steganography conceals messages in finite-length, finite-alphabet
covertext objects, such as images or software binary code. Embedding hidden mes-
sages in covertext produces stegotext, necessarily changing the properties of the cover-
text. The countermeasure for steganography, steganalysis (an analog of cryptanalysis
for cryptography), looks for these changes. Covertext is usually unavailable for ste-
ganalysis (when it is, steganalysis consists of the trivial comparison between the cover-
text and the suspected stegotext). However, Willie is assumed to have a complete
statistical model of the covertext. The amount of information that can be embedded
without being discovered depends on whether Alice also has access to this model.
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If she does, then positive-rate steganography is achievable: given an O(n)-bit1 secret
“key” that is shared with Bob prior to the embedding, O(n) bits can be embedded
in an n-symbol covertext without being detected by Willie [29, Chapter 13.1].
Recent work focuses on the more general scenario where the complete statisti-
cal model of the covertext is unavailable to Alice. Then, Alice can safely embed
O(√n log n) bits by modifying O(√n) symbols out of n in the covertext, at the
cost of pre-sharing O(√n log n) secret bits with Bob. Note that this square root law
of digital steganography yields zero-rate steganography since limn→∞
O(√n logn)
n
= 0
bits/symbol. The square root law was first observed empirically in the experimental
analysis of existing steganalysis systems and the proof is available in Chapter 13.2.1
of the review of pre-2009 work in digital steganography [29]. More recent work shows
that an empirical model of covertext suffices to break the square root law and achieve
positive-rate steganography [20]. Essentially, while embedding at a positive rate lets
Willie obtain O(n) stegotext observations (enabling detection of Alice when statistics
of covertext and stegotext differ), the increasing size n of the covertext allows Alice
to improve her covertext model and produce statistically-matching stegotext.
Although it is an active research area, steganography has limited application for
covert communication. First, analysis of the steganographic systems generally as-
sumes that stegotext is not corrupted by a noisy channel. Second, the generalization
of the results for steganographic systems is limited because of their finite-alphabet
discrete nature. Finally, the most serious drawback of using steganography for covert
communication is the necessity of transmitting the stegotext from Alice to Bob—a
potentially unrealizable requirement when all communication is prohibited. We thus
consider covert communication over noisy channels.
1The asymptotic notation is formally defined in Section 3.1.
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2.2 Covert Communication over Noisy Channels
We begin the investigation of covert communication over noisy channels by con-
sidering RF wireless communication. Since its emergence in the early 20th century,
protecting wireless RF communication from detection, jamming and eavesdropping
has been of paramount concern. Spread spectrum techniques, devised between the
two world wars to address this issue, have constituted the earliest and, arguably, the
most enduring form of physical layer security.
2.2.1 Spread Spectrum Communication
Essentially, the spread spectrum approach involves transmitting a signal that re-
quires a bandwidth WM on a much wider bandwidth Ws  WM , thereby suppressing
the power spectral density of the transmission below the noise floor. Spread spec-
trum systems provide both a covert communication capability as well as resistance
to jamming, fading, and other forms of interference. A comprehensive review of this
field is available in [78, 81]. Typical spread spectrum techniques include direct se-
quence spread spectrum (DSSS), frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), and
their combination.
When Alice uses DSSS, she multiplies the signal waveform by the spreading se-
quence—a randomly-generated binary waveform with a substantially higher band-
width than the original signal. The resulting waveform is thus “spread” over a wider
bandwidth, which reduces the power spectral density of the transmitted signal. Bob
uses the same spreading sequence to de-spread the received waveform and obtain the
original signal. The spreading sequence is exchanged by the communicating parties
prior to transmission and is kept secret from Willie.2 Outside of security applications,
2While an exchange of a secret prior to covert communication is similar to a key exchange in
symmetric-key cryptography [67, Chapter 1.5] (e.g., one-time pad [76]), an important distinction is
that public-key cryptography techniques [67, Chapter 1.8] cannot be used to exchange this secret
on a channel monitored by Willie without revealing the intention to communicate.
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(a) DSSS (b) FHSS with OFDM and time-hopping.
Figure 2.1: Illustration of spread spectrum techniques. Direct sequence spread spec-
trum (DSSS) is described in (a): the signal with bandwidth WM is multiplied by a
spreading sequence with bandwidth Ws  WM prior to the transmission, reducing
below the noise floor the power spectral density of the transmission. Frequency-
hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) achieves the same by re-tuning the transmitter to
a different carrier frequency within a wide frequency band. As illustrated in (b),
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) enables the use of multiple fre-
quency bands at each transmission and time-hopping allows arbitrary varying of the
transmission duty cycle. Note that the spreading sequence and the frequency/time
hopping pattern are kept secret from the adversaries.
the use of public uncorrelated spreading sequences between transmitter/receiver pairs
enables multiple access; DSSS thus forms the basis of code-division multiple access
(CDMA) protocols used in cellular telephony [85]. The operation of DSSS is illus-
trated in Figure 2.1(a).
Unlike DSSS, FHSS re-tunes the carrier frequency for each transmitted symbol.
However, like the spreading sequence in DSSS, the frequency-hopping pattern is also
randomly generated and secretly shared between the communicating parties prior to
the transmission. FHSS can be combined with orthogonal frequency-division multi-
plexing (OFDM), enabling the use of multiple carrier frequencies. To further reduce
the average transmitted symbol power, FHSS can be used with time-hopping tech-
niques that randomly vary the duty cycle (the time-hopping pattern is also secretly
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pre-shared between the communicating parties prior to the transmission). The oper-
ation of FHSS with OFDM and time-hopping is illustrated in Figure 2.1(b).
Although spread spectrum architectures for covert communication are well-developed,
their fundamental information-theoretic limits have not been explored. Knowledge of
the limits of communication systems is important, particularly since modern coding
techniques (such as Turbo codes [8] and low-density parity check [31, 61] codes) allow
3G/4G cellular systems to operate near their theoretical channel capacity, the maxi-
mum rate of reliable communication without imposing any security requirement [75].
We thus discuss the fundamental limits of covert communication next.
2.2.2 Square Root Law for Covert Communication over AWGN Channels
Spread spectrum systems allow communication where it is prohibited because
spreading the signal power over a large time-frequency space substantially reduces
the adversary’s signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). This impairs his/her capability to dis-
criminate between the noise and the information-carrying signal corrupted by noise.
Here we determine just how small the power has to be for the communication to be
fundamentally undetectable, and how much covert information can be transmitted
reliably.
Consider an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel model where the
signaling sequence is corrupted by the addition of a sequence of independent and
identically distributed zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variance σ2. This
is the standard model for a free-space RF channel. Suppose that the channels from
Alice to Bob and to Willie are subject to AWGN with respective variances σ2b >
0 and σ2w > 0,
3 as illustrated in Figure 2.2(a). Let channel use denote the unit
of communication resource—a fixed time period that is used to transmit a fixed-
3If the channel from Alice to Bob is noiseless (σ2b = 0) and the channel from Alice to Willie is
noisy (σ2w > 0), then Alice can transmit an infinite amount of information to Bob; if the channel
from Alice to Willie is noiseless (σ2w = 0), then covert communication is impossible.
11
(a) Additive white Gaussian noise chan-
nel. (b) Discrete memoryless channel.
(c) Binary symmetric channel. (d) Lossy-noisy optical channel.
Figure 2.2: Channel models.
bandwidth signal—and let n be the total number of channel uses available to Alice and
Bob (e.g., n = WsTs in Figure 2.1(b)). Willie’s ability to detect Alice’s transmission
depends on the amount of total power that she uses. Let’s intuitively derive4 Alice’s
power constraint assuming that Willie observes these n channel uses. When Alice
is not transmitting, Willie observes AWGN with total power σ2wn over n channel
observations on average. By standard statistical arguments, with high probability,
observations of the total power lie within ±cσ2w
√
n of this average, where c is a
4The formal proof is in Chapter 4.
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Figure 2.3: Design of a covert communication system that allows Alice and Bob to
use any error-correction codes (including those known to Willie) to reliably transmit
O(√n) covert bits using O(√n log n) pre-shared secret bits. Subset S is effectively a
frequency/time-hopping pattern, generated by flipping a biased random coin n times,
with probability of heads O(1/√n): the ith channel use is selected for transmission if
the ith flip is heads. On average, the number of channel uses selected |S| = O(√n).
Knowledge of S allows Bob to discard the observations of his channel from Alice that
are not in S and decode her message; Willie observes mostly noise since he does not
know S. Furthermore, application of a one-time pad prevents Willie’s exploitation
of the error correction code’s structure to detect Alice (rather than protects the
message content). In Appendix A.4 a binary amplitude modulation is used while
in Chapter 7 this scheme is implemented on an optical testbed using a Q-ary pulse
position modulation.
constant. Since Willie observes Alice’s signal power when she transmits in addition to
the noise power, to prevent Willie from getting suspicious, the total amount of power
that Alice can use is limited to O(√n), or P = O(1/√n) per symbol; otherwise her
transmission will be detected. We show (Chapter 4) that this allows her to reliably
transmit O(√n) covert bits to Bob in n channel uses, but no more than that. The
similarity of this square root law for covert communications to the steganographic
square root law from Section 2.1 is attributable to the mathematics of statistical
hypothesis testing (as discussed in Section 4.2.3.2). The additional log n factor in the
steganographic square root law comes from the fact that the steganographic “channel”
to Bob is noiseless.
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As in steganography and spread spectrum communication, prior to communicat-
ing, Alice and Bob may share a secret signaling scheme. Figure 2.3 depicts a method
used in Appendix A.4 that allows Alice and Bob to use any error-correction code
(which can be known to Willie) on top of binary modulation to reliably transmit
O(√n) covert bits using O(√n log n) pre-shared secret bits; this method is trivially
extended to higher-order modulation schemes (e.g., in Chapter 7 is is used with Q-
ary pulse position modulation to implement optical communication on an optical
testbed.) While the size of the key is asymptotically larger than the size of the
transmitted message, there are many real-world scenarios where this is an accept-
able trade-off to being detected. Furthermore, the recent extension of our work in
Chapter 4 to digital covert communication that we describe next suggests that the
pre-shared secret can be eliminated in some scenarios.
2.2.3 Digital Covert Communication
The discrete memoryless channel (DMC) model [19, Chapter 7] describing dig-
ital communication often sheds light on what is feasible in practical communica-
tion systems. Discrete input and output allow the DMC to be represented using a
bipartite graph where the two sets of vertices correspond to input and output al-
phabets, and edges correspond to the stochastic transitions from input to output
symbols. The memoryless nature of the DMC means that its output is statistically
independent from any symbol other than the input at that time. We illustrate this
model in Figure 2.2(b), which we augment by designating one of Alice’s inputs as “no
transmission”—a necessary default channel input permitted by Willie.5
We first consider the binary symmetric channel (BSC) illustrated in Figure 2.2(c),
which restricts the DMC to binary input and output alphabet {0, 1}, and the proba-
bility of a crossover from zero at the input to one at the output being equal to that of
5For example, this could be the zero-signal in the AWGN channel scenario.
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a crossover from one to zero. Denote by pb > 0 and pw > 0 the crossover probabilities
on Bob’s and Willie’s BSCs, respectively. It has been shown that, while no more than
O(√n) covert bits can be reliably transmitted in n BSC uses, if pw > pb, then the
pre-shared secret is unnecessary [15].
Channel resolvability can be employed to generalize the square root law in [15]
to DMCs. Channel resolvability is the minimum input entropy6 needed to generate
a channel output distribution that is “close” (by some measure of closeness between
probability distributions7) to the channel output distribution for a given input; re-
solvability has been used to obtain new, stronger results for the information-theoretic
secrecy capacity [10]. If the channels from Alice to both Willie and Bob are DMCs,
and Willie’s channel capacity is smaller than Bob’s, then techniques in [44] can be
used to demonstrate the square root law without a pre-shared secret [54]. The re-
sults in [15] and [54] provide evidence that secret-less covert communication over the
AWGN channel should be possible.
2.2.4 Willie’s Ignorance of Transmission Time Helps Alice
When deriving the square root laws, we assume that Willie knows when the trans-
mission takes place, if it does. However, in many scenarios Alice and Bob have a
pre-arranged time for communication that is unknown to Willie (e.g., a certain time
and day). The transmission might also be short relative to the total time during
which it may take place (e.g., a few seconds out of the day). If Willie does not know
when the message may be transmitted, he has to monitor a much longer time period
6Essentially, entropy measures “surprise” associated with a random variable, or its “uncertainty”.
For example, a binary random variable describing a flip of a fair coin with equal probabilities of
heads and tails has higher entropy than the binary random variable describing a flip of a biased
coin with probability of heads larger than tails. The output of the biased coin is more predictable,
and less surprising, as one should observe more heads. Introductory texts on the information theory
(such as [19]) provide the in-depth discussion of entropy and other information-theoretic concepts.
7Examples of measures of closeness are variational distance and relative entropy (see Section 4.2.1
and [19, Chapter 11]).
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than the time required for the transmission. It turns out that Willie’s ignorance of
Alice’s transmission time allows her to transmit additional information to Bob. Sur-
prisingly, under some mild conditions on the relationship between the total available
transmission time and the transmission duration, Alice and Bob do not even have to
pre-arrange the communication time.
slot 1
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
slot 2
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
· · · slot tA
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
· · · slot T (n)
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
︸ ︷︷ ︸
nT (n) total symbol periods


Slot used by Alice and Bob
Figure 2.4: Slotted channel: each of the T (n) slots contains n symbols. Alice and
Bob use slot tA to communicate.
Consider the scenario of Section 2.2.2 where the channels from Alice to Bob and
to Willie are subject to AWGN. Suppose that time is slotted, with each of T (n) slots
containing n channel uses and T (n) being an increasing function of n, as depicted in
Figure 2.4. Clearly, if Alice used all T (n) slots, by the square root law, she could
reliably transmit O(√nT (n)) covert bits in nT (n) channel uses. However, suppose
that she only employs a single time slot tA, selected uniformly at random. While
the na¨ıve application of the square root law states that she can reliably transmit
O(√n) covert bits, in fact, as we show in Chapter 5, Willie being subject to much
more noise from having to monitor all T (n) slots allows Alice to reliably transmit
O(min{√n log T (n), n}) covert bits during the selected time slot, if she chooses to
transmit. Furthermore, no additional bits of pre-shared secret are required if T (n) <
2cTn, where constant cT > 0 depends on the relative power of AWGN on Bob’s and
Willie’s channels. Conversely, no more than O(√n log T (n)) can be transmitted both
reliably and covertly.
While it has been established that the absence of transmission timing knowledge
by Willie allows Alice to transmit more covert bits, the proof in Chapter 5 is valid
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only for an AWGN channel. The problem is open for DMCs; however, we suspect
that the same scaling laws hold.
2.2.5 Positive-rate Covert Communication
The covert communication channels described above have zero rates, since the
average number of bits that can be covertly transmitted per channel use tends to
zero as the number of channel uses n gets large. Here we discuss the possibility of
positive-rate covert communication, i.e. reliable transmission of O(n) covert bits in n
channel uses. In general, the circumstances that allow Alice to covertly communicate
with Bob at positive rates occur either when Willie allows Alice to transmit positive-
entropy messages or when he is ignorant of the probabilistic structure of the noise
on his channel (note that the applicability of the steganographic results [20] here is
limited since estimation of the probabilistic structure of the noise on Willie’s channel is
insufficient unless Alice can “replace” this noise rather than add to it). When Willie
allows transmissions, the covert capacity is the same as the information-theoretic
secrecy capacity (see [44] for treatment of the DMCs). Incompleteness of Willie’s
noise model can also allow positive-rate covert communication: in the noisy digital
channel setting, Willie’s ignorance of the channel model is a special case of the scenario
in [44]; while in the AWGN channel setting, random noise power fluctuations have
been shown to yield positive-rate covert communication [57, 58]. The latter result
holds even when the noise power can be bounded; a positive rate is achieved because
Willie does not have a constant baseline of noise for comparison.
2.2.6 Covert Broadcast
Some of the results for the point-to-point covert communication in the presence of
a single warden that are discussed in this section can easily be extended to scenarios
with multiple receivers. For example, covert communication over an AWGN channel
effectively imposes a power constraint on Alice. Since a pre-shared secret enables
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covert communication in this setting, if each receiver obtains it prior to communica-
tion, Alice can use standard techniques [19, Chapter 15] to encode covert messages
to multiple recipients. The extension to a multi-warden setting as well as other net-
worked scenarios is the ongoing work discussed in Chapter 8.
2.3 Covert Optical Communication
Optical signaling enables such important cryptographic security techniques as
QKD [7]. It is also ideal for covert communication because of the narrow beam
spread of laser-based communication systems [30, 35] and the availability of time-
domain reflectometry devices [2] for detecting taps in optical fiber. Therefore, in this
section we outline the main results for covert optical communication from Chapters 6
and 7.
2.3.1 Optical channel: model and analysis
A lossy-noisy optical channel is typically modeled by a beamsplitter that takes
inputs from Alice and the environment and outputs to Bob and Willie, as depicted
in Figure 2.2(d). The analysis of Section 2.2.2 applies to an optical channel with
a thermal environment (described later) where Alice uses a laser-light transmit-
ter while both Bob and Willie use coherent-detection (i.e., homodyne or hetero-
dyne) receivers. However, modern high-sensitivity optical components are limited
by noise of quantum-mechanical origin. Thus, establishing the ultimate limit of
covert communication that is secure against the most powerful adversary allowed
by physics—the standard of security to which quantum cryptography adheres for
encrypted communication—requires quantum information theory.
2.3.2 Covert communication is impossible over pure-loss channels
Consider a pure loss optical channel, i.e., one with a “vacuum” environment, which
corresponds to the minimum noise the channel must inject to preserve the Heisen-
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berg inequality of quantum mechanics. If Willie has such a channel from Alice and
is limited only by the laws of physics in his choice of a detector, regardless of the
resources available to Alice and Bob, he can prevent any reliable covert communica-
tion by using an ideal single photon detector (SPD). An ideal SPD registers detection
events only when one or more photons impinge on its receiver aperture, and, thus,
Willie does not experience false alarms. A detection of a single photon gives away
Alice’s transmission attempt regardless of her signaling scheme. This restricts Alice
to transmissions that are nearly indistinguishable from vacuum, rendering unreliable
any communication designed to be covert and vice-versa.
2.3.3 Square root law for covert optical communication
The analysis of quantum cryptography schemes such as QKD assumes a nearly-
omnipotent adversary that is in control of the channel noise and is capable of employ-
ing ideal detectors. While providing the highest level of security, such assumptions are
unreasonably strong for covert communication: a positive amount of noise in addition
to the quantum minimum is unavoidable in any practical setting. This excess noise is
not controlled by the adversary and originates either from the thermal environment or
the detector itself. First, consider the thermal noise channel, where the noise source
is the thermal environment. The thermal environment, such as the background radi-
ation from a 300K thermal blackbody, is modeled by a mixture of zero-mean complex
Gaussian-distributed coherent states, where a coherent state is a quantum-mechanical
description of ideal laser light. The thermal noise channel allows covert communi-
cation when Alice transmits O(1/√n) photons per optical mode averaged over n
available modes8. Signaling photons then blend in with the noise photons, resulting
in the square root law for covert optical communication: Alice can reliably transmit
8Here an optical channel mode is a communication resource unit, equivalent to the channel use
in the previous section. A more formal description is provided in the footnote on page 65 and in
Appendix B.4.
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O(√n) covert bits to Bob using n modes. For the thermal noise channel the square
root law holds even when Willie has access to all of Alice’s signaling photons not cap-
tured by Bob and arbitrary quantum measurement and computation resources. Alice
and Bob pre-share a secret codebook prior to communication and Bob needs only
a suboptimal homodyne-detection receiver to decode Alice’s transmissions. We note
that these results are also relevant to the RF covert communication systems because
of the recent advances in quantum-limited microwave-frequency coherent detectors
and amplifiers [1].
However, assuming single-mode detection for Willie, thermal noise is negligible at
optical frequencies. It is easy to show that the ideal photon number resolving (PNR)
detector is asymptotically optimal in this (hypothetical) pure-loss channel scenario.
PNR detectors count the number of photons observed in a mode. However, their prac-
tical implementations suffer from various excess noise sources, with dark counts being
most prevalent. Dark counts are false photon detection events triggered by the inter-
nal spontaneous emission process, rather than photons impinging on the detector’s
active surface (they also plague practical implementations of SPDs). The square root
law holds in this scenario, and Alice can use laser pulses to reliably transmit O(√n)
covert bits in n modes. A noisy PNR detector can also be used to prove the converse
of the square root law, i.e., more than O(√n) covert bits cannot be transmitted us-
ing n modes without either being detected or suffering from uncorrectable decoding
errors. In fact, a noisy SPD suffices to prove the converse in all practical scenar-
ios when codewords with bounded photon number per mode. In Chapter 7 we use
noisy SPDs, laser-light pulse-position modulation and Reed-Solomon error-correction
coding (implementing the covert communication system depicted in Figure 2.3) to
experimentally demonstrate the square root law for covert optical communication on
a testbed.
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2.4 Relationship to Previous Work in Communications
Here we relate our thesis to other work in communication.
2.4.1 Information-theoretic secrecy
There exists a rich body of literature on the information-theoretic secrecy result-
ing from the legitimate receiver having a better channel to the transmitter than the
adversary. Wyner was the first to show that if the adversary only has access to a noisy
version of the signal received by the legitimate receiver (using a wire-tap channel),
then the legitimate receiver can achieve a positive secure communication rate to the
sender without the use of a shared one-time pad [90]. Cheong and Hellman extended
this result to Gaussian channels [60], and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner generalized it to broad-
cast channels [21]. Our approach considers the adversary’s ability to detect rather
than decode the transmissions, and it does not rely on the channel to the legitimate
receiver being better than the channel to the adversary. However, as discussed in
Section 2.2.3, the legitimate receiver having a better channel than the adversary may
allow achievability of covert communication without a pre-shared secret.
2.4.2 Anonymous communication
Our problem is related to that of anonymous communication [23], specifically
the task of defeating the network traffic timing analysis. While the objective is
fundamentally the same, the setting and approaches are vastly different. The network
traffic analysis involves the adversary inferring network properties (such as source-
relay pairs) by correlating properties (such as the inter-packet timing) of two or more
encrypted packet flows. Protecting against this kind of analysis is costly, as one
needs to make flows look statistically independent by randomizing the timing of the
packets, inserting dummy packets, or dropping a portion of the data packets. Recent
work thus addressed the amount of common information that can be embedded into
two flows that are generated by independent renewal processes [65]. However, in our
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scenario Willie cannot perform traffic analysis (or any kind of network layer analysis),
as Alice prevents him (with high probability) from detecting her transmission in the
first place.
2.4.3 Cognitive Radio
The covert communication problem is also related to that of establishing a cog-
nitive radio (CR) network [91]. Aspects of covert communication can be cast in the
CR context by considering a problem of secondary users communicating while mini-
mizing the interference from their transmissions to the primary users of the network.
To do so, secondary users must monitor the channel for primary users and back off
if their transmissions are detected. This task is identical to that of Willie in the
covert communication scenario. In fact, the work showing that positive-rate covert
communication is possible when Willie uses a power detector and has uncertainty
about his noise variance was inspired by the primary user detection problem in CR
networks [57, 58].
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CHAPTER 3
INFORMATION-THEORETICALLY COVERT
COMMUNICATION
Quantum and classical information-theoretic analyses of covert communication
consider the reliability and detectability of a transmission. We introduce these con-
cepts after a brief overview of the asymptotic notation used in this thesis. We conclude
this chapter by presenting the general mathematical methodology of the proofs that
follow.
3.1 Asymptotic Notation
We use asymptotic notation [18, Ch. 3.1] where:
• f(n) = O(g(n)) denotes an asymptotic upper bound on f(n) (i.e., there exist
constants m,n0 > 0 such that 0 ≤ f(n) ≤ mg(n) for all n ≥ n0),
• f(n) = o(g(n)) denotes an upper bound on f(n) that is not asymptotically
tight (i.e., for any constant m > 0, there exists constant n0 > 0 such that
0 ≤ f(n) < mg(n) for all n ≥ n0),
• f(n) = Ω(g(n)) denotes an asymptotic lower bound on f(n) (i.e., there exist
constants m,n0 > 0 such that 0 ≤ mg(n) ≤ f(n) for all n ≥ n0),
• f(n) = ω(g(n)) denotes a lower bound on f(n) that is not asymptotically
tight (i.e., for any constant m > 0, there exists constant n0 > 0 such that
0 ≤ mg(n) < f(n) for all n ≥ n0), and
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• f(n) = Θ(g(n)) denotes an asymptotically tight bound on f(n) (i.e., there
exist constants m1,m2, n0 > 0 such that 0 ≤ m1g(n) ≤ f(n) ≤ m2g(n) for all
n ≥ n0). f(n) = Θ(g(n)) implies that f(n) = Ω(g(n)) and f(n) = O(g(n)).
3.2 Reliability
We consider a scenario where Alice attempts to transmit M bits to Bob over n
uses of the channel while Willie attempts to detect her transmission attempt. A chan-
nel use corresponds to a signaling interval carrying one fixed-bandwidth modulation
symbol. Each of the 2M possible M -bit messages maps to an n-symbol codeword, and
their collection forms a codebook. Desirable codebooks ensure that the codewords,
when corrupted by the channel, are distinguishable from one another. This provides
reliability : a guarantee that the probability of Bob’s error in decoding Alice’s message
P(b)e < δ with arbitrarily small δ > 0 for n large enough. In practice, error-correction
codes (ECCs) are used to enable reliability.
3.3 Detectability
Willie’s detector reduces to a binary hypothesis test of Alice’s transmission state
given his observations of the channel, where the null hypothesis H0 corresponds to
the hypothesis that Alice does not transmit and the alternate hypothesis H1 corre-
sponds to the hypothesis that Alice transmits. Denote by PFA the probability that
Willie raises a false alarm when Alice does not transmit, and by PMD the probabil-
ity that Willie misses the detection of Alice’s transmission. We assume equal prior
probabilities for hypotheses H0 and H1, i.e., P(H0 true) = P(H1 true) = 12 , which
corresponds to Willie’s complete ignorance of Alice’s transmission state. We examine
the impact of using unequal prior probabilities (which corresponds to Willie possess-
ing some information about the likelihood of Alice transmitting) in Appendix A.1
for classical hypothesis testing and in Appendix B.2 for quantum hypothesis testing,
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of Willie’s ROC curve when Alice’s maintains P(w)e ≥ 1/2− .
The ROC for a detector that makes random decisions is the diagonal line of no
discrimination. Since PFA ≤ 1 − PMD, P(w)e ≥ 12 −  implies PFA ≤ 1 − PMD ≤
PFA + 2. Thus, Willie’s ROC curve is confined to a narrow region near the line of no
discrimination.
and find that, unless one of the prior probabilities is unity, the asymptotic results
that follow are unaffected. Under the assumption of equal prior probabilities, Willie’s
detection error probability, P(w)e = PFA+PMD2 . Since P
(w)
e = 12 for a detector that guesses
Alice’s transmission state, P(w)e ≤ 12 . We call a signaling scheme covert if it ensures
P(w)e ≥ 1/2− for an arbitrarily small  > 0 regardless of Willie’s detector choice. This
has a natural signal processing interpretation via the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve [83, Ch. 2.2.2], which plots the probability of true detection 1 − PMD
versus the probability of false detection PFA. Since PFA ≤ 1− PMD and P(w)e ≥ 12 − 
imply that PFA ≤ 1 − PMD ≤ PFA + 2, when  is small, the ROC curve lies very
close to the line of no discrimination (the diagonal line where 1 − PMD = PFA), as
illustrated in Figure 3.1. Since the line of no discrimination corresponds to a detec-
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tor that guesses Alice’s transmission state randomly, a small  implies that the best
detector available to Willie does only slightly better than a random guess.
By decreasing her transmission power, Alice can decrease the effectiveness of
Willie’s hypothesis test at the expense of the reliability of Bob’s decoding. Information-
theoretically secure covert communication is both reliable and covert. To achieve it,
prior to transmission, Alice and Bob share a secret, the cost of which we assume to
be substantially less than that of being detected by Willie. This secret allows Alice
to encode the message in such a way that it is reliably decoded Bob, but not distin-
guished from the noise by Willie; in fact, it is a codebook secretly shared between
Alice and Bob prior to communication in some of the achievability proofs that follow.
This follows “best practices” in security system design as the security of the covert
communication system depends only on the shared secret [52, 67]. Secret-sharing is
also consistent with other information-hiding systems [47, 29, 27, 50, 51, 77]; how-
ever, as evidenced by the recent results for a restricted class of channels [16, 46],
certain scenarios (e.g., Willie’s channel from Alice being worse than Bob’s) may allow
secret-less covert communication [54].
3.4 Covert Communication Proof Methodology
Each theorem presented in this thesis can be classified as either an “achievability”
or a “converse”. Achievability theorems (4.2.1, 4.2.2, 5.2.1, 6.3.1, 6.4.1, and 7.1.1)
establish the lower limit on the amount of information that can be covertly trans-
mitted from Alice to Bob, while the converse theorems (4.3.1, 5.3.1, 6.2.1 and 6.5.1)
demonstrate the upper limit. In essence, the achievability results are obtained by
1. fixing Alice’s and Bob’s communication system and revealing its construction
in entirety (except the shared secret) to Willie;
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2. showing that, even with such information, Willie’s optimal detector (that also
satisfies the constraints of a particular scenario discussed) is ineffective at dis-
criminating Alice’s transmission state; and
3. demonstrating that the transmission can be reliably decoded by Bob using the
shared secret.
On the other hand, converses are established by
1. fixing Willie’s detection scheme (and revealing it to Alice and Bob); and
2. demonstrating that no amount of resources allows Alice to both remain unde-
tected by Willie and exceed the upper limit on the amount of information that
is reliably transmitted to Bob.
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CHAPTER 4
COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER AWGN CHANNELS
In this chapter we develop the fundamental bounds on covert communication over
channels that are subject to additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). AWGN chan-
nel model is standard for many practical communication systems, including wireless
devices operating on radio frequencies (RF). In our scenario, Alice has an AWGN
channel to Bob, while passive warden Willie attempts to detect transmissions on this
channel. The channel between Alice and Willie is also AWGN. Willie is passive in
that he only observes and does not actively jam Alice’s channel. Willie attempts to
classify his observations as either noise on his channel from Alice or Alice’s signals
to Bob. If he detects communication, Willie can potentially shut the channel down
or otherwise punish Alice (however, punishing innocent Alice is costly). If the noise
on the channel between Willie and Alice has non-zero power, Alice can communicate
with Bob while tolerating a certain probability of detection, which she can drive down
by transmitting with low enough power. Thus, Alice potentially transmits non-zero
mutual information covertly to Bob in n uses of the channel.
The main result of this chapter is the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 (Square root law for covert communication over AWGN channels).
Suppose the channels between Alice and each of Bob and Willie experience additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with powers σ2b > 0 and σ
2
w > 0, respectively, where
σ2b and σ
2
w are constants. Then, provided that Alice and Bob have a shared secret of
sufficient length, for any  > 0 and unknown σ2w, Alice can reliably (i.e., with Bob’s
decoding error probability P(b)e ≤ δ for arbitrary δ > 0) transmit o(√n) information
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bits to Bob in n channel uses while lower-bounding Willie’s detection error probability
P(w)e ≥ 12 − . Moreover, if Alice knows a lower bound σˆ2w > 0 to the power of the
AWGN on Willie’s channel σ2w (i.e. σ
2
w ≥ σˆ2w), she can transmit O(
√
n) bits in n
channel uses while maintaining the lower bound P(w)e ≥ 12 − . Conversely, if Alice
attempts to transmit ω(
√
n) bits in n channel uses, then, as n → ∞, either Willie
detects her with arbitrarily low probability of error or Bob cannot decode her message
reliably, regardless of the length of the shared secret.
We note that, since covert communication allows transmission of O(√n) bits in n
channel uses and, considering limn→∞
O(√n)
n
= 0, the information-theoretic capacity
of the covert channel is zero, unlike many other communications settings where it
is a positive constant. However, a significant amount of information can still be
transmitted using this channel. We are thus concerned with the number of information
bits transmitted in n channel uses, as opposed to the number of bits per channel use.
After introducing our channel model in Section 4.1, we prove the achievability of
the square root law in Section 4.2. We then prove the converse in Section 4.3.
4.1 Channel Model
The discrete-time AWGN channel model with real-valued symbols is a standard
mathematical description of the free-space radio-frequency (RF) communication sys-
tem, as well as of certain optical communications systems (see the introduction to
Chapter 6). We defer discussion of the mapping to a continuous-time channel to Ap-
pendix A.2. Our formal system framework is depicted in Figure 4.1. Alice transmits
a vector of n real-valued symbols f = {fi}ni=1. Bob receives vector yb = {y(b)i }ni=1
where y
(b)
i = fi + z
(b)
i with an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) se-
quence {z(b)i }ni=1 of zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variance σ2b (i.e.,
z
(b)
i ∼ N (0, σ2b )). Willie observes vector yw = {y(w)i }ni=1 where y(w)i = fi + z(w)i , with
an i.i.d. sequence {z(w)i }ni=1 of zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variance σ2w
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Figure 4.1: System framework: Alice and Bob share a secret before the transmission.
Alice encodes information into a vector of real symbols f = {fi}ni=1 and transmits it on
an AWGN channel to Bob, while Willie attempts to classify his vector of observations
of the channel from Alice yw as either an AWGN vector zw = {z(w)i }ni=1 or a vector
{fi + z(w)i }ni=1 of transmissions corrupted by AWGN.
(i.e., z
(w)
i ∼ N (0, σ2w)). Thus, when Alice does not transmit (i.e., the null hypothesis
H0 is true), samples are i.i.d. with y
(w)
i ∼ N (0, σ2w); and when Alice transmits (i.e.,
the alternate hypothesis H1 is true), samples y
(w)
i come from a different distribution.
4.2 Achievability
4.2.1 Information-theoretic analysis of classical hypothesis testing
Willie’s objective is to determine whether Alice transmits given the vector of
observations yw of his channel from Alice. For converse results, we demonstrate
existence of a detector that allows Willie to upper-bound P(w)e arbitrarily close to zero.
The necessary upper bounds are typically derived using probability concentration
inequalities such as Chebyshev’s and Chernoff’s. On the other hand, achievability
proofs require analyzing the performance of an arbitrary detector. Here we provide
the mathematical machinery for such analysis.
Denote the probability distribution of Willie’s channel observations when Alice
does not transmit (i.e. when H0 is true) as P0, and the probability distribution of
the observations when Alice transmits (i.e. when H1 is true) as P1. To strengthen
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the achievability results, we assume that Alice’s channel input distribution, as well
as the statistics of the AWGN on the channel between Alice and Willie, are known
to Willie. Then P0 and P1 are known to Willie, and he can construct an optimal
statistical hypothesis test (such as the Neyman–Pearson test) that minimizes the
detection error probability P(w)e [59, Ch. 13]. The following holds for such a test:
Lemma 4.1 (Theorem 13.1.1 in [59]). For the optimal test,
P(w)e =
1
2
− 1
2
V (P0,P1)
where V (P0,P1) is the variational distance between P0 and P1 defined as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Variational distance [59]). The variational distance (also known as
the total variation distance) between two probability measures P0 and P1 is
V (P0,P1) =
1
2
‖p0(x)− p1(x)‖1 (4.1)
where p0(x) and p1(x) are the density functions of P0 and P1, respectively, and ‖a−b‖1
is the L1 norm.
Proof of Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.1 includes Lemma 4.1 as a special case,
since Lemma A.1 is a generalization of Lemma 4.1 to unequal prior probabilities of
hypotheses H0 and H1.
Since variational distance lower-bounds the error of all hypothesis tests Willie can
use, a clever choice of f allows Alice to limit Willie’s detector performance. Unfor-
tunately, the variational distance is unwieldy for products of probability measures,
which are used in the analysis of the vectors of observations. We thus use Pinsker’s
inequality:
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Lemma 4.2 (Pinsker’s inequality (Lemma 11.6.1 in [19])).
V (P0,P1) ≤
√
1
2
D(P0‖P1)
where relative entropy D(P0‖P1) is defined as follows:
Definition 4.2. The relative entropy (also known as Kullback–Leibler divergence)
between two continuous probability measures P0 and P1 is:
D(P0‖P1) =
∫
X
p0(x) ln
p0(x)
p1(x)
dx, (4.2)
while if the probability measures P0 and P1 are discrete, the relative entropy is:
D(P0‖P1) =
∑
x∈X
p0(x) ln
p0(x)
p1(x)
, (4.3)
where X is the support of p1(x).
If Pn is the distribution of a sequence {Xi}ni=1 where each Xi ∼ P is i.i.d., then:
Lemma 4.3 (Relative entropy product). From the chain rule for relative entropy
[19, Eq. (2.67)]:
D(Pn0‖Pn1 ) = nD(P0‖P1)
Relative entropy is directly related to Neyman–Pearson hypothesis testing via
the Chernoff–Stein Lemma [19, Ch. 11.8]: for a given PFA < ν with 0 < ν <
1
2
, limν→0 limn→∞ 1n lnP
∗
MD = −D(P0‖P1) where P∗MD = minPMD. Thus, upper-
bounding the relative entropy limits the performance of the Neyman–Pearson hy-
pothesis test. Indeed, the steganography community often concludes their proofs by
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showing an upper bound on the relative entropy [12, 29]. However, we take the extra
step of lower-bounding P(w)e since it has a natural signal processing interpretation, as
described in Section 3.3. Next we show that this results in the square root limit on
the amount of information that can be covertly transmitted between Alice and Bob
when Bob and Willie both have AWGN channels from Alice.
4.2.2 Achievability of the square root law for covert communication over
AWGN channels
We use Taylor’s theorem with the Lagrange form of the remainder to upper-bound
the relative entropy, and here we restate it as a lemma.
Lemma 4.4 (Taylor’s theorem with the remainder). If f(x) is a function with n+ 1
continuous derivatives on the interval [u, v], then
f(v) =f(u) + f ′(u)(v − u) + . . .+ f
(n)(u)
n!
(v − u)n + f
(n+1)(ξ)
(n+ 1)!
(v − u)n+1,
where f (n)(x) denotes the nth derivative of f(x), and ξ satisfies u ≤ ξ ≤ v.
The proof is available in [56, Ch. V.3]. Note that if the remainder term is negative
on [u, v], then the sum of the zeroth through nth order terms yields an upper bound
on f(v).
We now state the achievability theorem under an average power constraint:
Theorem 4.2.1 (Achievability under an average power constraint). Suppose Willie’s
channel is subject to AWGN with average power σ2w > 0 and suppose that Alice and
Bob share a secret of sufficient length. Then Alice can maintain Willie’s detection
error probability P(w)e ≥ 12 −  for any  > 0 while reliably transmitting o(
√
n) bits to
Bob over n uses of an AWGN channel when σ2w is unknown and O(
√
n) bits over n
channel uses if she knows a lower bound σ2w ≥ σˆ2w for some σˆ2w > 0.
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Proof. Construction: Alice’s channel encoder takes as inputs blocks of lengthM bits
and encodes them into codewords of length n. We employ random coding arguments
and independently generate 2M codewords {c(Wk), k = 1, 2, . . . , 2M} from Rn for
messages {Wk}2Mk=1, each according to pX(x) =
∏n
i=1 pX(xi), where X ∼ N (0, Pf ) and
Pf is defined later. The codebook is used only to send a single message and is the
secret not revealed to Willie, though he knows how it is constructed, including the
value of Pf . The size of this secret is discussed following the proof of Theorem 4.2.2.
The channel between Alice and Willie is corrupted by AWGN with power σ2w.
Willie applies statistical hypothesis testing on a vector of n channel readings yw to
decide whether Alice transmits. Next we show how Alice can limit the performance
of Willie’s methods.
Analysis: Consider the case when Alice transmits codeword c(Wk). Suppose that
Willie employs a detector that implements an optimal hypothesis test on his n channel
readings. His null hypothesis H0 is that Alice does not transmit and that he observes
noise on his channel. His alternate hypothesis H1 is that Alice transmits and that he
observes Alice’s codeword corrupted by noise. By Fact 4.1, Willie’s detection error
probability is expressed by P(w)e = 12 − 12V (P0,P1), where the variational distance is
between the distribution P0 of n noise readings that Willie expects to observe under
his null hypothesis and the distribution P1 of the codeword transmitted by Alice
corrupted by noise. Alice can lower-bound P(w)e by upper-bounding the variational
distance: V (P0,P1) ≤ 2.
The realizations of noise z
(w)
i in vector zw are zero-mean i.i.d. Gaussian random
variables with variance σ2w, and, thus, P0 = Pnw where Pw = N (0, σ2w). Recall that
Willie does not know the codebook and that noise is independent of the transmitted
symbols. Therefore, when Alice transmits, Willie observes vector yw, where y
(w)
i ∼
N (0, Pf + σ2w) = Ps is i.i.d., and thus, P1 = Pns . By Facts 4.2 and 4.3:
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V (Pnw,Pns ) ≤
√
1
2
D(Pnw‖Pns ) =
√
n
2
D(Pw‖Ps).
In our case the relative entropy is:
D(Pw‖Ps) = 1
2
ln(1 + Pf
σ2w
)
−
(
1 +
(
Pf
σ2w
)−1)−1 .
Since the first three derivatives of D(Pw‖Ps) with respect to Pf are continuous, we
can apply Lemma 4.4. The zeroth and first order terms of the Taylor series expansion
with respect to Pf around Pf = 0 are zero. However, the second order term is:
P 2f
2!
× ∂
2D(Pw‖Ps)
∂P 2f
∣∣∣∣∣
Pf=0
=
P 2f
4σ4w
.
That relative entropy is locally quadratic is well-known; in fact ∂
2D(Pw‖Ps)
∂P 2f
∣∣∣
Pf=0
= 1
2σ4w
is the Fisher information that an observation of noise carries about its power [55,
Ch. 2.6]. Now, the remainder term is:
P 3f
3!
× ∂
3D(Pw‖Ps)
∂P 3f
∣∣∣∣∣
Pf=ξ
=
P 3f
3!
× ξ − 2σ
2
w
(ξ + σ2w)
4
,
where ξ satisfies 0 ≤ ξ ≤ Pf . Suppose Alice sets her average symbol power Pf ≤ cf(n)√n ,
where c = 4
√
2 and f(n) = O(1) is a function defined later. Since the remainder is
negative when Pf < 2σ
2
w, for n large enough, we can upper-bound relative entropy
with the second order term as follows:
V (Pnw,Pns ) ≤
Pf
2σ2w
√
n
2
≤ f(n)
σ2w
. (4.4)
In most practical scenarios Alice knows a lower bound σ2w ≥ σˆ2w and can set
f(n) = σˆ2w (a conservative lower bound is the thermal noise power of the best cur-
rently available receiver). If σ2w is unknown, Alice can set f(n) such that f(n) = o(1)
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and f(n) = ω(1/
√
n) (the latter condition is needed to bound Bob’s decoding er-
ror probability). In either case, Alice upper-bounds V (Pnw,Pns ) ≤ 2, limiting the
performance of Willie’s detector.
Next we examine the probability P(b)e of Bob’s decoding error averaged over all
possible codebooks. Since Alice’s symbol power Pf is a decreasing function of the
codeword length n, the standard channel coding results for constant power (and
constant rate) do not directly apply. Let Bob employ a maximum-likelihood (ML)
decoder (i.e. minimum distance decoder) to process the received vector yb when c(Wk)
was sent. The decoder suffers an error event Ei(c(Wk)) when yb is closer to another
codeword c(Wi), i 6= k. The decoding error probability, averaged over all codebooks,
is then:
P(b)e = Ec(Wk)
[
P
(
∪2Mi=1,i 6=kEi(c(Wk))
)]
≤ Ec(Wk)
 2M∑
i=1,i 6=k
P (Ei(c(Wk)))
 (4.5)
=
2M∑
i=1,i 6=k
Ec(Wk) [P (Ei(c(Wk)))] , (4.6)
where EX [·] denotes the expectation operator over random variable X and (4.5) fol-
lows from the union bound. Let d = c(Wk) − c(Wi). Then ‖d‖2 is the distance
between two codewords, where ‖ · ‖2 is the L2 norm. Since codewords are indepen-
dent and Gaussian, dj ∼ N (0, 2Pf ) for j = 1, 2, . . . , n and ‖d‖22 = 2PfU , where
U ∼ χ2n, with χ2n denoting the chi-squared distribution with n degrees of freedom.
Therefore, by [62, Eq. (3.44)]:
Ec(Wk) [P (Ei(c(Wk)))] = EU
[
Q
(√
PfU
2σ2b
)]
,
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
e−t
2/2dt. Since Q(x) ≤ 1
2
e−x
2/2 [17, Eq. (5)]:
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EU
[
Q
(√
PfU
2σ2b
)]
≤ EU
[
exp
(
−PfU
4σ2b
)]
=
∫ ∞
0
e
−Pfu
4σ2
b
−u
2 2−
n
2 u
n
2
−1
Γ(n/2)
du (4.7)
= 2−n/2
(
1
2
+
Pf
4σ2b
)−n/2
, (4.8)
where (4.8) follows from the substitution v = u
(
1
2
+
Pf
4σ2b
)
in (4.7) and the definition
of the Gamma function Γ(n) =
∫∞
0
xn−1e−xdx. Since 1
2
+
Pf
4σ2b
= 2
log2
(
1
2
+
Pf
4σ2
b
)
:
Ec(Wk) [P (Ei(c(Wk)))] ≤ 2
−n
2
log2
(
1+
Pf
2σ2
b
)
for all i, and (4.6) becomes:
P(b)e ≤ 2
M−n
2
log2
(
1+
Pf
2σ2
b
)
. (4.9)
Since Pf =
cf(n)√
n
with f(n) = ω(1/
√
n), if, for some constant γ < 1, Alice at-
tempts to transmit M = nγ
2
log2
(
1 + cf(n)
2
√
nσ2b
)
bits, as n increases, the probability of
Bob’s decoding error averaged over all codebooks decays exponentially to zero. Since
log2(1 + x) ≥ x when x ∈ [0, 1], M ≥
√
nγcf(n)
4σ2b
for large n. Thus, Bob receives o(
√
n)
bits in n channel uses, and O(√n) bits in n channel uses if f(n) = σˆ2w.
Unlike Shannon’s coding theorem for AWGN channels [19, Theorem 9.1.1, p. 268],
we cannot purge codewords from our codebook to lower the maximal decoding error
probability, as that would violate the i.i.d. condition for the codeword construction
that is needed to limit Willie’s detection ability in our proof. However, it is rea-
sonable that users in sensitive situations attempting to hide their communications
would prefer uniform rather than average decoding error performance, in essence de-
manding that the specific codebook they use be effective. In such a scenario, the
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construction of Theorem 4.2.2 can be used with the modification given by the remark
following its proof. This construction also satisfies both the peak and the average
power constraints, as demonstrated below.
Theorem 4.2.2 (Achievability under a peak power constraint). Suppose Alice’s
transmitter is subject to the peak power constraint b, 0 < b <∞, and Willie’s channel
is subject to AWGN with power σ2w > 0. Also suppose that Alice and Bob share a se-
cret of sufficient length. Then Alice can maintain Willie’s detection error probability
P(w)e ≥ 12 −  for any  > 0 while reliably transmitting o(
√
n) bits to Bob over n uses
of an AWGN channel when σ2w is unknown and O(
√
n) bits in n channel uses if she
knows a lower bound σ2w ≥ σˆ2w for some σˆ2w > 0.
To prove Theorem 4.2.2, we introduce a variant of the Leibniz integral rule as a
lemma:
Lemma 4.5 (Leibniz integral rule). Suppose that f(x, a) is defined for x ≥ x0 and
a ∈ [u, v], u < v, and satisfies the following properties:
1. f(x, a) is continuous on [u, v] for x ≥ x0;
2. ∂f(x,a)
∂a
is continuous on [u, v] for x ≥ x0;
3. There is a function g(x) such that |f(x, a)| ≤ g(x) and ∫∞
x0
g(x)dx <∞;
4. There is a function h(x) such that |∂f(x,a)
∂a
| ≤ h(x) and ∫∞
x0
h(x)dx <∞.
Then ∂
∂a
∫∞
x0
f(x, a)dx =
∫∞
x0
∂f(x,a)
∂a
dx.
The proof is available in [56, Ch. XIII.3]. We now prove Theorem 4.2.2.
Proof (Theorem 4.2.2). Construction: Alice encodes the input in blocks of length
M bits into codewords of length n with the symbols drawn from alphabet {−a, a},
where a satisfies the peak power constraint a2 < b and is defined later. We inde-
pendently generate 2M codewords {c(Wk), k = 1, 2, . . . , 2M} for messages {Wk} from
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{−a, a}n according to pX(x) =
∏n
i=1 pX(xi), where pX(−a) = pX(a) = 12 . As in the
proof of Theorem 4.2.1, this single-use codebook is not revealed to Willie, though he
knows how it is constructed, including the value of a. While the entire codebook is
secretly shared between Alice and Bob, in the remark following the proof we discuss
how to reduce the amount of shared secret information.
Analysis: When Alice transmits a symbol during the ith symbol period, she trans-
mits −a or a equiprobably by construction and Willie observes the symbol corrupted
by AWGN. Therefore, Ps = 12 (N (−a, σ2w) +N (a, σ2w)), and, with Pw = N (0, σ2w), we
have
D(Pw‖Ps) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
ln
e
− x2
2σ2w
1
2
(
e
− (x+a)2
2σ2w + e
− (x−a)2
2σ2w
)dx. (4.10)
Since (4.10) is an even function, we assume a ≥ 0.
While there is no closed-form expression for (4.10), its integrand is well-behaved,
allowing the application of Lemma 4.4 to (4.10). The Taylor series expansion with
respect to a around a = 0 can be performed using Lemma 4.5. We demonstrate that
the conditions for Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 hold in Appendix A.3. The zeroth through
third order terms of the Taylor series expansion of (4.10) are zero, as is the fifth term.
The fourth order term is:
a4
4!
× ∂
4D(Pw‖Ps)
∂a4
∣∣∣∣
a=0
=
a4
4σ4w
.
Suppose Alice sets a2 ≤ cf(n)√
n
, where c and f(n) are defined as in Theorem 4.2.1. The
sixth derivative of (4.10) with respect to a is:
∂6D(Pw‖Ps)
∂a6
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
8x6e
− x2
2σ2w
σ12w
√
2piσw
[
15 sech6
ax
σ2w
− 15 sech4 ax
σ2w
+ 2 sech2
ax
σ2w
]
dx,
(4.11)
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where sechx = 2
ex+e−x is the hyperbolic secant function. Evaluated at zero, the sixth
derivative is ∂
6D(Pw‖Ps)
∂a6
∣∣∣
a=0
= −240
σ6w
. Since (4.11) is continuous (see Appendix A.3),
there exists a neighborhood [0, µ] such that, for all ξ ∈ [0, µ], the remainder term
a6
6!
× ∂6D(Pw‖Ps)
∂a6
∣∣∣
a=ξ
≤ 0. Then, for n large enough, we can apply Lemma 4.4 to
upper-bound relative entropy with the fourth order term as follows:
V (Pnw,Pns ) ≤
a2
2σ2w
√
n
2
≤ 2f(n)
σ2w
. (4.12)
Since the power of Alice’s symbol is a2 = Pf , (4.12) is identical to (4.4) and
Alice obtains the upper bound V (Pnw,Pns ) ≤ 2, limiting the performance of Willie’s
detector.
Next let’s examine the probability P(b)e of Bob’s decoding error averaged over
all possible codebooks. As in Theorem 4.2.1, we cannot directly apply the stan-
dard constant-power channel coding results to our system where the symbol power
is a decreasing function of the codeword length. We upper-bound Bob’s decod-
ing error probability by analyzing a suboptimal decoding scheme. Suppose Bob
uses a hard-decision device on each received symbol y
(b)
i = fi + z
(b)
i via the rule
fˆi =
{
a if y
(b)
i ≥ 0;−a otherwise
}
, and applies an ML decoder on its output. The
effective channel for the encoder/decoder pair is a binary symmetric channel with
cross-over probability pe = Q(a/σb) and the probability of the decoding error aver-
aged over all possible codebooks is [32, Theorem 5.6.2]:
P(b)e ≤ eM−nE0(pe), (4.13)
where E0(pe) = ln(2)−2 ln
(√
1− pe +√pe
)
is the error exponent for a BSC from [32,
Theorem 5.6.2] with parameter ρ = 1. We expand the analysis in [63, Section I.2.1]
to characterize the rate R. We use Lemma 4.4 to upper-bound
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pe ≤ 1
2
− 1√
2pi
(
a
σb
− a
3
6σ3b
)
, p(UB)e ,
where p
(UB)
e denotes the sum of the zeroth through second terms of the Taylor series
expansion of Q(a/σb) around a = 0. The remainder term is non-positive for a/σb
satisfying 8a
6
σ6b
− 60a4
σ4b
+ 90a
2
σ2b
−15 ≤ 0, and, since a2 = cf(n)√
n
, the upper bound thus holds
for large enough n. Since E0(p) is a monotonically increasing function on the interval[
0, 1
2
]
, E0(pe) ≤ E0(p(UB)e ). The Taylor series expansion of E0(p(UB)e ) with respect
to a around a = 0 yields E0(p
(UB)
e ) = a
2
2piσ2b
+ O(a4). Substituting a2 = cf(n)√
n
, we
obtain P(b)e ≤ eM−
√
ncf(n)
2piσ2
b
+O(1)
. Since f(n) = ω(1/
√
n), if Alice attempts to transmit
M = γcf(n)
√
n
2piσ2b ln 2
bits with a constant γ < 1, the probability of Bob’s decoding error
averaged over all codebooks decays exponentially to zero as n increases and Bob
obtains M = o(
√
n) bits in n channel uses, and O(√n) bits in n channel uses if
f(n) = σˆ2w.
4.2.3 Remarks
4.2.3.1 Employing the best codebook
The proof of Theorem 4.2.2 guarantees Bob’s decoding error performance averaged
over all binary codebooks. Following the standard coding arguments [19, p. 204], there
must be at least one binary alphabet codebook that has at least average probability
of error. Thus, to guarantee uniform performance, Alice and Bob must select “good”
codebooks for communications. However, choosing specific codebooks would violate
the i.i.d. condition for the codeword construction that is needed to limit Willie’s
detection capability in our proof.
Consider a codebook that has at least average probability of error, but now assume
that it is public (i.e. known to Willie). Theorem 4.2.2 shows that Alice can use
it to transmit O(√n) bits to Bob in n channel uses with exponentially-decaying
probability of error. However, since the codebook is public, unless Alice and Bob
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take steps to protect their communication, Willie can use this codebook to detect
Alice’s transmissions by performing the same decoding as Bob. Here we demonstrate
that to use a public codebook it suffices for Alice and Bob to share a secret random
binary vector and note that this resembles the one-time pad scheme from traditional
cryptography [76], but employed here for a very different application.
Suppose that, prior to communication, Alice and Bob generate and share binary
vector k where pK(k) =
∏n
i=1 pK(ki) with pK(0) = pK(1) =
1
2
. Alice XORs k
and the binary representation of the codeword c(Wk), resulting in an equiprobable
transmission of −a and a when Alice transmits a symbol during the ith symbol period.
Provided k is never re-used and is kept secret from Willie, the i.i.d. assumption for
the vector yw in Theorem 4.2.2 holds without the need to exchange an entire secret
codebook between Alice and Bob. Bob decodes by XORing k with the output of the
hard-decision device prior to applying the ML decoder. While the square root law
implies that the shared O(n)-bit secret here is quadratic in the length M = O(√n)
of a message, we offer a coding scheme that, on average, requires an O(√n log n)-
bit secret in Appendix A.4. The development of covert communication with a shared
secret either linear or sublinear in the message size is a subject of the ongoing research.
4.2.3.2 Relationship with Square Root Law in Steganography
The covert communication problem is related to steganography. A comprehensive
review of steganography is available in a book by Fridrich [29]. In finite-alphabet
imperfect steganographic systems at most O(√n) symbols in the original cover-
text of length n may safely be modified to hide a steganographic message of length
O(√n log n) bits [29, Ch. 13] [48]. This result was extended to Markov covertext
[27] and was shown to either require a key linear in the size of the message [50] or
encryption of the message prior to embedding [51].
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The square root law in steganography has the same form as our square root law
because both laws follow from the property that relative entropy is locally quadratic
[55, Ch. 2.6]: D(P0‖P1) = δ22 J(θ) +O(δ3), where J(θ) =
∫
X
(
∂
∂θ
ln f(x; θ)
)2
f(x; θ)dx
is the Fisher information associated with parameter θ, and P0 and P1 are probability
measures with density functions from the same family over the support X , but with
parameters differing by δ: p0(x) = f(x; θ) and p1(x) = f(x; θ+δ). Fisher information
is thus used as a metric for steganographic security [26, 49].
In a typical steganography scenario with a passive warden, coding techniques
similar to Hamming codes allow embedding of log(n) bits per changed symbol [29,
Ch. 8], which make hiding O(√n log n) bits in n symbols possible. However, because
of the noise on the channel between Alice and Bob, and the resultant need for error
correction, no more than O(√n) bits can be transmitted both reliably and covertly
in n channel uses, as we prove in the following section.
4.3 Converse
Here, as in the proof of achievability, the channel between Alice and Bob is AWGN
with power σ2b . Alice desires to transmit one of 2
M (equally likely) M -bit messages
to Bob in n channel uses, where M = ω(
√
n), with arbitrarily small probability of
decoding error as n gets large, while limiting Willie’s ability to detect her transmission.
To this end, Alice encodes each message arbitrarily into n symbols.
Willie observes all n of Alice’s channel uses, but he is oblivious to her signal
properties and employs only a simple power detector. Nevertheless, we prove that,
even if Willie only has these limited capabilities, Alice cannot transmit a message
with ω(
√
n) bits of information in n channel uses without either being detected by
Willie or having Bob suffer a non-zero decoding error probability.
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Theorem 4.3.1. If over n channel uses, Alice attempts to transmit a message to
Bob that is ω(
√
n) bits long, then, as n → ∞, either Willie can detect her with high
probability, or Bob cannot decode with arbitrarily low probability of error.
Proof. Suppose Alice employs an arbitrary codebook {c(Wk), k = 1, 2, . . . , 2M}. De-
tection of Alice’s transmissions entails Willie deciding between the following hypothe-
ses:
H0 : y
(w)
i = z
(w)
i , i = 1, . . . , n
H1 : y
(w)
i = fi + z
(w)
i , i = 1, . . . , n
Suppose Willie uses a power detector to perform the hypothesis test as follows: first,
he collects a row vector of n independent readings yw from his channel to Alice. Then
he generates the test statistic S = ywy
T
w
n
where xT denotes the transpose of vector x,
and rejects or accepts the null hypothesis based on a comparison of S to a threshold
that we discuss later. We first show how Willie can bound the error probabilities PFA
and PMD of the power detector as a function of Alice’s signal parameters. Then we
show that if Alice’s codebook prevents Willie’s test from detecting her, Bob cannot
decode her transmissions without error.
If the null hypothesis H0 is true, Alice does not transmit and Willie observes
AWGN on his channel. Thus, y
(w)
i ∼ N (0, σ2w), and the mean and the variance of S
when H0 is true are:
E [S] = σ2w (4.14)
Var [S] =
2σ4w
n
(4.15)
Suppose Alice transmits codeword c(Wk) = {f (k)i }ni=1. Then Willie’s vector of
observations yw,k = {y(w,k)i }ni=1 contains readings of mean-shifted noise y(w,k)i ∼
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N (f (k)i , σ2w). The mean of each squared observation is E [y2i ] = σ2w +
(
f
(k)
i
)2
and
the variance is Var [y2i ] = E [y4i ]− (E [y2i ])2 = 4
(
f
(k)
i
)2
σ2w + 2σ
4
w. Denote the average
symbol power of codeword c(Wk) by Pk =
c(Wk)c
T (Wk)
n
. Then the mean and variance
of S when Alice transmits codeword c(Wk) are:
E [S] = σ2w + Pk (4.16)
Var [S] =
4Pkσ
2
w + 2σ
4
w
n
(4.17)
The variance of Willie’s test statistic (4.17) is computed by adding the variances
conditioned on c(Wk) of the squared individual observations Var [y
2
i ] (and dividing
by n2) since the noise on the individual observations is independent.
The probability distribution for the vector of Willie’s observations depends on
which hypothesis is true. Denote by P0 the distribution when H0 holds, and P(k)1 when
H1 holds with Alice transmitting message Wk. While P(k)1 is conditioned on Alice’s
codeword, we show that the average symbol power Pk =
c(Wk)c
T (Wk)
n
of codeword
c(Wk) determines its detectability by this detector, and that our result applies to all
codewords with power of the same order.
If H0 is true, then S should be close to (4.14). Willie picks a threshold t and
compares the value of S to σ2w+t. He accepts H0 if S < σ
2
w+t and rejects it otherwise.
Suppose that he desires false positive probability P∗FA, which is the probability that
S ≥ σ2w + t when H0 is true. We bound it using (4.14) and (4.15) with Chebyshev’s
Inequality [19, Eq. (3.32)]:
PFA = P0
(
S ≥ σ2w + t
)
≤ P0
(|S − σ2w| ≥ t)
≤ 2σ
4
w
nt2
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Thus, to obtain P∗FA, Willie sets t = d√n , where d =
√
2σ2w√
P∗FA
is a constant. As n
increases, t decreases, which is consistent with Willie gaining greater confidence with
more observations.
Suppose Alice transmits codeword c(Wk). Then the probability of a miss P(k)MD is
the probability that S < σ2w + t, where t =
d√
n
. We bound P(k)MD using (4.16) and
(4.17) with Chebyshev’s Inequality:
P(k)MD = P
(k)
1
(
S < σ2w + t
)
≤ P(k)1
(∣∣S − σ2w − Pk∣∣ ≥ Pk − t)
≤ 4Pkσ
2
w + 2σ
4
w
(
√
nPk − d)2 (4.18)
If the average symbol power Pk = ω(1/
√
n), limn→∞ P(k)MD = 0. Thus, with enough
observations, Willie can detect with arbitrarily low error probability Alice’s codewords
with the average symbol power Pk =
c(Wk)c
T (Wk)
n
= ω(1/
√
n). Note that Willie’s
detector is oblivious to any details of Alice’s codebook construction.
On the other hand, if the transmitted codeword has the average symbol power
PU = O(1/
√
n), then (4.18) does not upper-bound the probability of a missed de-
tection arbitrarily close to zero regardless of the number of observations. Thus, if
Alice desires to lower-bound Willie’s detection error probability by P(w)e ≥ ζ > 0,
her codebook must contain a positive fraction γ of such low-power codewords. Let’s
denote this subset of codewords with the average symbol power PU = O(1/
√
n) as
U and examine the probability of Bob’s decoding error P(b)e . The probability that a
message from set U is sent is P (U) = γ, as all messages are equiprobable. We bound
P(b)e = Pe (U)P (U) + Pe
(U)P (U) ≥ γPe (U), where U is the complement of U and
Pe (U) is the probability of decoding error when a message from U is sent:
Pe (U) = 1|U|
∑
W∈U
Pe (c(W ) sent) (4.19)
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where Pe (c(W ) sent) is the probability of error when codeword c(W ) is transmitted,
| · | denotes the set cardinality operator, and (4.19) holds because all messages are
equiprobable.
When Bob uses the optimal decoder, Pe (c(W ) sent) is the probability that Bob
decodes the received signal as Wˆ 6= W . This is the probability of a union of events
Ej, where Ej is the event that sent message W is decoded as some other message
Wj 6= W :
Pe (c(W ) sent) = P
(
∪2Mj=1,Wj 6=WEj
)
≥ P (∪Wj∈U\{W}Ej) , P(U)e (4.20)
Here the inequality in (4.20) is from the observation that the sets in the second union
are contained in the first. From the decoder perspective, this is because the decoding
error probability decreases when Bob knows that the message is from U (the set of
messages on which the decoder can err is reduced).
Our analysis of P(U)e uses Cover’s simplification of Fano’s inequality similar to the
proof of the converse to the coding theorem for Gaussian channels in [19, Ch. 9.2].
Since we are interested in P(U)e , we do not absorb it into n as done in (9.37) of [19].
Rather, we explicitly use:
H(W |Wˆ ) ≤ 1 + (log2 |U|)P(U)e (4.21)
where H(W |Wˆ ) denotes the entropy of message W conditioned on Bob’s decoding
Wˆ of W .
Noting that the size of the set U from which the messages are drawn is γ2M
and that, since each message is equiprobable, the entropy of a message W from U is
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H(W ) = log2 |U| = log2 γ +M , we utilize (4.21) and carry out steps (9.38)–(9.53) in
[19] to obtain:
P(U)e ≥ 1−
PU/2σ2b + 1/n
log2 γ
n
+ M
n
(4.22)
Since Alice transmits M = ω(
√
n) bits in n channel uses, M
n
= ω(1/
√
n). However,
PU = O(1/
√
n), and, as n→∞, P(U)e is bounded away from zero. Since γ > 0, P(b)e is
bounded away from zero if Alice tries to transmit ω(
√
n) bits reliably while beating
Willie’s simple power detector.
Goodput of Alice’s Communication
Define the goodput G(n) of Alice’s communication as the average number of bits
that Bob can receive from Alice over n channel uses with non-zero probability of a
message being undetected as n→∞. Since only U contains such messages, by (4.22),
the probability of her message being successfully decoded by Bob is P(U)s = 1−P(U)e =
O
(√
n
M
)
and the goodput is G(n) = γP(U)s M = O(√n). Thus, Alice cannot break the
square root law using an arbitrarily high transmission rate and retransmissions while
keeping the power below Willie’s detection threshold.
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CHAPTER 5
WARDEN’S IGNORANCE OF TRANSMISSION TIME
INCREASES COVERT THROUGHPUT
In the previous chapter we assume that Willie knows when Alice starts trans-
mitting (if she transmits). However, there are many practical scenarios where this
assumption can be relaxed and Alice’s time of communication is unknown to Willie.
Alice’s message may also be much shorter than the total time available to transmit
it (e.g., a few seconds out of the day when both Alice and Bob are available). Thus,
since Willie does not know when Alice transmits, he has to monitor a much longer
time period than the duration of Alice’s transmission. In this chapter we show how
Alice can leverage Willie’s ignorance of her transmission time to transmit significant
additional information to Bob.
slot 1
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
slot 2
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
· · · slot tA
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
· · · slot T (n)
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
︸ ︷︷ ︸
nT (n) total symbol periods


Slot used by Alice and Bob
Figure 5.1: Slotted channel: each of the T (n) slots contains n symbol periods. Alice
and Bob use slot tA to communicate (reprint of Figure 2.4).
In our scenario, Alice communicates with Bob over an additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel. Willie also has an AWGN channel from Alice. Unlike the
setting in Chapter 4, the channel is slotted, as described in Figure 5.1. Each of
T (n) slots contains n symbol periods, where T (n) is an increasing function of n. If
Alice used all nT (n) symbol periods for transmission, then, by the square root law
in Chapter 4, she could reliably transmit O(√nT (n)) covert bits to Bob. However,
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Alice uses only a single slot tA, which she keeps secret from Willie, who is thus forced
to monitor all T (n) slots. A na¨ıve application of the square root law from Chapter 4
allows Alice to reliably transmit O(√n) covert bits in this scenario. We demonstrate
that Alice can transmit O
(
min{√n log T (n), n}) bits reliably on this channel while
maintaining arbitrarily low probability of detection by Willie. Conversely, we show
that the transmission of ω(
√
n log T (n)) bits either results in Alice being detected
with high probability or unreliable communication.
The cost of covert communication on the AWGN channel is the secret that Alice
and Bob share before the transmission. Remarkably, we demonstrate that the multi-
plicative increase (by a factor of
√
log T (n)) in the number of covert bits that Alice
can transmit reliably to Bob comes without any increase in the size of the pre-shared
secret if T (n) < 2cTn, where cT is a constant; to realize the
√
log T (n) gain when
T (n) ≥ 2cTn only an additive expense of an extra log T (n) secret bits is needed to
indicate to Bob the slot employed by Alice. Timing is thus a very efficient resource
for covert communication. It also necessitates a vastly different analysis than that of
the power alone in Chapter 4. Specifically, the relative entropy based bounds on the
probability of detection error employed in Chapter 4 are too loose to yield our achiev-
ability results, and we therefore have to apply other techniques from mathematical
statistics.
The main result of this chapter is the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1. Suppose the channel between Alice and each of Bob and Willie ex-
periences independent additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with constant power
σ2b > 0 and σ
2
w > 0, respectively. Also suppose that, if Alice chooses to transmit, she
uses one of the T (n) slots chosen randomly. Each slot contains n symbol periods,
where T (n) = ω(1). Then, for any  > 0, there exists n0 such that, for all n ≥ n0, Al-
ice can reliably transmit O
(
min{√n log T (n), n}) bits to Bob in a selected slot while
maintaining a probability of detection error by Willie greater than 1
2
− . Conversely,
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if Alice tries to transmit ω(
√
n log T (n)) bits using n consecutive symbol periods, ei-
ther Willie detects with arbitrarily low probability of error or Bob cannot decode her
message with arbitrary low probability of decoding error.
After introducing our slotted channel model in Section 5.1, we prove the achiev-
ability and the converse in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. We conclude this chapter
by discussing its relationship to steganography in Section 5.4.
5.1 Channel Model
secret
? ?
Alice -
..., 0, f1, ..., fn︸ ︷︷ ︸, 0, ...
transmit in slot tA
r
? - Willie
decide: zw or not?
-z
(w)
i
z
(b)
i

6
- Bob
decode f1, . . . , fn
Figure 5.2: System framework: Alice and Bob share a secret before transmission.
If Alice chooses to transmit, she encodes information into a vector of real symbols
f = {fi}ni=1 and uses random slot tA to send it on an AWGN channel to Bob (to
ensure reliable decoding tA is secretly shared with Bob before the transmission if
T (n) ≥ 2cTn, where cT is a constant). Upon observing the channel from Alice, Willie
has to classify his vector of readings yw as either an AWGN vector zw = {z(w)i }nT (n)i=1
or an AWGN vector that contains a slot with transmissions corrupted by AWGN.
We use the discrete-time slotted AWGN channel model with real-valued symbols
depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The channel has T (n) slots, each containing n
symbol periods. Alice selects slot tA uniformly at random prior to transmission; it
is shared secretly with Bob before the transmission if T (n) ≥ 2cTn, where cT is a
constant that we determine later. If Alice chooses to transmit, she uses tA to send a
vector of n real-valued symbols f = {fi}ni=1. Bob receives a vector yb = {yb(t)}T (n)t=1
where yb(t) = [y
(b)
(t−1)n+1, . . . , y
(b)
tn ] is a vector of observations of slot t, y
(b)
(tA−1)n+i =
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fi + z
(b)
(tA−1)n+i and y
(b)
(t−1)n+i = z
(b)
(t−1)n+i for all t 6= tA, with an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence {z(b)i }nT (n)i=1 of zero-mean Gaussian random
variables with variance σ2b (i.e., z
(b)
i ∼ N (0, σ2b )). Similarly, Willie observes vector
yw = {yw(t)}T (n)t=1 where yw(t) = [y(w)(t−1)n+1, . . . , y(w)tn ] is a vector of observations of
slot t, y
(w)
(tA−1)n+i = fi + z
(w)
(tA−1)n+i and y
(w)
(t−1)n+i = z
(w)
(t−1)n+i for all t 6= tA, with an
i.i.d. sequence {z(w)i }nT (n)i=1 of zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variance σ2w
(i.e., z
(w)
i ∼ N (0, σ2w)). Willie does not know tA and has to examine the entire yw to
determine whether Alice is communicating.
5.2 Achievability
We first state the achievability theorem, then discuss the proof idea before pro-
ceeding with the proof.
Theorem 5.2.1 (Achievability). Suppose Alice has a slotted AWGN channel to Bob
with T (n) = ω(1) slots, each containing n symbol periods. Then, provided that Al-
ice and Bob have a secret of sufficient length, if Alice chooses to, she can trans-
mit O
(
min{√n log T (n), n}) bits in a single slot while limn→∞ P(w)e > 12 −  and
limn→∞ P(b)e ≤ δ for arbitrary  > 0 and δ > 0.
Proof idea. The techniques used to bound the performance of Willie’s optimal detector
in the proofs of Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 are ineffective here, as the resulting bounds
lack the necessary tightness. Therefore, we take a different approach by explicitly
deriving the test statistic for Willie’s optimal detector assuming that Alice’s channel
input distribution, as well as the distribution of the AWGN on the channel between
Alice and Willie, are known to Willie. Furthermore, it is assumed that Alice confines
her transmission (if she transmits) to one of the slots depicted in Figure 5.2 with
the slot boundaries known to Willie. Since Willie has to discriminate between two
simple hypotheses on Alice’s transmission state, the optimal detector, given by the
Neyman–Pearson lemma, employs the likelihood ratio test (LRT) [59, Ch. 3.2].
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Willie’s LRT statistic is a sum of T (n) independent random variables. Regardless
of Alice’s transmission state, T (n) − 1 terms of this sum are identically distributed
since they correspond to the slots that Alice does not select for potential transmission
(i.e., slots that are not tA). We show that these T (n) − 1 terms are i.i.d. zero-mean
unit-variance random variables, each weighted by 1√
T (n)−1 . Thus, by the central
limit theorem, asymptotically, their sum is a standard Gaussian random variable
Z ∼ N (0, 1). The distribution of the term that corresponds to slot tA depends on
Alice’s transmission state. This term effectively offsets Z’s mean away from zero,
however, we show that it converges to zero in probability under either hypothesis as
long as Alice uses per-symbol power Pf = O
(√
log T (n)√
n
)
. This allows us to lower-
bound P(w)e ≥ 12 −  for a sufficiently large n and prove the covertness of Alice’s
transmission. We conclude the proof by extending the analysis of Bob’s probability
of error from the proof of Theorem 4.2.1 to T (n) slots via a standard union bound.
Proof. (Theorem 5.2.1) Construction: Alice secretly selects slot tA uniformly at
random out of the T (n) slots in which to communicate. Alice’s channel encoder
takes as input blocks of length M bits and encodes them into codewords of length
n symbols. We employ random coding arguments and independently generate 2M
codewords {c(Wk), k = 1, 2, . . . , 2M} from Rn for messages {Wk}2Mk=1, each according
to pX(x) =
∏n
i=1 pX(xi), where X ∼ N (0, Pf ) and symbol power Pf < σ
2
w
2
is defined
later. The codebook is used only to send a single message and, along with tA, is the
secret not revealed to Willie, though he knows how it is constructed, including the
value Pf .
Another way of viewing the construction is as a choice of one of T (n) codebooks,
where the ith codebook has a block of non-zero symbols in the ith slot. Agreement on
the timing is equivalent to selection of the tA-th codebook and the message is encoded
by choosing a codeword from the selected codebook.
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Analysis (Willie): Willie is interested in performing the following hypothesis
test on his vector of observations yw:
H0 : Alice does not transmit
H1 : ∃ a slot tA ∈ {1, . . . , T (n)} in which Alice transmits
Let Yt =
∑
yi∈yw(t) y
2
i be the power in slot t. Since Willie’s channel from Alice is
corrupted by AWGN with power σ2w, the likelihood function of the observations yw
under H0 is:
f0(yw) =
(
1
2piσ2w
)nT (n)
2
exp
− 1
2σ2w
T (n)∑
t=1
Yt
 . (5.1)
Since Willie does not know which of the T (n) slots Alice and Bob randomly select for
communication, nor the codebook they use, but knows that Alice’s signal is Gaussian,
the likelihood function of the observations yw under H1 is:
f1(yw) =
1
A(n)(2pi)
nT (n)
2 T (n)
T (n)∑
t=1
e
− Yt
2(σ2w+Pf )
−B(t)
2σ2w , (5.2)
where A(n) = σ
(T (n)−1)n
w (σ2w + Pf )
n
2 and B(t) =
∑T (n)
r=1 r6= t
Yr.
Since the test is between two simple hypotheses on Alice’s transmission state,
the likelihood ratio test (LRT) is optimal under the Neyman–Pearson criterion [59,
Ch. 3.2]. Taking the ratio between (5.1) and (5.2), and re-arranging terms, we obtain:
Λ(yw) =
f1(yw)
f0(yw)
=
(
σ2w
σ2w + Pf
)n
2 1
T (n)
T (n)∑
t=1
e
PfYt
2σ2w(σ
2
w+Pf ) . (5.3)
The likelihood ratio Λ(yw) is compared to a threshold τ(n), which is a function of
the information known to Willie, and H0 or H1 is chosen based on whether Λ(yw) is
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smaller or larger than τ(n) (if it is equal, a random decision is made):
Λ(yw)
H0
≶
H1
τ(n) (5.4)
When Alice does not transmit in the ith symbol period, yi ∼ N (0, σ2w) since Willie
observes AWGN; when Alice transmits, yi ∼ N (0, σ2w + Pf ) by construction. Let
{Xt}, Xt ∼ χ2n, t = 1, . . . , T (n) be a sequence of i.i.d. chi-squared random variables
with n degrees of freedom. Then Yt = σ
2
wXt for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T (n)} under H0 and
t ∈ {1, . . . , T (n)} \ {tA} under H1. However, under H1, YtA = (σ2w + Pf )XtA .
Consider a random variable L(n) defined as follows:
L(n) =
M(n)T (n)Λ(yw)− (T (n)− 1)M(n)√
V (n)
(5.5)
where M(n) =
(
σ2w+Pf
σ2w
)n
2
and
V (n) = (T (n)− 1)
[(
σ2w + Pf
σ2w − Pf
)n
2
−
(
σ2w + Pf
σ2w
)n]
. (5.6)
This is just a deterministically re-normalized LRT statistic. Since n, T (n), σ2w, and Pf
are known to Willie, and M(n) and V (n) are deterministic functions, the hypothesis
test:
L(n) =
∑T (n)
t=1 e
PfYt
2σ2w(σ
2
w+Pf ) − (T (n)− 1)M(n)√
V (n)
H0
≶
H1
S(n) (5.7)
is equivalent to that in (5.4), with the threshold
S(n) =
M(n)T (n)τ(n)− (T (n)− 1)M(n)√
V (n)
. (5.8)
55
The performance of both tests is equal. The probability of error is thus
P(w)e =
P(L(n) > S(n)|H0 true) + P(L(n) ≤ S(n)|H1 true)
2
(5.9)
When H0 is true, we can write (5.7) as the normalized sum of T (n)−1 i.i.d. random
variables {Ut}T (n)−1t=1 and an independent random variable UT (n)√V (n) as follows:
L(n) =
1√
V (n)
T (n)−1∑
t=1
(Ut −M(n)) + UT (n)√
V (n)
, (5.10)
where UT (n) is identical to Ut that is defined as
Ut = exp
[
PfXt
2(σ2w + Pf )
]
. (5.11)
When H1 is true, we can write (5.7) as the normalized sum of T (n)−1 i.i.d. random
variables {Ut}T (n)t=1,t6=tA and an independent random variable
UtA√
V (n)
as follows:
L(n) =
1√
V (n)
T (n)∑
t=1,t 6=tA
(Ut −M(n)) + UtA√
V (n)
, (5.12)
where Ut in the sum is defined as in (5.11), and
UtA = exp
[
PfXtA
2σ2w
]
. (5.13)
We first show that the normalized sums in (5.10) and (5.12) contain i.i.d. zero-
mean unit-variance random variables, thus both converging in distribution to the
standard Gaussian distribution N (0, 1) by the central limit theorem (CLT). We then
show that, outside the sums,
UT (n)√
V (n)
P−→ 0 and UtA√
V (n)
P−→ 0, where Kn P−→ Q denotes
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convergence of random variable Kn to random variable Q in probability. This allows
us to lower bound Willie’s probability of error for all values of threshold S(n).
First let’s calculate the moments of Ut defined in (5.11). The expectation of Ut
is the moment generating function (MGF) Mχ2n(x) = (1 − 2x)−n/2 of a chi-squared
random variable evaluated at x =
Pf
2(σ2w+Pf )
:
E[Ut] = E
[
exp
(
PfXt
2(σ2w + Pf )
)]
=
(
σ2w + Pf
σ2w
)n
2
(5.14)
Thus, M(n) = E[Ut], and the terms inside the sum in (5.10) and (5.12) have zero
mean. The second moment of Ut is:
E[U2t ] = E
[
exp
(
PfXt
σ2w + Pf
)]
=
(
σ2w + Pf
σ2w − Pf
)n
2
(5.15)
Thus V (n) = (T (n)− 1) Var[Ut], and, by the Lindenberg CLT for a triangular array
[9, Th. 27.2], the normalized sums in both (5.10) and (5.12) converge in distribution
to N (0, 1).
The probability that the magnitude of
UT (n)√
V (n)
in (5.10) exceeds δ > 0 is upper-
bounded using the Chebyshev’s inequality:
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ UT (n)√V (n)
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
)
≤
(
δ
√
T (n)− 1−R(n)
)−2
(5.16)
where R(n) = E[Ut]√
Var[Ut]
=
[(
σ4w
σ4w−P 2f
)n
2 − 1
]− 1
2
. Since T (n) is increasing and Pf <
σ2w
2
,
UT (n)√
T (n)
P−→ 0 as n→∞.
To show that
UtA√
V (n)
in (5.12) also converges in probability to zero, we need the
first two moments of UtA defined in (5.13). We use the MGFMχ2n(x) = (1− 2x)−n/2
evaluated at x =
Pf
2σ2w
to compute the expectation:
E[UtA ] = E
[
exp
(
PfXtA
2σ2w
)]
=
(
σ2w
σ2w − Pf
)n
2
(5.17)
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The second moment of UtA is:
E[U2tA ] = E
[
exp
(
PfXtA
σ2w
)]
=
(
σ2w
σ2w − 2Pf
)n
2
(5.18)
The probability that the magnitude of the term
UtA√
V (n)
in (5.12) exceeds δ > 0 is
upper-bounded using Chebyshev’s inequality:
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ UtA√V (n)
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
)
≤ Var[UtA ](
δ
√
V (n)− E[UtA ]
)2 (5.19)
Dividing the numerator and denominator in the RHS of (5.19) by Var[UtA ], we note
that
E[UtA ]√
Var[UtA ]
=
((
1 +
P 2f
σ4w−2Pfσ2w
)n
2 − 1
)− 1
2
< C, with C a constant for Pf <
σ2w
2
.
Also, V (n)
Var[UtA ]
≥ V (n)E[U2tA ] and
V (n)
E[U2tA ]
≥ (T (n)− 1)
[(
1− 2P
2
f
σ4w
)n
2
−
(
1− 3P
2
f
σ4w
)n
2
]
. (5.20)
The dominant term inside the square brackets in (5.20) is
(
1− 2P
2
f
σ4w
)n
2
= e
n
2
log
(
1− 2P
2
f
σ4w
)
.
When T (n) = o(en), we demonstrate that
UtA√
V (n)
P−→ 0 by setting the symbol power
to Pf =
cP σ
2
w
√
log T (n)√
n
for a constant cP ∈ (0, 1) and using the Taylor series ex-
pansion of log(1 − x) at x = 0. When T (n) = Ω(en), convergence is obtained
with Pf =
cP σ
2
w
2
. Thus, effectively, the symbol power that guarantees convergence
is Pf = cPσ
2
w min
{√
log T (n)√
n
, 1
2
}
.
When
∣∣∣∣ UT (n)√V (n)
∣∣∣∣ < δ, the false alarm probability is lower-bounded as follows:
P(L(n) > S(n)|H0 is true) ≥ P (Eg(S(n), δ)) , (5.21)
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where Eg(S(n), δ) denotes the event that
1√
V (n)
∑T (n)−1
t=1 (Ut −M(n)) ≥ S(n) + δ.
Similarly, when
∣∣∣∣ UtA√V (n)
∣∣∣∣ < δ, the probability of missed detection is lower-bounded as
follows:
P(L(n) ≤ S(n)|H1 is true) ≥ P (El(S(n), δ)) , (5.22)
where El(S(n), δ) denotes the event that
1√
V (n)
∑T (n)
t=1,t6=tA (Ut −M(n)) ≤ S(n) − δ.
Denote by EC(S(n), δ) the event when either event Eg(S(n), δ) occurs when Alice is
quiet or event El(S(n), δ) occurs when Alice transmits. Since we assume equiprobable
priors,
P(EC(S(n), δ)) =
P (Eg(S(n), δ)) + P (El(S(n), δ))
2
. (5.23)
By the CLT for triangular arrays in [9, Th. 27.2], the normalized sums in the events
Eg(S(n), δ) and El(S(n), δ) converge in distribution to standard Gaussian random
variables. This result only provides pointwise convergence in the argument of the
distribution function, but S(n) is the nth value in an arbitrary sequence. Instead,
in Appendix A.5, we exploit the uniform convergence on any finite number of points
and the monotonicity of the distribution function to show that, for each normalized
sum, setting δ = 
√
2pi/9 yields n0 such that for all n ≥ n0 and any S(n),
P
(
EC
(
S(n),

√
2pi
9
))
≥ 1
2
− 
3
. (5.24)
By (5.16) and (5.19), there exists n1 such that for all n ≥ n1, P
(∣∣∣∣ UT (n)√V (n)
∣∣∣∣ > √2pi9 ) <

3
and P
(∣∣∣∣ UtA√V (n)
∣∣∣∣ > √2pi9 ) < 3 . The intersection of these events and the event
EC(S(n), 
√
2pi/9) yields an error event. By combining their probabilities using
DeMorgan’s Law and the union bound, we can lower-bound P(w)e ≥ 12 −  for all
n ≥ max{n0, n1}, concluding the analysis of Willie’s detector.
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Analysis (Bob): Let Bob employ the maximum likelihood (ML) decoder (i.e.,
minimum distance decoder). If Bob knows the value of tA, his probability of de-
coding error is given directly by (4.9). Since Pf = cPσ
2
w min{
√
log T (n)√
n
, 1
2
}, Alice can
covertly transmit M = nγ
2
log2
(
1 + cP σ
2
w
2σ2b
min
{√
log T (n)√
n
, 1
2
})
bits, where γ ∈ (0, 1) is
a constant, with Bob’s probability of decoding error (averaged over all the codebooks)
decaying to zero as n → ∞. Therefore, O(min{√n log T (n), n}) covert bits can be
transmitted reliably using slot tA.
However, knowledge of tA is unnecessary for Bob if T (n) < 2
cTn, where cT is a
constant. Let’s augment Alice and Bob’s Gaussian codebook with the origin c(0) =
{0, . . . , 0} (indicating “no transmission”) and have Bob attempt to decode each of the
T (n) slots. The squared distance between a codeword c(Wk) and c(0) is PfX while
the squared distance between any pair of codewords {c(Wk), c(Wi)} is 2PfX, where
X ∼ χ2n. Repeating the analysis that leads to (4.9) using the distance between c(Wk)
and c(0) instead of c(Wi) yields a slightly looser upper bound on the probability of
the decoding error in each slot. By the union bound over all T (n) slots, the overall
probability of error is:
P(b)e ≤ T (n)2
M−n
2
log2
(
1+
Pf
4σ2
b
)
(5.25)
If T (n) = o(en), then clearly Bob’s decoding error probability decays to zero if Alice
attempts to transmit M = nγ
2
log2
(
1 +
cP σ
2
w
√
log T (n)
4σ2b
√
n
)
bits in a randomly selected
n-symbol slot tA. If T (n) = Ω(e
n), then, Pf =
σ2w
2
, and T (n) < 2cTn where cT =
1−γ
2
log2
(
1 + σ
2
w
8σ2b
)
ensures that Bob’s decoding error probability decays to zero if
Alice attempts to transmit M = nγ
2
log2
(
1 + cP σ
2
w
8σ2b
)
bits in a randomly selected n-
symbol slot tA.
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5.3 Converse
Suppose Alice attempts to transmit one of 2M (equally likely) M -bit messages
reliably to Bob using a sequence of n consecutive symbol periods inside a sequence of
nT (n) symbol periods, where M = ω(
√
n log T (n)), while limiting Willie’s ability to
detect her transmission. She thus encodes each message arbitrarily into n symbols.
If Alice transmits, Willie’s nT (n) observations of his channel from Alice contain
Alice’s sequence of n consecutive channel uses, however, Willie is oblivious to the
location of the start of Alice’s transmission as well as other properties of her signal.
Nevertheless, we prove that, by dividing his sequence of nT (n) observations into a set
of T (n) non-overlapping subsequences, and employing a simple threshold detector on
the maximum subsequence power, Willie can detect Alice if she attempts to transmit
ω(
√
n log T (n)) bits reliably.
Theorem 5.3.1. If Alice attempts to transmit ω(
√
n log T (n)) bits using a sequence
of n consecutive symbol periods that are arbitrarily located inside a sequence of nT (n)
symbol periods, then, as n→∞, either Willie can detect her with high probability, or
Bob cannot decode with arbitrarily low probability of error.
Proof. Let Willie divide the sequence yw of nT (n) observations of his channel from
Alice into a set of T (n) non-overlapping subsequences {yw(t)}T (n)t=1 , with each yw(t)
containing n consecutive observations. Denote by Yt =
∑
yi∈yw(t) y
2
i the observed
power in each subsequence and Ymax = maxt∈{1,...,T (n)} Yt. For a threshold S, Willie
accuses Alice of transmitting if Ymax > S.
Suppose Alice does not transmit. Willie’s probability of false alarm is P(Ymax > S).
Let S = σ2w(n+
√
nδ). To find δ so that Willie’s detector has an arbitrary probability
of false alarm P∗FA as n → ∞, note that each Yt = σ2wXt where {Xt}, Xt ∼ χ2n,
t = 1, . . . , T (n) is a sequence of i.i.d. chi-squared random variables each with n degrees
of freedom. We have
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P(Ymax > S) = 1− P
(
Xmax ≤ S/σ2w
)
(5.26)
= 1− (1− P (X1 > n+√nδ))T (n) (5.27)
where Xmax = maxt∈{1,...,T}Xt. For the desired P∗FA,
1− (1− P∗FA)1/T (n) = P
(
X1 > n+
√
nδ
)
. (5.28)
Using a Chernoff bound for the tail of a chi-squared distribution [24, Lemma 2.2], we
obtain:
P
(
X1 > n+
√
nδ
) ≤ (1 + δ/√n)n/2 e−√nδ2 (5.29)
= e
n
2
log
(
1+ δ√
n
)
−
√
nδ
2 (5.30)
= e−δ
2/4+O(1/√n) (5.31)
with (5.31) is from the Taylor series expansion of log(1 +x) at x = 0. Discarding low
order terms and solving (5.31) for δ yields δ = 2
√− log (1− (1− P∗FA)1/T (n)). Taylor
series expansion of 1 − cx at x = 0 yields 1 − (1 − P∗FA)1/T (n) = 1T (n) log
(
1
1−P∗FA
)
+
O( 1
T 2(n)
). Thus, setting δ = c
√
log T (n) with some constant c > 0 yields the desired
probability of false alarm P∗FA.
Now suppose Alice uses an arbitrary codebook {c(Wk), k = 1, . . . , 2nR} and trans-
mits codeword c(Wk) using n consecutive symbol periods. Denote average symbol
power of c(Wk) by Pf =
‖c(Wk)‖2
n
. Since Alice uses n consecutive symbols, her trans-
mission overlaps at most two of Willie’s subsequences, which we denote tA and tB.
Denote by PA and PB the power from Alice’s transmission in subsequences tA and tB,
respectively, with PA+PB = nPf . Willie’s probability of missing Alice’s transmission
is
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P(k)MD = P(Ymax ≤ S) = P(YtA ≤ S)P(YtB ≤ S)
T (n)∏
t=1 t
/∈{tA,tB}
P(Yt ≤ S) (5.32)
where the factorization in (5.32) is because Alice’s codeword and the noise in other
subsequences are independent.
∏T (n)
t=1,t/∈{tA,tB} P(Yt ≤ S) ≤ 1 does not depend on
Alice’s codeword. However, since the codeword is an unknown deterministic signal
that is added to AWGN on Willie’s channel to Alice,
YtA
σ2w
∼ χ2n(PA) and YtBσ2w ∼ χ
2
n(PB)
are non-central chi-squared random variables with n degrees of freedom and respective
non-centrality parameters PA
σ2w
and PB
σ2w
. Without loss of generality, assume that PA ≥
PB. Thus, PA satisfies
nPf
2
≤ PA ≤ nPf and the expected value and variance of YtA
are bounded as follows [82, App. D.1]:
E [YtA ] ≥ σ2wn+
nPf
2
(5.33)
Var [YtA ] ≤ 2nσ4w + 4nσ2wPf (5.34)
Since P(YtB ≤ S) ≤ 1, Chebyshev’s inequality with (5.33) and (5.34) yields
P(k)MD ≤ P
(
|YtA − E[YtA ]| > E[YtA ]− σ2w(n− c
√
n log T (n))
)
≤ 2σ
4
w + 4σ
2
wPf(√
nPf
2
− cσ2w
√
log T (n)
)2 . (5.35)
If Pf = ω
(√
log T (n)
n
)
, as n → ∞, Willie’s average probability of error can be made
arbitrarily low.
The proof of the non-zero lower bound on Bob’s probability of decoding error
if Alice tries to transmit ω(
√
n log T (n)) bits using average symbol power Pf =
O
(√
log T (n)
n
)
follows from a similar proof in Chapter 4.3.
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5.4 Relationship with Steganography
Steganographic systems discussed in Section 2.1 hide information by altering the
properties of fixed-size, finite-alphabet covertext objects (e.g. images), and are subject
to a similar square root law as covert communication: O(√n) symbols in covertext of
size n may safely be modified to hide an O(√n log n)-bit message [51]. The similarity
between the square root laws in these disciplines is from the mathematics of statistical
hypothesis testing, as discussed in Section 4.2.3.2. However, in steganography, the
transmission to Bob is noiseless, which allows the extra log n factor.
Batch steganography uses multiple covertext objects to hide a message and is
subject to the steganographic square root law described above [48, 47]. The batch
steganography interpretation of covert communication using timing as described in
this work is equivalent to using only one of T (n) covertext objects of size n to embed
a message. Willie, who knows that one covertext object is used but not which one,
has to examine all of them. We are not aware of any work on this particular problem,
but it is likely that our result extends to it.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS OF COVERT OPTICAL COMMUNICATION
Optical signaling [11, 74] is particularly attractive for covert communication be-
cause of its narrow diffraction-limited beam spread in free space [30, 35] and the ease
of detecting fiber taps using time-domain reflectometry [2]. Our information-theoretic
analysis of covert communication on the AWGN channel in Chapter 4 also applies
to a lossy optical channel with additive Gaussian noise when Alice uses a laser-light
transmitter and both Bob and Willie use coherent-detection receivers. However, mod-
ern high-sensitivity optical communication components are primarily limited by noise
of quantum-mechanical origin. Thus, recent studies on the performance of physical
optical communication have focused on this quantum-limited regime [33, 89, 87]. We
provide the background material on quantum information theory and quantum optics
in Appendix B.
In this chapter we establish the quantum limits of covert communication. We
begin by introducing our optical channel model in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2 we
demonstrate that covert communication is impossible over a pure-loss channel. How-
ever, in Section 6.3 we show that, when the channel has any excess noise (e.g., the
unavoidable thermal noise from the blackbody radiation at the operating tempera-
ture), Alice can reliably transmit O(√n) covert bits to Bob using n optical modes1
1This chapter and Chapter 7 address optical communication where we treat one spatio-temporal-
polarization mode of the optical-frequency electromagnetic field as the fundamental transmission
unit over the channel, which can be likened to “channel use” of the previous chapters. A mode is
a spatio-temporal electromagnetic field pattern of a given polarization, which can act as a unit of
communication over an optical channel. A mode can be excited in a coherent state—the quantum
description of ideal laser light—of a given amplitude and phase, as is done in standard classical
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even if Willie intercepts all the photons not reaching Bob and employs arbitrary
quantum memory and measurements. This is achievable using standard laser-light
modulation and homodyne detection (thus the Alice-Bob channel is still an AWGN
channel). Thus, noise enables stealth. Indeed, we demonstrate in Section 6.4 that
if Willie’s detector contributes excess noise (e.g., dark counts in photon-counting de-
tectors), Alice can covertly communicate to Bob, even when the channel itself is
pure-loss. We conclude this chapter by showing that the square-root limit cannot be
circumvented in Section 6.5.
6.1 Channel model
Consider a single-mode quasi-monochromatic lossy optical channel E n¯Tηb of trans-
missivity ηb ∈ (0, 1] and thermal noise mean photon number per mode n¯T ≥ 0, as
depicted in Figure 6.1. Willie collects the entire ηw = 1 − ηb fraction of Alice’s pho-
tons that do not reach Bob but otherwise remains passive, not injecting any light into
the channel. Later we argue that being active does not help Willie to detect Alice’s
transmissions. For a pure loss channel (n¯T = 0), the environment input is in the
vacuum state ρˆE0 = |0〉〈0|E, corresponding to the minimum noise the channel must
inject to preserve the Heisenberg inequality of quantum mechanics.
6.2 Pure loss insufficient for covert communication
Regardless of Alice’s strategy, reliable and covert communication over a pure-loss
channel to Bob is impossible, as Willie can effectively use an ideal single photon de-
tector (SPD) on each mode to discriminate between an n-mode vacuum state and any
optical communication. On other hand, quantum optics allows for a mode to be excited in other,
non-classical states of light such as a squeezed state or a Fock state. For example, each temporal
mode of a single (spatial) mode optical fiber can carry one of the two coherent-state pulses of the
binary phase shift keying (BPSK) modulation format. We provide a more formal description of
optical modes in Appendix B.4.
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Figure 6.1: Optical channel model. The input-output relationship is captured by a
beamsplitter of transmissivity ηb, with the transmitter Alice at one of the input ports
and the intended receiver Bob at one of the output ports, and ηb being the fraction
of Alice’s signaling photons that reach Bob. The other input and output ports of the
beamsplitter correspond to the environment and the adversary Willie. Willie collects
the entire ηw = 1− ηb fraction of Alice’s photons that do not reach Bob. This models
single-spatial-mode free-space and single-mode fiber optical channels. Alice and Bob
share a secret before the transmission.
non-vacuum state in Alice’s codebook. Willie avoids false alarms since no photons
impinge on his SPD when Alice is silent. However, a single click—detection of one
or more photons—gives away Alice’s transmission attempt regardless of the actual
quantum state of Alice’s signaling photons. Alice is thus constrained to codewords
that are nearly indistinguishable from vacuum, rendering unreliable any communica-
tion attempt that is designed to be covert. Furthermore, any communication attempt
that is designed to be reliable cannot remain covert, as Willie detects it with high
probability for large n. This is true even when Alice and Bob have access to an
infinitely-large pre-shared secret. The following theorem formally states this result.
Theorem 6.2.1. (Insufficiency of pure-loss for covert communication) Suppose Willie
has a pure-loss channel from Alice and is limited only by the laws of physics in his
receiver measurement choice. Then Alice cannot communicate to Bob reliably and
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covertly even if Alice and Bob have access to a pre-shared secret of unbounded size,
an unattenuated observation of the transmission, and a quantum-optimal receiver.
In the proof of this theorem we denote a tensor product of n Fock (or photon
number) states by |u〉 ≡ |u1〉 ⊗ |u2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |un〉, where vector u ∈ Nn0 with N0 being
the set of non-negative integers. Specifically, |0〉 ≡ |0〉⊗n. Before proceeding with the
proof, we state the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1. Given the input of n-mode vacuum state |0〉En on the “environment”
port and an n-mode entangled state |ψ〉An = ∑k ak |k〉An on the “Alice” port of a
beamsplitter with transmissivity ηb = 1−ηw, the diagonal elements of the output state
ρW
n
on the “Willie” port can be expressed in the n-fold Fock state basis as follows:
Wn〈s| ρˆWn |s〉Wn =
∑
k∈Nn0
|ak|2
n∏
i=1
(
ki
si
)
(1− ηw)ki−siηsiw . (6.1)
Proof. See Appendix C.1
Proof. (Theorem 6.2.1) Alice sends one of 2M (equally likely) M -bit messages by
choosing an element from an arbitrary codebook {ρˆAnx , x = 1, . . . , 2M}, where a state
ρˆA
n
x = |ψx〉A
nAn〈ψx| encodes an M -bit message Wx. |ψx〉A
n
=
∑
k∈Nn0 ak(x) |k〉
An is a
general n-mode pure state, where |k〉 ≡ |k1〉 ⊗ |k2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |kn〉 is a tensor product of
n Fock states. We limit our analysis to pure input states since, by convexity, using
mixed states as inputs can only degrade the performance (since that is equivalent
to transmitting a randomly chosen pure state from an ensemble and discarding the
knowledge of that choice).
Let Willie use an ideal SPD on all n modes, given by positive operator-valued mea-
sure (POVM)
{
|0〉 〈0| ,∑∞j=1 |j〉 〈j|}⊗n. When Wu is transmitted, Willie’s hypothesis
test reduces to discriminating between the states
68
ρˆW
n
0 = |0〉W
nWn〈0| and (6.2)
ρˆW
n
1 = ρˆ
Wn
u , (6.3)
where ρˆW
n
u is the output state of a pure-loss channel with transmissivity ηw corre-
sponding to an input state ρˆA
n
u . Thus, Willie’s average error probability is:
P(w)e =
1
2M+1
2M∑
u=1
Wn〈0| ρˆWnu |0〉W
n
, (6.4)
since messages are sent equiprobably. Note that the error is entirely because of missed
codeword detections, as Willie’s receiver never raises a false alarm. By Lemma 6.1,
Wn〈0| ρˆWu |0〉W
n
=
∑
k∈Nn0
|ak(u)|2 (1− ηw)
∑n
i=1 ki
≤ |a0(u)|2 + (1− |a0(u)|2)(1− ηw)
= 1− ηw
(
1− |a0(u)|2
)
. (6.5)
Substituting equation (6.5) into equation (6.4) yields
P(w)e ≤
1
2
− ηw
2
1− 1
2M
2M∑
u=1
|a0(u)|2
 .
Thus, to ensure P(w)e ≥ 12 − , Alice must use a codebook with the probability of
transmitting zero photons:
1
2M
2M∑
u=1
|a0(u)|2 ≥ 1− 2
ηw
. (6.6)
Equation (6.6) can be restated as an upper bound on the probability of transmitting
one or more photons:
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12M
2M∑
u=1
(
1− |a0(u)|2
) ≤ 2
ηw
. (6.7)
Now we show that there exists an interval (0, 0], 0 > 0 such that if  ∈ (0, 0],
Bob’s average decoding error probability P(b)e ≥ δ0 where δ0 > 0, thus making covert
communication over a pure-loss channel unreliable.
Denote by Eu→v the event that the transmitted message Wu is decoded by Bob
as Wv 6= Wu. Given that Wu is transmitted, the decoding error probability is the
probability of the union of events ∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v. Let Bob choose a POVM {Λˆ∗j} that
minimizes the average probability of error over n optical channel modes:
P(b)e = inf{Λˆj}
1
2M
2M∑
u=1
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v
)
. (6.8)
Now consider a codebook that meets the necessary condition for covert communica-
tion given in equation (6.7). Define the subset of this codebook
{
ρˆA
n
u , u ∈ A
}
where
A =
{
u : 1− |a0(u)|2 ≤ 4ηw
}
. We lower-bound (6.8) as follows:
P(b)e =
1
2M
∑
u∈A¯
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v
)
+
1
2M
∑
u∈A
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v
)
(6.9)
≥ 1
2M
∑
u∈A
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v
)
, (6.10)
where the probabilities in equation (6.9) are with respect to the POVM {Λˆ∗j} that
minimizes equation (6.8) over the entire codebook. Without loss of generality, let’s
assume that |A| is even, and split A into two equal-sized non-overlapping subsets
A(left) and A(right) (formally, A(left) ∪ A(right) = A, A(left) ∩ A(right) = ∅, and |A(left)| =
|A(right)|). Let g : A(left) → A(right) be a bijection. We can thus re-write (6.10):
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P(b)e ≥
1
2M
∑
u∈A(left)
2
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v
)
2
+
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=g(u)Eg(u)→v
)
2

≥ 1
2M
∑
u∈A(left)
2
(
P
(
Eu→g(u)
)
2
+
P
(
Eg(u)→u
)
2
)
, (6.11)
where the second lower bound is because the events Eu→g(u) and Eg(u)→u are contained
in the unions ∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v and ∪2Mv=0,v 6=g(u)Eg(u)→v, respectively. The summation term
in equation (6.11),
Pe(u) ≡
P
(
Eu→g(u)
)
2
+
P
(
Eg(u)→u
)
2
, (6.12)
is Bob’s average probability of error when Alice only sends messages Wu and Wg(u)
equiprobably. We thus reduce the analytically intractable problem of discriminating
between many states in equation (6.8) to a quantum binary hypothesis test.
The lower bound on the probability of error in discriminating two received code-
words is obtained by lower-bounding the probability of error in discriminating two
codewords before they are sent (this is equivalent to Bob having an unattenuated
unity-transmissivity channel from Alice). Recalling that ρˆA
n
u = |ψu〉A
nAn〈ψu| and
ρˆA
n
g(u) =
∣∣ψg(u)〉AnAn〈ψg(u)∣∣ are pure states, the lower bound on the probability of er-
ror in discriminating between
∣∣ψAnu 〉 and ∣∣∣ψAng(u)〉 is [41, Chapter IV.2 (c), Equation
(2.34)]:
Pe(u) ≥
[
1−
√
1− F
(
|ψu〉An ,
∣∣ψg(u)〉An)]/2 , (6.13)
where F (|ψ〉 , |φ〉) = | 〈ψ|φ〉 |2 is the fidelity between the pure states |ψ〉 and |φ〉.
Lower-bounding F
(
|ψu〉A
n
,
∣∣ψg(u)〉An) lower-bounds the RHS of equation (6.13). For
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pure states |ψ〉 and |φ〉, F (|ψ〉 , |φ〉) = 1 − (1
2
‖ |ψ〉 〈ψ| − |φ〉 〈φ| ‖1
)2
, where ‖ρ − σ‖1
is the trace distance [88, Equation (9.134)]. Thus,
F
(
|ψu〉A
n
,
∣∣ψg(u)〉An) = 1− (1
2
‖ρˆAnu − ρˆA
n
g(u)‖1
)2
≥ 1−
(
‖ρˆAnu − |0〉A
nAn〈0| ‖1
2
+
‖ρˆAng(u) − |0〉A
nAn〈0| ‖1
2
)2
= 1−
(√
1−
∣∣∣An〈0|ψu〉An∣∣∣2 +√1− ∣∣∣An〈0|ψg(u)〉An∣∣∣2)2 ,
(6.14)
where the inequality is from the triangle inequality for trace distance. Substituting
(6.14) into (6.13) yields
Pe(u) ≥
[
1−
√
1−
∣∣∣An〈0|ψu〉An∣∣∣2 −√1− ∣∣∣An〈0|ψg(u)〉An∣∣∣2]/2 . (6.15)
Since
∣∣∣An〈0|ψu〉An∣∣∣2 = |a0(u)|2 and, by the construction of A, 1 − |a0(u)|2 ≤ 4ηw and
1− |a0(g(u))|2 ≤ 4ηw , we have
Pe(u) ≥ 1
2
− 2
√

ηw
. (6.16)
Recalling the definition of Pe(u) in equation (6.12), we substitute (6.16) into (6.11)
to obtain
P(b)e ≥
|A|
2M
(
1
2
− 2
√

ηw
)
, (6.17)
Now, re-stating the condition for covert communication (6.7) yields
2
ηw
≥ 1
2M
∑
u∈A
(
1− |a0(u)|2
)
≥
(
2M − |A|)
2M
4
ηw
(6.18)
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with equality (6.18) because 1−|a0(u)|2 > 4ηw for all codewords in A by the construc-
tion of A. Solving inequality in (6.18) for |A|
2M
yields the lower bound on the fraction
of the codewords in A,
|A|
2M
≥ 1
2
. (6.19)
Combining equations (6.17) and (6.19) results in a positive lower bound on Bob’s
probability of decoding error P(b)e ≥ 14 −
√

ηw
for  ∈ (0, ηw
16
]
and any n, and demon-
strates that reliable covert communication over a pure-loss channel is impossible.
Thus, if Willie controlled the environment (as assumed in QKD proofs), by setting
it to vacuum, he could deny covert communication between Alice and Bob. However,
a positive amount of non-adversarial excess noise—whether from the thermal back-
ground or the detector itself—is unavoidable, which enables covert communication.
6.3 Channel noise yields the square root law
Now consider a lossy bosonic channel E n¯Tηb , where the environment mode is in
a thermal state with mean photon number n¯T > 0. A thermal state ρˆ
E
n¯T
is rep-
resented by a mixture of coherent states |α〉—quantum descriptors of ideal laser-
light—weighted by a Gaussian distribution over the field amplitude α ∈ C:
ρˆEn¯T =
1
pin¯T
∫
C
e−|α|
2/n¯T |α〉〈α|Ed2α.
This thermal noise masks Alice’s transmission attempt, enabling covert communica-
tion even when Willie has arbitrary resources, such as any quantum-limited measure-
ment on the isometric extension of the Alice-to-Bob quantum channel (i.e., access
to all signaling photons not captured by Bob). The following theorem demonstrates
that in this scenario Alice can use mean photon number per mode n¯ = O(1/√n) to
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reliably transmit O(√n) covert bits using n optical modes to Bob, who needs only a
conventional homodyne-detection receiver:
Theorem 6.3.1. (Square root law for the thermal noise channel) Suppose Willie
has access to an arbitrarily complex receiver measurement as permitted by the laws of
quantum physics and can capture all the photons transmitted by Alice that do not reach
Bob. Let Willie’s channel from Alice be subject to noise from a thermal environment
that injects n¯T > 0 photons per optical mode on average, and let Alice and Bob share a
secret of sufficient length before communicating. Then Alice can lower-bound Willie’s
detection error probability P(w)e ≥ 12 −  for any  > 0 while reliably transmitting
O(√n) bits to Bob in n optical modes even if Bob only has access to a (sub-optimal)
coherent detection receiver, such as an optical homodyne detector.
First, we define quantum relative entropy.
Definition 6.1. Quantum relative entropy between states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 is D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1) ≡
Tr{ρˆ0(ln ρˆ0 − ln ρˆ1)}.
The following lemma provides the expression for the quantum relative entropy
between two thermal states.
Lemma 6.2. If ρˆ0 =
∑∞
n=0
n¯n0
(1+n¯0)1+n
|n〉 〈n| and ρˆ1 =
∑∞
n=0
n¯n1
(1+n¯1)1+n
|n〉 〈n|, then
D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1) = n¯0 ln n¯0(1+n¯1)n¯1(1+n¯0) + ln 1+n¯11+n¯0
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Proof. (Theorem 6.3.1) Construction: Let Alice use a zero-mean isotropic Gaussian-
distributed coherent state input {p(α), |α〉}, where α ∈ C, p(α) = e−|α|2/n¯/pin¯ with
mean photon number per symbol n¯ =
∫
C |α|2p(α)d2α. Alice encodes M -bit blocks of
input into codewords of length n symbols by generating 2M codewords {⊗ni=1 |αi〉k}2Mk=1,
each according to p(
⊗n
i=1 |αi〉) =
∏n
i=1 p(αi), where
⊗n
i=1 |αi〉 = |α1 . . . αn〉 is an n-
mode tensor-product coherent state. The codebook is used only once to send a single
message and is kept secret from Willie, though he knows how it is constructed.
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Analysis (Willie): Since Willie does not have access to Alice’s codebook, Willie
has to discriminate between the following n-copy quantum states:
ρˆ⊗n0 =
( ∞∑
i=0
(ηbn¯T )
i
(1 + ηbn¯T )1+i
|i〉 〈i|
)⊗n
,
and
ρˆ⊗n1 =
( ∞∑
i=0
(ηwn¯+ ηbn¯T )
i
(1 + ηwn¯+ η(n)n¯T )1+i
|i〉 〈i|
)⊗n
.
Assuming equal prior probabilities, by Lemma B.2, Willie’s average probability of
error in discriminating between ρˆ⊗n0 and ρˆ
⊗n
1 is:
P(w)e ≥
1
2
[
1− 1
2
‖ρˆ⊗n1 − ρˆ⊗n0 ‖1
]
,
where the minimum in this case is attained by a PNR detection. The trace distance
‖ρˆ0−ρˆ1‖1 between states ρˆ1 and ρˆ1 (see Appendix B.2) is upper-bounded the quantum
relative entropy (QRE) using quantum Pinsker’s Inequality [88, Theorem 11.9.2] as
follows:
‖ρˆ0 − ρˆ1‖1 ≤
√
2D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1),
Thus,
P(w)e ≥
1
2
−
√
1
8
D(ρˆ⊗n0 ‖ρˆ⊗n1 ). (6.20)
QRE is additive for tensor product states:
D(ρˆ⊗n0 ‖ρˆ⊗n1 ) = nD(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1). (6.21)
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By Lemma 6.2,
D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1) = ηbn¯T ln (1 + ηwn¯+ ηbn¯T )ηbn¯T
(ηwn¯+ ηbn¯T )(1 + ηbn¯T )
+ ln
1 + ηwn¯+ ηbn¯T
1 + ηbn¯T
. (6.22)
The first two terms of the Taylor series expansion of the RHS of (6.22) with respect
to n¯ at n¯ = 0 are zero and the fourth term is negative. Thus, using Taylor’s Theorem
with the remainder, we can upper-bound equation (6.22) by the third term as follows:
D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1) ≤ η
2
wn¯
2
2ηbn¯T (1 + ηbn¯T )
. (6.23)
Combining equations (6.20), (6.21), and (6.23) yields
P(w)e ≥
1
2
− ηwn¯
√
n
4
√
ηbn¯T (1 + ηbn¯T )
(6.24)
Therefore, setting
n¯ =
4
√
ηbn¯T (1 + ηbn¯T )√
nηw
(6.25)
ensures that Willie’s error probability is lower-bounded by P(w)e ≥ 12−  over n optical
modes.
Analysis (Bob): Suppose Bob uses a coherent detection receiver. A homodyne
receiver, which is more efficient than a heterodyne receiver in the low photon number
regime [33], induces an AWGN channel with noise power σ2b =
2(1−ηb)n¯T+1
4ηb
. Since
Alice uses Gaussian modulation with symbol power n¯ defined in equation (6.25), we
can upper-bound P(b)e by equation (4.9):
P(b)e ≤ 2M−
n
2
log2(1+n¯/2σ2b). (6.26)
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Substitution of n¯ from (6.25) into (6.26) shows that O(√n) bits can be covertly
transmitted from Alice to Bob with P(b)e < δ for arbitrary δ > 0 given large enough
n.
6.4 Detector noise also enables covert communication
While any n¯T > 0 enables covert communication, the number of covertly-transmitted
bits decreases with n¯T . Blackbody radiation is negligible at optical frequencies (e.g.,
a typical daytime value of n¯T ≈ 10−6 photons per mode at the optical telecom wave-
length of 1.55µm [53]). However, other sources of excess noise can also hide the
transmissions (e.g. detector dark counts and Johnson noise).
To illustrate the information-hiding capabilities of these noise sources, we consider
the (hypothetical) pure-loss channel. Willie’s task reduces to that of discriminating
between the states corresponding to n-mode vacuum state and the output state ρˆW
n
u
of a pure-loss channel with transmissivity ηw corresponding to an input state ρˆ
An
u ,
i.e., the states given by equations (6.2) and (6.3) in the proof of Theorem 6.2.1. The
minimum probability of discrimination error satisfies [70, Section III]:
1−
√
1− Wn〈0| ρˆWnu |0〉W
n
2
≤ minP(w)e ≤
1
2
Wn〈0| ρˆWnu |0〉W
n
.
Since
Wn〈0|ρˆWnu |0〉W
n
4
≤ 1−
√
1−Wn〈0|ρˆWnu |0〉W
n
2
, the error probability for the SPD is at
most twice that of an optimal detector. Thus, the SPD is an asymptotically optimal
detector when the channel from Alice is pure-loss. Since the photon number resolving
(PNR) receiver, given by the POVM elements {|0〉 〈0| , |1〉 〈1| , |2〉 〈2| , . . .}⊗n, could be
used to mimic the SPD with the detection event threshold set at one photon, the PNR
receiver is also asymptotically optimal in this scenario.
Thus, we consider a pure-loss channel where Willie is equipped with a PNR de-
tector. However, any practical implementation of a PNR receiver has a non-zero dark
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current, with the noise from the resulting dark counts enabling covert communication
even over a pure-loss channel. We model the dark counts per mode in Willie’s PNR
detector as a Poisson process with average number of dark counts per mode λw.
We note that, since his receiver is fixed, lower-bounding Willie’s probability of
detection error is a classical problem, and we, therefore, can apply Lemmas 4.1 and
4.2. The following theorem demonstrates that, using an on-off keying (OOK) co-
herent state modulation where Alice transmits the on symbol |α〉 with probability
q = O(1/√n) and the off symbol |0〉 with probability 1− q, Alice can reliably trans-
mit O(√n) covert bits using n OOK symbols:
Theorem 6.4.1. (Dark counts yield square root law) Suppose that Willie has a
pure-loss channel from Alice, captures all photons transmitted by Alice that do not
reach Bob, but is limited to a receiver with a non-zero dark current. Let Alice and
Bob share a secret of sufficient length before communicating. Then Alice can lower-
bound Willie’s detection error probability P(w)e ≥ 12 −  for any  > 0 while reliably
transmitting O(√n) bits to Bob in n optical modes.
Proof. Construction: Let Alice use a coherent state on-off keying (OOK) modulation
{pii, |ψi〉〈ψi|}, i = 1, 2, where pi1 = 1 − q, pi2 = q, |ψ1〉 = |0〉, |ψ2〉 = |α〉. Alice and
Bob generate a random codebook with each codeword symbol chosen i.i.d. from the
above binary OOK constellation.
Analysis (Willie): Willie records vector yw = [y1, . . . , yn], where yi is the number
of photons observed in the ith mode. Denote by P0 the distribution of yw when Alice
does not transmit and by P1 the distribution when she transmits. When Alice does not
transmit, Willie’s receiver observes a Poisson dark count process with rate λw photons
per mode. Thus, {yi} is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence of
Poisson random variables with rate λw, and P0 = Pnw where Pw = Poisson(λw). When
Alice transmits, although Willie captures all of her transmitted energy that does
not reach Bob, he does not have access to Alice’s and Bob’s codebook. Since the
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dark counts are independent of the transmitted pulses, each observation is a mixture
of two independent Poisson random variables. Thus, each yi ∼ Ps is i.i.d., with
Ps = (1− q)Poisson(λw) + qPoisson(λw + ηw|α|2) and P1 = Pns . By Lemmas 4.1 and
4.2, P(w)e ≥ 12 −
√
1
8
D(P0‖P1). By Lemma 4.3, D(P0‖P1) = nD(Pw‖Ps). Now,
D(Pw‖Ps) = −
∞∑
y=0
λywe
−λw
y!
log
[
1− q + q
(
1 +
ηw|α|2
λw
)
e−ηw|α|
2
]
(6.27)
≤
q2
(
e(ηw|α|
2)2/λw − 1
)
2
where the inequality is from the application of Lemma 4.4 to the Taylor series expan-
sion of equation (6.27) with respect to q at q = 0. Thus,
P(w)e ≥
1
2
− q
4
√
n (e(ηw|α|2)2/λw − 1). (6.28)
Therefore, to ensure that P(w)e ≥ 12 − , Alice sets
q =
4√
n (e(ηw|α|2)2/λw − 1) . (6.29)
Analysis (Bob): Suppose Bob uses a practical single photon detector (SPD) re-
ceiver with probability of a dark click per mode p
(b)
D . This induces a binary asymmetric
channel between Alice and Bob, where the click probabilities, conditioned on the in-
put, are P(click | input |0〉) = p(b)D and P(click | input |α〉) = 1− e−ηb|α|
2
(1− p(b)D ) ≡
p
(b)
C , with corresponding no-click probabilities P(no-click | input |0〉) = 1 − p(b)D and
P(no-click | input |α〉) = e−ηb|α|2(1 − p(b)D ) ≡ 1 − p(b)C . At each mode, a click corre-
sponds to “1” and a no-click to “0”. Let Bob use a maximum likelihood decoder
on this sequence. Then the standard upper bound on Bob’s average decoding error
probability is2 P(b)e ≤ eM−nE0 , where
2We use [32, Theorem 5.6.2], setting parameter ρ = 1.
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E0 = − ln
[(
q
√
p
(b)
C + (1− q)
√
p
(b)
D
)2
+
(
q
√
1− p(b)C + (1− q)
√
1− p(b)D
)2]
.
The Taylor series expansion of E0 with respect to q at q = 0 yields E0 = qC +O(q2),
where
C = 2e−ηb|α|
2/2
(
eηb|α|
2/2 − 1 + p(b)D −
√
p
(b)
D
(
eηb|α|2/2 − 1 + p(b)D
))
is a positive constant. Since q = O(1/√n), this demonstrates that O(√n) bits can
be covertly transmitted from Alice to Bob with P(b)e < δ for arbitrary δ > 0 given
large enough n.
6.5 Quantum-strong converse of the square root law
Finally, we claim the ultimate unsurmountability of the square root law. We
assume non-zero thermal noise (n¯T > 0) in the channel and non-zero dark count rate
(λw > 0) in Willie’s detector. We restrict the photon number variance of Alice’s
input states to σ2x = O(n). However, this restriction is not onerous since it subsumes
all well-known quantum states of a bosonic mode. However, proving this theorem
for input states with unbounded photon number variance per mode remains an open
problem. Setting λw = 0 yields the converse for Theorem 6.3.1, and setting n¯T = 0
yields the converse for Theorems 6.4.1 and 7.1.1. Setting λw = 0 and n¯T = 0 yields
the conditions for Theorem 6.2.1.
Theorem 6.5.1. (Converse of the square root law) Suppose Alice only uses n-mode
codewords with total photon number variance σ2x = O(n). Then, if she attempts to
transmit ω(
√
n) bits in n modes, as n → ∞, she is either detected by Willie with
arbitrarily low detection error probability, or Bob cannot decode with arbitrarily low
decoding error probability.
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Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 6.2.1, Alice sends one of 2M (equally likely) M -bit
messages by choosing an element from an arbitrary codebook {ρˆAnx }2Mx=1, where a state
ρˆA
n
x = |ψx〉A
nAn〈ψx| encodes an M -bit message Wx. |ψx〉A
n
=
∑
k∈Nn0 ak(x) |k〉 is a gen-
eral n-mode pure state, where |k〉 ≡ |k1〉⊗|k2〉⊗· · ·⊗|kn〉 is a tensor product of n Fock
states. The mean photon number of a codeword ρˆA
n
x is n¯x =
∑
k∈Nn0 (
∑n
i=1 ki)|ak(x)|2,
and the photon number variance is σ2x =
∑
k∈Nn0 (
∑n
i=1 ki)
2|ak(x)|2 − n¯2x = O(n). We
limit our analysis to pure input states since, by convexity, using mixed states as in-
puts can only deteriorate the performance (since that is equivalent to transmitting a
randomly chosen pure state from an ensemble and discarding the knowledge of that
choice).
Willie uses a noisy PNR receiver to observe his channel from Alice, and records the
total photon count Xtot over n modes. For some threshold S that we discuss later,
Willie declares that Alice transmitted when Xtot ≥ S, and did not transmit when
Xtot < S. When Alice does not transmit, Willie observes noise: X
(0)
tot = XD + XT ,
where XD is the number of dark counts from the spontaneous emission process at the
detector, and XT is the number of photons observed from the thermal background.
Since the dark counts are modeled by a Poisson process with rate λw photons per
mode, both the mean and variance of the observed dark counts per mode is λw. The
mean of the number of photons observed per mode from the thermal background with
mean photon number per mode n¯T is (1−ηw)n¯T and the variance is (1−ηw)2(n¯T +n¯2T ).
Thus, the mean of the total number of noise photons observed per mode is µN =
λw + (1− ηw)n¯T , and, because of the statistical independence of the noise processes,
the variance is σ2N = λw + (1 − ηw)2(n¯T + n¯2T ). We upper-bound the false alarm
probability using Chebyshev’s inequality:
PFA = P(X(0)tot ≥ S)
≤ nσ
2
N
(S − nµN)2 , (6.30)
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where equation (6.30) is because of the memorylessness of the noise processes. Thus,
to obtain the desired P∗FA, Willie sets threshold S = nµN +
√
nσ2N/P∗FA.
When Alice transmits codeword ρˆA
n
u corresponding to message Wu, Willie observes
X
(1)
tot = Xu +XD +XT , where Xu is the count from Alice’s transmission. We upper-
bound the missed detection probability using Chebyshev’s inequality:
PMD = P(X(1)tot < S)
≤ P
(
|X(1)tot − ηwn¯u − nµN | ≥ ηwn¯u −
√
nσ2N
P∗FA
)
≤ nσ
2
N + η
2
wσ
2
u
(ηwn¯u −
√
nσ2N/P∗FA)2
, (6.31)
where equation (6.31) is because the noise and Alice’s codeword are independent.
Since σ2u = O(n), if n¯u = ω(
√
n), then limn→∞ PMD = 0. Thus, given large enough
n, Willie can detect Alice’s codewords that have mean photon number n¯u = ω(
√
n)
with probability of error P(w)e ≤  for any  > 0.
If Alice wants to lower-bound P(w)e , her codebook must contain a positive fraction
of codewords with mean photon number upper-bounded by n¯U = O(
√
n). Formally,
there must exist a subset of the codebook
{
ρˆA
n
u , u ∈ U
}
, where U = {u : n¯u ≤ n¯U},
with |U|
2M
≥ κ and κ > 0. Suppose Bob has an unattenuated pure-loss channel from
Alice (ηb = 0 and n¯T = 0) and access to any receiver allowed by quantum mechanics.
The decoding error probability P(b)e in such scenario clearly lower-bounds the decod-
ing error probability in a practical scenario where the channel from Alice is lossy and
either the channel or the receiver are noisy. Denote by Ea→k the event that a trans-
mitted message Wa is decoded as Wk 6= Wa. Since the messages are equiprobable,
the average probability of error for the codebook containing only the codewords in U
is
82
P(b)e (U) =
1
|U|
∑
a∈U
P
(∪k∈U\{a}Ea→k) . (6.32)
Since the probability that a message is sent from U is κ,
P(b)e ≥ κP(b)e (U). (6.33)
Equality holds only when Bob receives messages that are not in U error-free and
knows when the messages from U are sent (in other words, equality holds when the
set of messages on which decoder can err is reduced to U). Denote by Wa, a ∈ U , the
message transmitted by Alice, and by Wˆa Bob’s decoding of Wa. Then, since each
message is equiprobable and |U| = κ2M ,
log2 κ+M = H(Wa) (6.34)
= I(Wa; Wˆa) +H(Wa|Wˆa) (6.35)
≤ I(Wa; Wˆa) + 1 + (log2 κ+M)P(b)e (U) (6.36)
≤ χ
({
1
|U| , ρˆ
An
u
})
+ 1 + (log2 κ+M)P(b)e (U) (6.37)
where (6.35) is from the definition of mutual information, (6.36) is because of classical
Fano’s inequality [19, Equation (9.37)], and (6.37) is the Holevo bound I(X;Y ) ≤
χ({pX(x), ρˆx}) (see Appendix B.3.6). The mutual information I(X;Y ) is between a
classical input X and a classical output Y , which is a function of the prior probability
distribution pX(x), and the conditional probability distribution pY |X(y|x), with x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y . The classical input x maps to a quantum state ρˆx. A specific choice of
a quantum measurement, described by POVM elements {Πˆy, y ∈ Y}, induces the
conditional probability distribution pY |X(y|x) = Tr
[
Πˆyρˆx
]
. The Holevo information,
χ({px, ρˆx}) = S
(∑
x∈X pxρˆx
) −∑x∈X pxS(ρˆx), where S(ρˆ) ≡ −Tr[ρˆ ln ρˆ] is the von
Neumann entropy of the state ρˆ, is not a function of the quantum measurement.
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Since ρˆA
n
u = |ψu〉A
nAn〈ψu| is a pure state, χ
(
{ 1|U| , ρˆA
n
u }
)
= S
(
1
|U|
∑
u∈U |ψu〉A
nAn〈ψu|
)
.
Denote the “average codeword” in U by ρ¯An = 1|U|
∑
u∈U |ψu〉A
nAn〈ψu|, and the state of
the jth mode of ρ¯A
n
by ρ¯A
n
j . We obtain ρ¯
An
j by taking the partial trace over all the other
modes in ρ¯A
n
and denote its mean photon number by n¯j (i.e. n¯j is the mean photon
number of the jth mode of ρ¯A
n
). Finally, denote a coherent state ensemble with a
zero-mean circularly-symmetric Gaussian distribution by ρˆTn¯ =
1
pin¯
∫
e−|α|
2/n¯|α〉〈α|d2α.
The von Neumann entropy of ρˆTn¯ , S
(
ρˆTn¯
)
= log2(1 + n¯) + n¯ log2
(
1 + 1
n¯
)
. Now,
S
(
ρ¯A
n) ≤ n∑
j=1
S
(
ρ¯A
n
j
)
(6.38)
≤
n∑
i=1
log2(1 + n¯j) + n¯j log2
(
1 +
1
n¯j
)
(6.39)
≤ n
(
log2
(
1 +
n¯U
n
)
+
n¯U
n
log2
(
1 +
n
n¯U
))
, (6.40)
where (6.38) follows from the subadditivity of the von Neumann entropy (see Ap-
pendix B.3.2) and (6.39) is because ρˆTn¯ maximizes the von Neumann entropy of a
single-mode state with mean photon number constraint n¯ [33]. Now, S
(
ρˆTn¯
)
is con-
cave and increasing for n¯ > 0, and, since
∑n
j=1 n¯j ≤ n¯U by construction of U , the
application of Jensen’s inequality yields (6.40). Combining (6.37) and (6.40) and
solving for P(b)e (U) yields:
P(b)e (U) ≥ 1−
log2
(
1 + n¯U
n
)
+ n¯U
n
log2
(
1 + n
n¯U
)
+ 1
n
log2 κ
n
+ M
n
. (6.41)
Substituting (6.41) into (6.33) yields the following lower bound on Bob’s decoding
error probability:
P(b)e ≥ κ
1− log2 (1 + n¯Un )+ n¯Un log2
(
1 + n
n¯U
)
+ 1
n
log2 κ
n
+ M
n
 . (6.42)
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Since Alice transmits ω(
√
n) bits in n modes, M/n = ω(1/
√
n) bits/symbol. However,
since n¯U = O(
√
n), as n→∞, P(b)e is bounded away from zero for any κ > 0. Thus,
Alice cannot transmit ω(
√
n) bits in n optical modes both covertly and reliably.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF COVERT OPTICAL
COMMUNICATION
In this chapter we corroborate the theoretical results from the previous chapter
with a proof-of-concept experiment, where the excess noise in Willie’s detection is
emulated by dark counts of his single photon detector. This is the first known imple-
mentation of a truly quantum-information-theoretically secure covert communication
system that allows communication when all transmissions are prohibited.
We use pulse position modulation (PPM) in our experiments, as it allows us to
use a practical error correction code (ECC). In Section 7.1 we prove that it can be
used for achieving covert communication, and in Section 7.2 we describe our testbed
and report the results of our experiments demonstrating the feasibility of quantum-
information-theoretically secure covert communication.
7.1 A structured strategy for covert communication
The assumptions of Section 6.4 (hypothetical pure-loss channel, with detector
afflicted by the dark counts) describe many optical communication scenarios. While
Theorem 6.4.1 states that such settings allow Alice to covertly communicate with
Bob, however the skewed on-off duty cycle of OOK modulation used in the proof
makes construction of an efficient ECC challenging. Constraining OOK signaling to
Q-ary pulse position modulation (PPM) addresses this issue by sacrificing a constant
fraction of throughput. Each PPM symbol uses a PPM frame to transmit a sequence
of Q coherent state pulses, |0〉 . . . |α〉 . . . |0〉, encoding message i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Q} by
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transmitting |α〉 in the ith mode of the PPM frame. Thus, instead ofO(n) bits allowed
by OOK, PPM lets O
(
n
Q
logQ
)
bits be transmitted in n optical modes. However,
PPM performs well in the low photon number regime [86] and the symmetry of its
symbols enables us to use any one of efficient ECCs.
To communicate covertly, Alice and Bob use a fraction ζ = O
(√
Q/n
)
of n/Q
available PPM frames on average, effectively using n¯ = O(1/√n) photons per mode.
By keeping secret which frames they use, Alice and Bob force Willie to examine all of
them, increasing the likelihood of dark counts. An ECC ensures the reliability of the
communication between Alice and Bob (if it occurs). While the ECC is revealed to
Willie, the transmitted pulse positions are scrambled within the corresponding PPM
frames via an operation resembling one-time pad encryption [76], preventing Willie’s
exploitation of the ECC’s structure for detection (rather than protecting the message
content). The following theorem demonstrates that, using this scheme, Alice reliably
transmits O
(√
n
Q
logQ
)
covert bits at the cost of pre-sharing O
(√
n
Q
log n
)
secret
bits:
Theorem 7.1.1. (Dark counts yield square root law under structured modulation)
Suppose that Willie has a pure-loss channel from Alice, can capture all photons trans-
mitted by Alice that do not reach Bob, but is limited to a PNR receiver with a non-zero
dark current. Let Alice and Bob share a secret of sufficient length before communicat-
ing. Then Alice can lower-bound Willie’s detection error probability P(w)e ≥ 12 −  for
any  > 0 while reliably transmitting O(
√
n
Q
logQ) bits to Bob using n optical modes
and a Q-ary PPM constellation.
Proof. Construction: Prior to communication, Alice and Bob secretly choose a ran-
dom subset S of PPM frames to use for transmission by selecting each of n/Q available
PPM frames independently with probability ζ. Alice and Bob then secretly generate
a vector k containing |S| integers selected independently uniformly at random from
{0, 1, . . . , Q − 1}, where |S| denotes the cardinality of S. Alice encodes a message
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into a codeword of size |S| using an ECC that may be known to Willie. She adds k
modulo Q to this message and transmits it on the PPM frames in S.
Analysis (Willie): Willie detects each PPM frame received from Alice, recording
the photon counts in yw = [y
(w)
1 , . . . ,y
(w)
n ] where y
(w)
i = [y
(w)
i,1 , . . . , y
(w)
i,Q ] and y
(w)
i,j it the
number of photons observed in the jth mode of the ith PPM frame. Denote by P0 the
distribution of yw when Alice does not transmit and by P1 the distribution when she
transmits. When Alice does not transmit, Willie’s receiver observes a Poisson dark
count process with rate λw photons per mode, implying that yw is a vector of nQ
i.i.d. Poisson(λw) random variables. Therefore, {y(w)i } is i.i.d. with y(w)i ∼ Pw and
P0 = Pnw, where Pw is the distribution of Q i.i.d. Poisson(λw) random variables with
p.m.f.:
p0(y
(w)
i ) =
Q∏
j=1
λ
y
(w)
i,j
w e−λw
y
(w)
i,j !
. (7.1)
When Alice transmits, by construction, each PPM frame is randomly selected for
transmission with probability ζ. In each selected PPM frame, a pulse is transmitted
using one of Q modes chosen equiprobably. Therefore, in this case {y(w)i } is also
i.i.d. with y
(w)
i ∼ Ps and P1 = Pns , where the p.m.f. of Ps is:
p1(y
(w)
i ) = (1− ζ)
Q∏
j=1
λ
y
(w)
i,j
w e−λw
y
(w)
i,j !
+
ζ
Q
Q∑
m=1
(ηw|α|2 + λw)y
(w)
i,me−ηw|α|
2−λw
y
(w)
i,m !
Q∏
j=1
j 6=m
λ
y
(w)
i,j
w e−λw
y
(w)
i,j !
.
(7.2)
By Lemma 4.3, D(P0‖P1) = nQD(Pw‖Ps). Now, denoting by x = [x1, · · · , xQ]
where xj ∈ N0, we have
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D(Pw‖Ps) = −
∑
x∈NQ0
Q∏
j=1
λ
xj
w e−λw
xj!
log
[
1− ζ + ζ
Q
Q∑
m=1
(
1 +
ηw|α|2
λw
)xm
e−ηw|α|
2
]
(7.3)
≤
ζ2
(
e
(ηw|α|2)2
λw − 1
)
2Q
where the inequality is from Lemma 4.4 applied to the Taylor series expansion of equa-
tion (7.3) with respect to ζ at ζ = 0. By Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, ζ = 4Q√√√√n(e (ηw|α|2)2λw −1)
ensures that Willie’s error probability is lower-bounded by P(w)e ≥ 12 − .
Analysis (Bob): As in the proof of Theorem 6.4.1, Bob uses a practical SPD
receiver with probability of a dark click p
(b)
D . Bob examines only the PPM frames in
S. If two or more clicks are detected in a PPM frame, a PPM symbol is assigned
by selecting one of the clicks uniformly at random. If no clicks are detected, the
PPM frame is labeled as an erasure. After subtracting k modulo Q from this vector
of PPM symbols (subtraction is not performed on erasures), the resultant vector is
passed to the decoder. A random coding argument [32, Theorem 5.6.2] yields reliable
transmission of O
(√
n
Q
logQ
)
covert bits.
7.2 Implementation of experimental covert optical commu-
nication system
7.2.1 System design and implementation
To demonstrate the square-root law of covert optical communication we realized
a proof-of-concept test-bed implementation. Here we describe its design and imple-
mentation.
7.2.1.1 Alice’s encoder
Alice and Bob engage in an n-mode communication session consisting of n/Q
Q-ary PPM frames with Q = 32. As in the construction of the coding scheme in
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the proof of Theorem 7.1.1, prior to communication, Alice and Bob secretly select
a random subset S of PPM frames to use for transmission: each of the n/Q avail-
able PPM frames is selected independently with probability ζ. Alice and Bob then
secretly generate a vector k containing |S| integers selected independently uniformly
at random from {0, 1, . . . , Q − 1}, where |S| denotes the cardinality of S. However,
instead of using a random codebook as in the proof of Theorem 7.1.1, Alice encodes
a message into a codeword of size |S| using a (31, 15) Reed-Solomon (RS) error cor-
rection code. She adds k modulo Q to this message and transmits it on the PPM
frames in S. RS codes perform well on channels dominated by erasures, which occur
in low receive-power scenarios, e.g., covert and deep space communication [68].
7.2.1.2 Generation of transmitted symbols
Alice generates the binary sequence of length n describing the transmitted signal,
with a “1” at a given location indicating a pulse in that mode, and a “0” indicating the
absence of a pulse. First, Alice encodes random data, organized into Q-ary symbols,
with an RS code and modulo-Q addition of k to produce a coded sequence of Q-ary
symbols. The value of the ith symbol in this sequence indicates which mode in the
ith PPM symbol in the set S contains a pulse, whereas all modes of the PPM frames
not in S remain empty. Mapping occupied modes to “1” and unoccupied modes to
“0” results in the desired length-n binary sequence.
To accurately estimate Willie’s detection error probability in the face of optical
power fluctuations, the above binary sequence is alternated with a sequence of n
“0”s, to produce a final length-2n sequence that is passed to the experimental setup.
Willie gets a “clean” look at the channel when Alice is silent using these interleaved
“0”s, thus allowing the estimation of both the false alarm and the missed detection
probabilities under the same conditions. Bob simply discards the interleaved “0”s.
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Figure 7.1: Experimental setup. A National Instruments PCIe-6537 data acquisi-
tion card (DAQ), driven by a 1 MHz clock, controlled the experiment, generating
transmissions and reading detection events. Alice generated 1 ns optical pulses using
a temperature-stabilized laser diode with center wavelength 1550.2 nm. The pulses
were sent into a free-space optical channel, where a half-wave plate (HWP) and polar-
izing beamsplitter cube (PBSC) sent a fraction ηb of light to Bob, and the remaining
light to Willie. Bob and Willie’s receivers operated InGaAs Geiger-mode avalanche
photodiode SPDs that were gated with 1 ns reverse bias triggered to match the arrival
of Alice’s pulses.
We varied n from 3.2×106 to 3.2×107 in several communication regimes: “careful
Alice” (ζ = 0.25
√
Q/n), “careless Alice” (ζ = 0.03 4
√
Q/n), and “dangerously careless
Alice” (ζ = 0.003 and ζ = 0.008). For each (n, ζ) pair we conducted 100 experiments
and 105 Monte-Carlo simulations, measuring Bob’s total number of bits received and
Willie’s detection error probability.
7.2.1.3 Implementation
The experiment was conducted using a mixture of fiber-based and free-space opti-
cal elements implementing channels from Alice to both Bob and Willie. As depicted
by the schematic in Figure 7.1, we used a National Instruments PCIe-6537 data ac-
quisition card, driven by a 1 MHz clock, to control the experiment. Alice generated
1 ns optical pulses using a temperature-stabilized laser diode with center wavelength
1550.2 nm, the standard optical telecom wavelength. The pulses were sent into a
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Table 7.1: Optical channel characteristics
Willie Bob
Experimental
estimates
p
(w)
D n¯
(w)
det p
(b)
D n¯
(b)
det
ζ = 0.25
√
Q/n 9.15× 10−5 0.036 2.96× 10−6 1.52
ζ = 0.03 4
√
Q/n 9.12× 10−5 0.031 2.54× 10−6 1.14
ζ = 0.003 9.29× 10−5 0.033 2.62× 10−6 1.19
ζ = 0.008 9.28× 10−5 0.028 2.63× 10−6 1.05
Target: 9× 10−5 0.03 3× 10−6 1.4
free-space optical channel, where a half-wave plate and polarizing beamsplitter cube
were employed to send a fraction ηb of light to Bob, and the remaining light to Willie.
Because of the low intensity of Alice’s pulses, direct detection using single photon de-
tectors (SPDs), rather than PNR receivers, was sufficient. Bob and Willie’s receivers
operated InGaAs Geiger-mode avalanche photodiode SPDs that were gated with 1
ns reverse bias triggered to match the arrival of Alice’s pulses. Geiger-mode photodi-
odes have to reset after each detection event, resulting in a deterministic number of
no-clicks always following a click [45]. This is known as the dead time td of a detector,
and, in our experiment, td = 16 observation periods.
1,2
While some thermal noise is unavoidable, in order to control the experimental en-
vironment, several configurations were considered for implementing the background
1We note that td is adjustable. The detector is forced to reset in order to suppress the after-
pulses: a sequence of erroneous clicks that immediately follow detection events in Geiger-mode
avalanche photodiodes because of the imperfections in their circuitry. To verify our choice of td = 16
we performed Pearson chi-squared tests of independence [36] between observations xi and xi+k on
each of the four click records corresponding to different communication regimes (i.e., values of ζ) in
our experiments. None of the tests rejected the null hypothesis (independence between xi and xi+k)
for k = 17 at 5% significance level, while rejecting it for smaller k, thus providing evidence for the
correctness of td = 16 used in our study.
2While we account for the dead time in our evaluation of the experiments and the Monte-
Carlo simulation, in Appendix D.2 we argue that its impact on Willie’s detector’s performance is
insignificant. We thus do not account for the detector dead time in the proof of Theorem 7.1.1: the
construction of Alice and Bob’s signaling scheme ensures covert communication since the positive
dead time only hurts Willie’s detector performance.
92
noise at the receivers. We provided noise only during the gating period of the de-
tectors since continuous wave light irradiating Geiger-mode avalanche photodiodes
(APDs) suppresses detection efficiency [64]. Instead of providing extraneous optical
pulses during the gating window of the APD, we emulated optical noise at the detec-
tors by increasing the detector gate voltage, thus increasing the detector’s dark click
probability. While the APD dark counts are Poisson-distributed with mean rate n¯N
photons per mode, when n¯N  1, the dark click probability 1−e−n¯N is close to n¯N1+n¯N ,
the probability that an incoherent thermal background with mean photon number per
mode n¯N produces a click. In Table 7.1 we report the experimentally-observed esti-
mates and targeted values of dark click probabilities p
(b)
D and p
(w)
D of Bob’s and Willie’s
detectors, as well as the mean number of photons detected by Bob n¯
(b)
det = ηbη
(b)
QEn¯ and
Willie n¯
(w)
det = (1−ηb)η(w)QE n¯, where n¯ = 5 is the mean photon number of Alice’s pulses,
ηb = 0.97 is the fraction of light sent to Bob, and η
(b)
QE and η
(w)
QE are the quantum
efficiencies of Bob’s and Willie’s detectors, which can be approximated using the es-
timates in Table 7.1 (we note that quantum efficiency is strongly correlated with the
detector’s dark click probability [71]). We provide the details of estimating the dark
click probability in Appendix D.4. While we observed slight temporal variations in
dark counts during our experiments, in Appendix D.4 we argue that their effect on
our analysis is minimal.
The amount of transmitted information, with other parameters fixed, is propor-
tional to n¯
(b)
det/n¯
(w)
det . Our choice of n¯
(b)
det  n¯(w)det allowed the experiment to gather a
statistically meaningful data sample in a reasonable duration. In an operational free-
space laser communication system, a directional transmitter will likely yield just such
an asymmetry in coupling between Bob and Willie; however, we note that the only
fundamental requirement for implementing information-theoretically secure covert
communication is p
(w)
D > 0, or n¯T > 0.
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Figure 7.2: Number of bits decoded by Bob. Each data point is an average from 100
experiments, with negligibly small 95% confidence intervals. The symbol error rates
are: 1.1 × 10−4 for ζ = 0.25√Q/n, 8.3 × 10−3 for ζ = 0.03/ 4√Q/n, 4.5 × 10−3 for
ζ = 0.003, and 1.8 × 10−2 for ζ = 0.008. We also report the maximum throughput
Csζn
Q
computed using the experimentally-observed values from Table 7.1, where Cs
is the per-symbol Shannon capacity [75]. Given the low observed symbol error rate
for ζ = 0.25
√
Q/n, we note that a square root scaling is achievable even using a
relatively short RS code; Figure 7.3 demonstrates that this is achieved covertly.
7.2.2 Analysis
7.2.2.1 Bob’s decoder
Bob examines only the PPM frames in S. If two or more pulses are detected in a
PPM frame, one of them is selected uniformly at random. If no pulses are detected,
it is labeled as an erasure. After subtracting k modulo Q from this vector of PPM
symbols (subtraction is not performed on erasures), the resultant vector is passed to
the RS decoder.
For each experiment we record the total number of bits in the successfully-decoded
codewords; the undecoded codewords are discarded. For each pair of parameters (ζ, n)
we report the mean of the total number of bits decoded by Bob over 100 experiments
in Figure 7.2. For each communication regime we report the symbol error rate in the
caption of Figure 7.2. The symbol error rate is the total number of lost data symbols
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during all the experiments at the specified communication regime divided by the total
number of data symbols transmitted during these experiments. We also report Bob’s
maximum throughput from Alice in Figure 7.2, which is the per-symbol Shannon
capacity Cs multiplied by the expected number of transmitted PPM symbols
ζn
Q
. Cs
is calculated for each regime using the experimentally-observed channel characteristics
in Table 7.1), with the details of the calculation deferred to Appendix D.1.
Our relatively short (31, 15) RS code achieves between 45% and 60% of the max-
imum throughput in the “careful Alice” regime and between 55% and 75% of the
maximum in other regimes at reasonable error rates, showing that even a basic code
demonstrates our theoretical scaling.
7.2.2.2 Willie’s detector
Estimation of P(w)e —Willie’s detection problem can be reduced to a test between
two simple hypotheses where the log-likelihood ratio test minimizes P(w)e [59, The-
orem 13.1.1]. The test statistic for the log-likelihood ratio test is derived in Ap-
pendix D.2 and is simply the total number of clicks Y observed by Willie. Willie
compares Y to a threshold S, accusing Alice if Y ≥ S. Willie chooses the value of S
that minimizes Willie’s detection error probability P(w)e .
For each pair of parameters (n, ζ) as well as Alice’s transmission state, we perform
m experiments, recording the observed number of clicks Y . We denote by
{
Y
(0)
i
}m
i=1
and
{
Y
(1)
i
}m
i=1
the sequences of experimentally observed click counts when Alice does
not transmit and transmits, respectively. To estimate Willie’s detection error proba-
bility P(w)e , we construct empirical distribution functions Fˆ (0)m (x) = 1n
∑m
i=1 1Y (0)i ≤x
(x)
and Fˆ
(1)
m (x) = 1m
∑m
i=1 1Y (1)i ≤x
(x), where 1A(x) = {1 if x ∈ A; 0 if x /∈ A} denotes
the indicator function. The estimated detection error probability is then
Pˆ(w)e =
1
2
min
S
(1− Fˆ (0)m (S) + Fˆ (1)m (S)). (7.4)
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Monte-Carlo simulation and Gaussian approximation—We perform a Monte-Carlo
study using 105 simulations per (n, ζ) pair. We generate, encode, and detect the
messages as in the physical experiment, and use equation (7.4) to estimate Willie’s
probability of error, but simulate the optical channel induced by our choice of a laser-
light transmitter and an SPD using its estimated characteristics reported in Table 7.1.
Similarly, we use the values in Table 7.1 for our analytical Gaussian approximation
of P(w)e described in Appendix D.3.
Confidence intervals—We compute the confidence intervals for the estimate in
equation (7.4) using Dvoretzky-Keifer-Wolfowitz inequality [25, 66], which relates the
distribution function FX(x) of random variable X to the empirical distribution func-
tion Fˆm(x) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 1Xi≤x(x) associated with a sequence {Xi}mi=1 of m i.i.d. draws
of the random variable X as follows:
P(sup
x
|Fˆm(x)− FX(x)| > ξ) ≤ 2e−2mξ2 , (7.5)
where ξ > 0. For x0, the (1−α) confidence interval for the empirical estimate of F (x0)
is given by [max{Fˆm(x0)− ξ, 0},min{Fˆm(x0) + ξ, 1}] where ξ =
√
log(2/α)
2m
. Thus, ±ξ
is used for reporting the confidence intervals in Figure 7.3.
Results—Figure 7.3 reports Willie’s probability of error estimated from the exper-
iments and the Monte-Carlo study, as well as its analytical Gaussian approximation.
Monte-Carlo simulations show that the Gaussian approximation is accurate. More
importantly, Figure 7.3 highlights Alice’s safety when she obeys the square root law
and her peril when she does not. When ζ = O(1/√n), P(w)e remains constant as n
increases. However, for asymptotically larger ζ, P(w)e drops at a rate that depends on
Alice’s carelessness. The drop at ζ = 0.008 vividly demonstrates our converse.
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Figure 7.3: Willie’s error probability. Estimates from 100 experiments have solid fill;
estimates from 105 Monte-Carlo simulations have clear fill; and Gaussian approxi-
mations are lines. The 95% confidence intervals for the experimental estimates are
±0.136; for the Monte-Carlo simulations they are ±0.014. Alice transmits ζn/Q PPM
symbols on average and Willie’s error probability remains constant when Alice obeys
the square root law and uses ζ = O(√Q/n); it drops as n increases if Alice breaks
the square root law by using an asymptotically larger ζ.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
8.1 Summary
In this thesis we developed the information-theoretic foundation for covert com-
munication. We established the square root limit on the amount of information that
can be transmitted both over the AWGN and noisy optical channels. Specifically, we
determined that O(√n) covert bits can be sent reliably in n uses of either an AWGN
or a single-mode noisy optical channel. Conversely, attempting to transmit more
than that either results in detection by the warden with probability one, or a non-
zero probability of decoding error as n→∞. We have also shown that the warden’s
ignorance of the transmission time provides additional throughput gain, and demon-
strated that additive noise is critical for establishing covert communication, whether
the source of this noise is the channel or the warden’s detection equipment. We cor-
roborated our theory in a proof-of-concept experiment on an optical testbed, which, to
our knowledge, is the first known implementation of information-theoretically secure
covert communication system.
8.2 Further Work
The field of covert communication is rich with research opportunities. As discussed
in the introduction, there are ongoing projects to reduce the size of the secret shared
between the parties prior to the communication attempt, as well as to eliminate it
completely in some scenarios [16, 54]. The converse of the square root law for covert
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optical communication can also be improved by lifting the restriction on the photon
number variance in the signaling states.
The investigation of the impact of Alice’s message being short relative to the
amount of time that she has to send it combined with warden’s ignorance of her
choice of the transmission time should also be continued. The results in Chapter
5 are for AWGN channels, and the throughput improvement is shown only using
the Gaussian random coding with average power constraint. The proof of Theorem
5.2.1 needs to extended to peak power constrained signaling, as well as other channel
models (such as DMCs). This would also allow significant reduction in the size of
the pre-shared secret, as the exchange of full Gaussian codebooks would no longer
be needed. Furthermore, the constraint on the length of Alice’s message could be
beneficial to Willie in that the time when Alice is not transmitting could be used to
calibrate Willie’s detector (even when the time of the actual transmission is unknown).
For example, this could allow him to accurately estimate his receiver’s noise power,
and thus nullify the positive covert communication rate when his knowledge of his
receiver’s noise power is incomplete as in [57, 58]
Our ultimate objective is to enable a “shadow network”, illustrated in Figure 1.1,
comprised of transmitters, receivers, and friendly jammers that generate artificial
noise, impairing wardens’ ability to detect transmissions. Relays in covert networks
are valuable and require protection while the jammers are cheap, numerous, and
disposable (i.e., a warden can silence a particular jammer easily, but, because of
their great numbers, silencing enough of them to produce a significant impact is
infeasible). Jammer activities are independent from the relay transmission states:
that is, wardens cannot detect transmissions by listening to the jammers. Thus,
jammers have a parasitic effect on the wardens’ SNRs and are a nuisance.
It is important to characterize the scaling behavior of such a network, akin to
how [14, 34, 84] extend the results of [28, 39] to the secure (but not covert) multi-
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path unicast communication in a large wireless network. The first step towards this
goal is extending the covert communication scenario of this thesis to point-to-point
jammer-assisted covert communication in the presence of multiple wardens. Prelim-
inary results [79] assume that jammers operate at a constant power, and the signal
propagation model accounts only for path loss and AWGN. However, as [57, 58]
demonstrate, uncertainty in noise experienced by the warden is beneficial to Alice.
Thus, variable jamming power and multipath fading should be incorporated into the
jammer-assisted covert communication model, as it may enable covert communica-
tion at a positive rate. Completing the characterization of the point-to-point covert
link in a multi-warden multi-jammer environment is an important step towards un-
derstanding the behavior of “shadow networks”, and their eventual implementation.
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APPENDIX A
CLASSICAL COVERT COMMUNICATION
MISCELLANEA
A.1 Impact of Warden’s a priori Knowledge of the Trans-
mission State
Our proofs assume that Willie has no prior knowledge on whether Alice transmits
or not. Here we argue that the assumption of a non-trivial prior distribution on Al-
ice’s transmission state does not impact our asymptotic results. Suppose that Willie
knows that Alice will not transmit (i.e. H0 is true) with probability pi0 and that she
will transmit (i.e. H0 is true) with probability pi1 = 1 − pi0. Denote the probability
distribution of Willie’s channel observations conditioned on Alice not transmitting
(i.e. on H0 being true) as P0, and the probability distribution of the observations con-
ditioned on Alice transmitting (i.e. on H1 being true) as P1. The following generalized
version of Lemma 4.1 then holds:
Lemma A.1 (Generalized Lemma 4.1). P(w)e ≥ min(pi0, pi1)−max(pi0, pi1)V (P0,P1)
Proof. Upon observing x, Willie’s hypothesis test selects either the null hypothesis
H0 or the alternate hypothesis H1. Denote by p0(x) = p(x|H0) and p1(x) = p(x|H1)
the probability density functions of x conditioned on either hypothesis H0 or H1
being true; p0(x) and p1(x) are therefore the probability density functions of P0 and
P1. Denote by p(H0|x) and p(H1|x) the probabilities of hypotheses H0 and H0 being
true conditioned on the observation x. Since the optimal hypothesis test uses the
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maximum a posteriori probability rule, the probability P(b)c of Willie’s optimal test
being correct, averaged over all observations, is as follows:
P(w)c =
∫
X
max(p(H0|x), p(H1|x))p(x)dx (A.1)
=
∫
X
max(pi0p0(x), pi1p1(x))dx (A.2)
where X is the support of p0(x) and p1(x), and (A.2) follows from Bayes’ theo-
rem. Denote the error probability of Willie’s optimal test by P(w)e = 1 − Pc =
1 − ∫X max(pi0p0(x), pi1p1(x))dx. Now, since max(a, b) = a+b+|a−b|2 , P(w)e can be ex-
pressed as follows:
P(w)e = 1−
1
2
(
pi0
∫
X
p0(x)dx+ pi1
∫
X
p1(x)dx
)
− 1
2
∫
X
|pi0p0(x)− pi1p1(x)|dx (A.3)
=
1
2
− 1
2
‖pi0p0(x)− pi1p1(x)‖1 (A.4)
where (A.4) is because of the probability densities integrating to one over their sup-
ports in the first two integrals of (A.3), pi0 + pi1 = 1, and the last integral in (A.3)
being the L1 norm.
When the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are equal: pi0 = pi1 =
1
2
, (A.4)
yields the proof of Lemma A.1. When pi0 6= pi1, we can lower-bound (A.4) using the
triangle inequality for the L1 norm:
P(w)e ≥
1
2
− 1
2
(‖pi0p0(x)− pi0p1(x)‖1 + ‖pi0p1(x)− pi1p1(x)‖1) (A.5)
=
1
2
− |pi0 − pi1|
2
− pi0
2
‖p0(x)− p1(x)‖1 (A.6)
where (A.6) follows from the L1 norm of a probability density function evaluating to
one and pi0 > 0. If pi1 > pi0, the following application of the triangle inequality yields
a tighter bound:
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P(w)e ≥
1
2
− 1
2
(‖pi1p1(x)− pi1p0(x)‖1 + ‖pi1p0(x)− pi0p0(x)‖1) (A.7)
=
1
2
− |pi0 − pi1|
2
− pi1
2
‖p0(x)− p1(x)‖1 (A.8)
By Definition 4.1, 1
2
‖p0(x)− p1(x)‖1 = V (P0,P1). Since min(a, b) = a+b−|a−b|2 , we can
combine (A.6) and (A.8) to yield
P(w)e ≥ min(pi0, pi1)−max(pi0, pi1)V (P0,P1) (A.9)
which completes the proof.
Thus, while Lemma A.1 demonstrates that additional information about the like-
lihood of Alice transmitting (in the form of unequal prior probabilities pi0 6= pi1) helps
Willie, the square root law still holds via the bounds on the variational distance
V (P0,P1).
A.2 Mapping to a Continuous-time Channel
We employ a discrete-time model in Chapters 4 and 5. However, while this is
commonly assumed without loss of generality in standard communication theory, it
is important to consider whether we have missed some aspect of the covert commu-
nication problem by focusing on discrete time.
Consider the standard communication system model, where Alice’s (baseband)
continuous-time waveform is given in terms of her discrete time transmitted sequence
by:
x(t) =
n∑
i=1
fi p(t− iTs)
where Ts is the symbol period and p(·) is the pulse shaping waveform. Consider a
(baseband) system bandwidth constraint of W Hz. Now, if Alice chooses p(·) ideally
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as sinc(2Wt), where sinc(x) = sin(pix)
pix
, then the natural choice of Ts = 1/2W results in
no intersymbol interference (ISI). From the Nyquist sampling criterion, both Willie
(and Bob) can extract all of the information from the signaling band by sampling at
a rate of 2W samples/second, which then leads directly to the discrete-time model of
Sections 4.1 and 5.1, and suits our demonstration of the fundamental limits to Alice’s
covert communication capabilities over AWGN channels. However, when p(·) is cho-
sen in a more practical fashion, for example, as a raised cosine pulse with some excess
bandwidth, then sampling at a rate higher than 2W has utility for signal detection
even if the Nyquist ISI criterion is satisfied. In particular, techniques involving cyclo-
stationary detection are now applicable, and we consider such a scenario a promising
area for future work.
A.3 D(Pw‖Ps) in the Proof of Theorem 4.2.2 Meets the Con-
ditions of Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5
Here we show that the expression (4.10) for the relative entropy D(Pw‖Ps) be-
tween the distributions Pw and Ps of an observation on Willie’s channel from Alice
corresponding to Alice’s transmission state meets the regularity conditions of Tay-
lor’s theorem (Lemma 4.4) and Leibniz integral rule (Lemma 4.5). Specifically, we
need to show that D(Pw‖Ps) and its first six derivatives are continuous on [0,
√
b] and
integrable.
Re-arranging the terms of (4.10) results in the following expression:
D(Pw‖Ps) = a
2
2σ2w
−
∫ ∞
−∞
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
ln cosh
(
ax
σ2w
)
dx (A.10)
where cosh(x) = e
x+e−x
2
is the hyperbolic cosine function. Since a
2
2σ2w
is clearly continu-
ous and differentiable with respect to a, we focus on the integral in (A.10), specifically
on its integrand:
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K(x, a) =
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
ln cosh
(
ax
σ2w
)
(A.11)
Because of the peak power constraint, 0 ≤ a ≤ √b. Also, ln cosh(x) ≤ |x| since
ln
(
ex+e−x
2
)
− |x| = ln
(
1+e−2|x|
2
)
≤ 0. Therefore, g(x) =
√
b|x|e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσ3w
≥ |K(x, a)|, in
other words, g(x) dominates K(x, a). g(x) is integrable since
∫∞
−∞ g(x)dx =
√
2b
piσ2w
<
∞.
The derivatives of K(x, a) with respect to a can be written in the following form:
∂iK(x, a)
∂ai
=

e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
xi
σ2iw
tanh
(
ax
σ2w
)∑(i−1)/2
k=1 ci,k sech
2k
(
ax
σ2w
)
, i odd
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
xi
σ2iw
∑i/2
k=1 ci,k sech
2k
(
ax
σ2w
)
, i even
(A.12)
where sech(x) = 2
ex+e−x and tanh(x) =
ex−e−x
ex+e−x are the hyperbolic secant and tangent
functions, respectively, ci,k are constants, and
∑0
k=1 ci,k = 1. The first six derivatives
of K(x, a) with respect to a are as follows:
∂K(x, a)
∂a
=
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
x
σ2w
tanh
(
ax
σ2w
)
(A.13)
∂2K(x, a)
∂a2
=
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
x2
σ4w
sech2
(
ax
σ2w
)
(A.14)
∂3K(x, a)
∂a3
= − e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
2x3
σ6w
sech2
(
ax
σ2w
)
tanh
(
ax
σ2w
)
(A.15)
∂4K(x, a)
∂a4
=
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
2x4
σ8w
(
2 sech2
(
ax
σ2w
)
− 3 sech4
(
ax
σ2w
))
(A.16)
∂5K(x, a)
∂a5
=
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
8x5 tanh
(
ax
σ2w
)
σ10w
(
3 sech4
(
ax
σ2w
)
− sech2
(
ax
σ2w
))
(A.17)
∂6K(x, a)
∂a6
=
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
8x6
σ12w
(
15 sech6
(
ax
σ2w
)
− 15 sech4
(
ax
σ2w
)
+ 2 sech2
(
ax
σ2w
))
(A.18)
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Clearly, K(x, a) and its derivatives are continuous, satisfying conditions 1 and 2 of
Lemma 4.5. Since −1 ≤ tanh(x) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ sech(x) ≤ 1 for all real x, we can use
the triangle inequality to show that
∣∣∣∂iK(x,a)∂ai ∣∣∣ ≤ hi(x) where
hi(x) =
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
|x|i
σ2iw
bi/2c∑
k=1
|ci,k| (A.19)
with bxc denoting the largest integer y ≤ x. Therefore, the following relations show
dominating functions of the corresponding derivatives of K(x, a):
∣∣∣∣∂K(x, a)∂a
∣∣∣∣ ≤ h1(x) = e−
x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
|x|
σ2w
(A.20)
∣∣∣∣∂2K(x, a)∂a2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ h2(x) = e−
x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
|x|2
σ4w
(A.21)
∣∣∣∣∂3K(x, a)∂a3
∣∣∣∣ ≤ h3(x) = e−
x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
2|x|3
σ6w
(A.22)
∣∣∣∣∂4K(x, a)∂a4
∣∣∣∣ ≤ h4(x) = e−
x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
10|x|4
σ8w
(A.23)
∣∣∣∣∂5K(x, a)∂a5
∣∣∣∣ ≤ h5(x) = e−
x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
32|x|5
σ10w
(A.24)
∣∣∣∣∂6K(x, a)∂a6
∣∣∣∣ ≤ h6(x) = e−
x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
256|x|6
σ12w
(A.25)
Clearly, the above functions are integrable since they are found in the integrands of
the central absolute moments of the Gaussian distribution. Therefore, conditions 3
and 4 of Lemma 4.5 are met by the integrand of (4.10) and the integrand’s derivatives.
The use of Lemma 4.4 is conditional on the integrals over x of K(x, a) and its
derivatives in (A.12) being continuous on a ∈ [0,√b]. To prove the continuity of a
function f(x) on the interval [u, v], it is sufficient to show that limx→x0 f(x) = f(x0)
for all x0 ∈ [u, v]. We prove that
∫∞
−∞K(x, a)dx is continuous as follows:
106
lim
a→a0
∫ ∞
−∞
K(x, a)dx =
∫ ∞
−∞
lim
a→a0
K(x, a)dx =
∫ ∞
−∞
K(x, a0)dx (A.26)
where the first equality is because of the application of the dominated convergence
theorem, which is valid since we provide the function g(x) above that dominates
K(x, a) and is integrable, and the second equality is because of the continuity of
K(x, a). Similar steps can be used to prove the continuity of the integrals of the
derivatives of K(x, a), with the ultimate result being the satisfaction of the continuity
condition of Lemma 4.4.
A.4 Size of Secret for Covert Communication over AWGN
Channels is O(√n log n) Bits
Here we demonstrate how Alice and Bob can construct a binary coding scheme
for covert communication over the AWGN channel described in Chapter 4 that, on
average, requires an O(√n log n)-bit secret. Figure A.1 depicts the construction and
operation of this scheme.
The scheme is constructed in two stages. First, Alice and Bob randomly select
the symbol periods that they will use for their transmission by flipping a biased coin
n times, with probability of heads τ to be assigned later. The ith symbol period
is selected if the ith flip is heads. Denote the number of selected symbol periods
by ns and note that E [ns] = τn. Alice and Bob then use the best public binary
codebook with codewords of length ns on these selected ns symbol periods. They
also generate and share a random binary vector k where pK(k) =
∏ns
i=1 pK(ki) with
pK(0) = pK(1) =
1
2
. Alice XORs k and the binary representation of the codeword
c(Wk). The symbol location selection is independent of both the symbol and the
channel noise. When Alice is transmitting a codeword, the distribution of each of
Willie’s observations is Ps = (1− τ)N (0, σ2w) + τ2 (N (−a, σ2w) +N (a, σ2w)) and, thus,
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Figure A.1: Design of a covert communication system that allows Alice and Bob to
use any error-correction codes (including those known to Willie) to reliably transmit
O(√n) covert bits using O(√n log n) pre-shared secret bits. Step 1 (a) effectively
constructs a frequency/time-hopping pattern, as m symbol periods are selected to be
used in the transmission by flipping biased random coin n times, with probability of
heads O(√n): the ith symbol period is chosen if the ith flip is heads. On average,
O(√n) symbol periods is selected . Bob simply ignores the discarded symbol periods,
however, Willie cannot do so and thus observes mostly noise. Furthermore, XORing
by vector k prevents Willie’s exploitation of the error correction code’s structure to
detect Alice (rather than protects the message content). Note that in Chapter 7 the
extension of this scheme to Q-ary pulse-position modulation is implemented on an
optical testbed.
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D(Pw‖Ps) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
ln
e
− x2
2σ2w /
√
2piσw
(1−τ)e
− x2
2σ2w√
2piσw
+ τ
2
(
e
− (x+a)2
2σ2w√
2piσw
+ e
− (x−a)2
2σ2w√
2piσw
)dx (A.27)
There is no closed-form expression for (A.27), but we can upper-bound it using Lemma
4.4. The Taylor series expansion with respect to a around a = 0 can be done using
Lemma 4.5, with conditions for Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 proven similarly as in Theorem
4.2.2. This yields the following bound:
V (Pnw,Pns ) ≤
τa2
2σ2w
√
n
2
(A.28)
The only difference in (A.28) from (4.12) is τ in the numerator. Thus, if Alice sets the
product τa2 ≤ cf(n)√
n
, with c and f(n) as previously defined, she limits the performance
of Willie’s detector. This product is the average symbol power used by Alice. Now
fix a and set τ = O(1/√n). Since, on average, τn symbol periods are selected, it
takes (again, on average) O(√n) positive integers to enumerate the selected symbols.
There are n total symbols, and, thus, it takes at most log(n) bits to represent each
selected symbol location and O(√n log n) bits to represent all the locations of selected
symbols. Also, the average length of the secret binary vector k is O(√n) bits. Thus,
on average, Alice and Bob need to share O(√n log n) secret bits for Alice to reliably
transmit O(√n) covert bits in n channel uses employing this coding scheme.
A.5 Derivation of (5.24)
The normalized sums 1√
V (n)
∑T (n)
t=1,t6=tA (Ut −M(n)) and 1√V (n)
∑T (n)−1
t=1 (Ut −M(n))
in the events Eg(S(n), δ) and El(S(n), δ) are identically distributed. Thus, we denote
both of them by Z(n), and the distribution function of Z(n) by FZ(n)(z). Then (5.23)
can be re-written as follows:
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P(EC(S(n), δ)) =
1− FZ(n)(S(n) + δ) + FZ(n)(S(n)− δ)
2
. (A.29)
Denote the standard Gaussian distribution function by Φ(z) =
∫ z
−∞ φ(t)dt where
φ(t) = e
−t2/2√
2pi
is the standard Gaussian density function. The convergence of FZ(n)(z)
to Φ(z) as provided by the CLT for the triangular arrays in [9, Th. 27.2] is pointwise
in the argument z, and, since S(n) is the nth value in an arbitrary sequence, we cannot
use this result directly.
-ff . . .. . .
0
← Region 1 Region 3 →Region 2
G HG−δ G+δ H−δ H+δ
S(n)+δS(n)S(n)−δ
xk xk + 3δ
Figure A.2: The real number line partitioned into three regions for the analysis
of P(EC(S(n), δ)). G, H and δ are the constants that we select. S(n) satisfying
G ≤ S(n) ≤ H is illustrated.
However, let’s choose finite constants G < 0 and H > 0, and partition the real
number line into three regions as shown in Figure A.2. Clearly, for any n, S(n) is in
one of these regions. Next we demonstrate that (5.24) holds for an arbitrary S(n) by
appropriately selecting G, H, and δ.
Consider S(n) < G, or region 1 in Figure A.2:
P(EC(S(n), δ)) ≥ 1
2
(
1− FZ(n)(S(n) + δ)
)
(A.30)
≥ 1
2
(
1− FZ(n)(G+ δ)
)
. (A.31)
Because the convergence of FZ(n)(z) to Φ(z) is pointwise, given δ, , and G =
Φ−1(/3)− δ, there exists n2 such that, for all n ≥ n2,
P(EC(S(n), δ)) ≥ 1
2
(
1− Φ(G+ δ)− 
3
)
=
1
2
− 
3
(A.32)
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when S(n) < G. Similarly for S(n) > H, or region 3 in Figure A.2:
P(EC(S(n), δ)) ≥ 1
2
FZ(n)(S(n)− δ) (A.33)
≥ 1
2
FZ(n)(H + δ). (A.34)
Again, because the convergence of FZ(n)(z) to Φ(z) is pointwise, given δ, , and
H = Φ−1(1− /3) + δ, there exists n3 such that, for all n ≥ n3,
P(EC(S(n), δ)) ≥ 1
2
(
Φ(H + δ)− 
3
)
=
1
2
− 
3
(A.35)
when S(n) > H.
Finally, consider S(n) satisfying G ≤ S(n) ≤ H, or region 2 in Figure A.2).
Let’s assume that H and G are selected so that H − G is an integer multiple of
δ (e.g., using larger H than necessary, which results in the RHS of (A.35) being
smaller). Consider a sequence (xk)
(H−G)/δ+2
k=0 where x0 = G− δ, x1 = G, x2 = G + δ,
x3 = G + 2δ, . . . , x(H−G)/δ = H − δ, x(H−G)/δ+1 = H, x(H−G)/δ+2 = H + δ. Sequence
(xk)
(H−G)/δ+2
k=0 partitions region 2 into
H−G
δ
+2 subregions, and, for any S(n) satisfying
G ≤ S(n) ≤ H, there exists k ∈ {0, . . . , H−G
δ
+ 2
}
such that xk ≤ S(n) − δ <
S(n)+δ ≤ xk+3δ, as illustrated in Figure A.2. Therefore, since FZ(n)(z) is monotonic,
P(EC(S(n), δ)) ≥ 1− FZ(n)(xk + 3δ) + FZ(n)(xk)
2
. (A.36)
Since the convergence of FZ(n)(z) to Φ(z) is pointwise, for a given xk, δ, and , there
exists mk such that for all n ≥ mk,
P(EC(S(n), δ)) ≥
1− (Φ(xk + 3δ) + 6)+ (Φ(xk)− 6)
2
=
1
2
(
1−
∫ xk+3δ
xk
φ(t)dt− 
3
)
(A.37)
≥ 1
2
− 3δ
2
√
2pi
− 
6
(A.38)
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where (A.38) follows from φ(t) ≤ 1√
2pi
. Setting δ = 
√
2pi
9
and n4 = max{0,...,H−Gδ }(mk)
yields the desired lower bound for all n ≥ n4 when S(n) satisfies G ≤ S(n) ≤ H.
Therefore, for an arbitrary S(n) when n ≥ n0 where n0 = max(n2, n3, n4),
P
(
EC
(
S(n),

√
2pi
9
))
≥ 1
2
− 
3
. (A.39)
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APPENDIX B
QUANTUM COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION
THEORY PRELIMINARIES
This appendix provides a brief background on quantum mechanics, quantum op-
tics, and quantum information theory that will be useful in reading this thesis.
B.1 Quantum Mechanics: States, Evolution, and Measure-
ment1
While the foundations of quantum mechanics date to the early 1800s, the modern
discipline began with Max Planck’s work in the early 1900s. Max Planck discovered
that the energy of electromagnetic waves must be described as consisting of small
packets of energy or “quanta” in order to explain the spectrum of black-body ra-
diation. He postulated that a radiating body consisted of an enormous number of
elementary electronic oscillators, some vibrating at one frequency and some at an-
other, with all frequencies from zero to infinity being represented. The energy E of
any one oscillator was not permitted to take on any arbitrary value, but was pro-
portional to an integer multiple of the frequency f of the oscillator, i.e., E = hf ,
where h = 6.626× 10−34 Joule seconds is the Planck’s constant. In 1905, Albert Ein-
stein used Planck’s constant to explain the photoelectric effect by postulating that
the energy in a beam of light occurs in concentrations that he called “light quanta,”
which later became known as photons. This led to a theory that established a duality
1The content of this section was adapted from [38, Appendix A.1] with permission of the author.
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between subatomic particles and electromagnetic waves in which particles and waves
were neither one nor the other, but had certain properties of both.
The acceptance of quantum mechanics2 by the general physics community stems
from its accurate prediction of the physical behavior of systems, particularly of sys-
tems showing previously unexplained phenomena in which Newtonian mechanics fails,
such as the black body radiation, photoelectric effect, and stable electron orbits. Most
of classical physics is now recognized to be composed of special cases of quantum
mechanics and/or relativity theory. Paul Dirac brought relativity theory to bear on
quantum physics so that it could properly deal with events that occur at a substantial
fraction of the speed of light. Classical physics, however, also deals with gravitational
forces, and no one has yet been able to bring gravity into a unified theory with the
relativized quantum theory.
Here we provide a very brief account of the mathematical formulation of quantum
mechanics that serves as a background for the material in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
The detailed study of quantum mechanics is available in many popular texts on the
subject, such as [37] and [72].
B.1.1 Pure and Mixed States
A pure state in quantum mechanics is the entirety of information that can be
known about a physical system. Mathematically, a pure state is a unit length vector
|ψ〉 (known as a ket in Dirac notation) that lives in a complex Hilbert space H of
possible states for that system. Expressed in terms of a set of complete basis vectors
{|φn〉} ∈ H, |ψ〉 =
∑
n cn|φn〉 becomes a column vector of (a possibly infinite) set
of complex numbers cn, where
∑
n |cn|2 = 1. With each pure state |ψ〉 we associate
its Hermitian conjugate vector (known as a bra) 〈ψ|, which is a row vector when
expressed in a basis of H. The simplest example of a pure state is the state of a two-
2The term “quantum mechanics” was coined by Max Born in 1924.
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level system known as a qubit, which is the fundamental unit of quantum information,
in analogy with a bit of classical information. A qubit lives in the two-dimensional
complex vector space C2 spanned by two orthonormal vectors |0〉 and |1〉, and can be
expressed as |ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, where α, β ∈ C, and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
A mixed state in quantum mechanics represents classical (statistical) uncertainty
about a physical system. Mathematically, a mixed state is represented by a density
matrix (or a density operator) ρˆ, which is a positive definite, unit-trace operator in
H. The canonical form of a density matrix is
ρˆ =
∑
k
pk|ψk〉〈ψk| (B.1)
for any collection of pure states {|ψk〉}, and
∑
k pk = 1. The mixed state ρˆ can be
thought of as a statistical mixture of pure states |ψk〉, where the projection |ψk〉〈ψk|
is the density operator for the pure state |ψk〉, though it is worth pointing out that
the decomposition of a mixed state ρˆ as a mixture of pure states (B.1) is by no means
unique. A positive definite operator ρˆ has a spectral decomposition ρˆ =
∑
i λi|λi〉〈λi|
in terms of the eigenkets |λi〉, with the unit-trace condition on ρˆ requiring that the
eigenvalues λi form a probability distribution.
B.1.2 Composite Quantum Systems
We shall henceforth use symbols such as A,B,C to refer to quantum systems,
with HA referring to the Hilbert space whose unit vectors are the pure states of the
quantum system A. Given two systems A and B, the pure states of the composite
system AB correspond to unit vectors in HAB ≡ HA ⊗HB. We use superscripts on
pure state vectors and density matrices to identify the quantum system with which
they are associated. For a multipartite density matrix ρˆABC , we use the notation
ρˆAB = TrC{ρˆABC} ≡
∑
n
C〈φn|ρˆABC |φn〉C to denote the partial trace over one of the
constituent quantum systems.
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Let
{|φm〉A} and {|φn〉B} represent sets of basis vectors for the state spaces HA
and HB of quantum systems A and B respectively. Pure states |ψ〉AB and mixed
states ρˆAB of the composite system AB are defined similarly with an underlying set
of basis vectors |φmn〉AB , |φm〉A ⊗ |φn〉B ∈ HAB, viz.,
|ψ〉AB =
∑
mn
cmn|φmn〉AB, with
∑
mn
|cmn|2 = 1, and (B.2)
ρˆAB =
∑
k
pk|ψk〉ABAB〈ψk|, with pk ≥ 0,
∑
k
pk = 1, (B.3)
for pure states |ψk〉AB ∈ HAB.
A pure state |ψ〉AB ∈ HAB of a composite system AB can be classified into:
1. A product state: when |ψ〉AB can be decomposed into a tensor product of two
pure states in A and B, i.e., |ψ〉AB = |ψ〉A ⊗ |ψ〉B.
2. An entangled state: when |ψ〉AB cannot be expressed as a tensor product of two
pure states in A and B (for instance, the state (|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉)/√2 is a pure
entangled state of a two-qubit system).3
A mixed state ρˆAB ∈ B(HAB) of a composite system4 AB can be classified into:
1. A product state: when ρˆAB can be decomposed into a tensor product of two
states in A and B, i.e. ρˆAB = ρˆA ⊗ ρˆB, with at least one of ρˆA or ρˆB being a
mixed state.
2. A classically-correlated state: when ρˆAB is not a product state, but nevertheless
can be expressed as a statistical mixture of product pure states of the systems
3Entanglement is inherently a quantum-mechanical property of composite physical systems and
is stronger than any probabilistic correlation between the constituent systems that classical physics
permits. The individual states of the systems A and B, when their joint state |ψ〉AB is pure and
entangled, are mixed states, which are obtained by taking a partial trace over the other system, i.e.,
ρˆA = TrB{ρˆAB} = TrB{|ψ〉ABAB〈ψ|} ≡
∑
n
B〈φn|ρˆAB |φn〉B , and vice versa.
4B(H) is the set of all bounded operators in H.
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A and B, i.e. ρˆAB =
∑
k pk(|αk〉A ⊗ |βk〉B)(A〈αk| ⊗ B〈βk|) for any set of pure
states |αk〉 ∈ HA and |βk〉 ∈ HB, with pk ≥ 0 and
∑
k pk = 1.
3. An entangled state: when ρˆAB is a mixed state of the composite system AB
which is neither a product state nor a classically-correlated state, i.e., the joint
state of the composite system has a correlation between the systems A and B,
which is stronger than any (classical) probabilistic correlation. For instance,
consider equal mixtures of the Bell states |α〉 = (|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉)/√2 and |β〉 =
(|1〉|0〉 + |0〉|1〉)/√2. This is a mixed entangled state, (|α〉〈α| + |β〉〈β|)/2, of a
two-qubit system.5
B.1.3 Evolution
The time evolution of a closed system is defined in terms of the unitary time-
evolution operator Uˆ(t, t0) = exp(−iHˆ(t − t0)/~), where Hˆ is the time-independent
Hamiltonian of the closed system. The evolution of the system when it is in a pure
state |ψ(t0)〉 at time t0, and when it is in a mixed state ρˆ(t0) at time t0 are respectively
given by:
|ψ(t)〉 = Uˆ(t, t0)|ψ(t0)〉, and (B.4)
ρˆ(t) = Uˆ(t, t0)ρˆ(t0)Uˆ
†(t, t0). (B.5)
The time evolution of a general open system, i.e., a system that interacts with an
environment, is not unitary. While the joint state of the system and the environment
is a closed system and hence follows a unitary evolution,6 the evolution of the state of
5We reiterate that if a mixed state ρˆAB is not decomposable into a tensor product of mixed
states, i.e. ρˆAB 6= ρˆA⊗ ρˆB , the joint state ρˆAB is NOT necessarily entangled, and it could just have
classical correlations between the two constituent systems.
6We use a unitary transformation describing the beamsplitter model of the optical channel to
prove Lemma 6.1 in Appendix C.1. However, in that particular case, the derivation of the expression
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the system alone is non-unitary and is represented by a trace-preserving, completely-
positive (TPCP) map. A TPCP map E takes density operator ρˆin ∈ B(Hin) to density
operator ρˆout ∈ B(Hout), and satisfies the following properties:
1. E preserves the trace, i.e., Tr{E(ρˆ)} = 1 for any ρˆin ∈ B(Hin).
2. E is a convex linear map on the set of density operators ρˆin ∈ B(Hin), i.e.
E(∑k pkρˆk) = ∑k pkE(ρˆk) for any probability distribution {pk}.
3. E is a completely positive map. This means that E maps positive operators in
B(Hin) to positive operators on B(Hout), and, for any reference system R and
for any positive operator ρˆ ∈ B(Hin ⊗ R), we have that (E ⊗ IR)ρˆ ≥ 0, where
IˆR is the identity operator on R.
It can be shown that any TPCP map can be expressed in an operator sum representa-
tion [69], E(ρˆ) = ∑k AˆkρˆAˆ†k, where the Kraus operators Ak must satisfy∑k Aˆ†kAˆk = Iˆ
in order to preserve the trace of E(ρˆ).
B.1.4 Observables and Measurement
In quantum mechanics, each dynamical observable (for instance position, momen-
tum, energy, angular momentum, etc.) is represented by a Hermitian operator Mˆ .
Being a Hermitian operator, Mˆ must have a complete orthonormal set of eigenvec-
tors {|φm〉} with associated real eigenvalues φm that satisfy Mˆ |φm〉 = φm|φm〉. The
outcome of a measurement of Mˆ on a quantum state ρˆ always leads to an eigenvalue
φn with probability p(n) = 〈φn|ρˆ|φn〉. Given that the measurement result obtained is
φn, the post-measurement state of the system is the eigenstate |φn〉 corresponding to
the eigenvalue φn. This phenomenon is known as the “collapse” of the wave function.
Thus, if the system is in an eigenstate of a measurement operator Mˆ to begin with,
for the output state of the beamsplitter is relatively simple since the environment port is in a vacuum
state; the derivation is substantially more complicated for a non-vacuum environment.
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the measurement result is known with certainty and the measurement of Mˆ does not
alter the state of the system. The Hermitian operator Hˆ corresponding to measuring
the total energy of a closed quantum system is known as the Hamiltonian for the
system. The measurement of an observable as described above is also known as a
projective measurement, as the measurement projects the state onto an eigenspace of
the measurement operator.
In analogy to the evolution of an open system described above, a more general
measurement on a system entails a projective measurement performed on the joint
state of the system in question along with an auxiliary environment prepared in some
initial state. This general measurement scheme can be described by a set of positive
semi-definite operators
{
Πˆm
}
that satisfy
∑
m Πˆm = Iˆ. If a measurement is per-
formed on a quantum state ρˆ, the outcome of the measurement is n with probability
p(n) = Tr{ρˆΠˆn}. The above description of a quantum measurement is known as the
positive operator-valued measure (POVM) formalism and the operators
{
Πˆm
}
are
known as POVM operators. The POVM operators by themselves do not determine a
post-measurement state. POVM formalism is crucial to quantum hypothesis testing
which is why we use it extensively in Chapter 6.
B.2 Trace Distance and Quantum Binary Hypothesis Testing
Willie has to perform a quantum binary hypothesis test to determine whether Alice
is transmitting. Here we develop the trace distance lower bound on the probability
of error in discriminating between two quantum states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1, which we use in the
proof of Theorem 6.3.1. We prove the quantum analog of Lemma A.1, thus arguing
that the assumption of a non-trivial prior distribution on Alice’s transmission state
does not impact our asymptotic results.
First, the trace distance between two quantum states is defined as follows:
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Definition B.1 (Trace distance [88]). The trace distance between two density oper-
ators σˆ and ρˆ is
‖σˆ − ρˆ‖1 = Tr{
√
(σˆ − ρˆ)†(σˆ − ρˆ)}. (B.6)
Trace distance relates to the probability of successful discrimination between two
quantum states via the following lemma:
Lemma B.1. One half of the trace distance 1
2
‖ρˆ− σˆ‖1 between quantum states ρˆ and
σˆ is equal to the largest probability difference that two states ρˆ and σˆ could give to the
outcome of the same measurement given by the positive semi-definite operator Λˆ with
eigenvalues upper-bounded by one:
1
2
‖ρˆ− σˆ‖1 = max
0≤Λˆ≤Iˆ
Tr {Λ (ρˆ− σˆ)} . (B.7)
Proof. See [88, Lemma 9.1.1].
Denote by ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 the respective quantum states that Willie observes on his
channel from Alice when she does not transmit and transmits. Willie constructs a
binary POVM {Λˆ0, Λˆ1} to discriminate between these states. Suppose that Willie
knows that Alice will not transmit (i.e., H0 is true) with probability pi0 and that she
will transmit (i.e., H1 is true) with probability pi1 = 1− pi0. Thus, pi0 and pi1 denote
the prior probabilities of states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1, respectively, and the probability of error
in discriminating between ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 is
P(w)e = pi0 Tr{Λˆ1ρˆ0}+ pi1 Tr{Λˆ0ρˆ1}. (B.8)
The following lemma generalizes the result for pi0 = pi1 =
1
2
given in [88, Section 9.1.4]
to pi0 6= pi1:
120
Lemma B.2 (Quantum version of Lemma A.1).
P(w)e ≥ min(pi0, pi1)−
max(pi0, pi1)
2
‖ρˆ0 − ρˆ1‖1. (B.9)
Proof. First, suppose that pi0 ≤ pi1. Since {Λˆ0, Λˆ1} is a POVM, Λˆ0 + Λˆ1 = Iˆ. Substi-
tuting Λˆ1 = Iˆ − Λˆ0 in (B.8) and re-arranging the terms, we obtain
P(w)e = pi0 Tr{ρˆ0} − pi0 Tr{Λˆ0ρˆ0}+ pi1 Tr{Λˆ0ρˆ1} (B.10)
= pi0 − Tr{Λˆ0(pi0ρˆ0 − pi1ρˆ1)}, (B.11)
where (B.11) is because the eigenvalues of a density operator sum to one. When
the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are equal: pi0 = pi1 =
1
2
, an application of
Lemma B.1 yields the lower bound P(w)e ≥ 12 − 14‖ρˆ0 − ρˆ1‖1. Now,
P(w)e = pi0 − Tr{Λˆ0(pi0ρˆ0 − pi1ρˆ1 + pi1ρˆ0 − pi1ρˆ0)} (B.12)
= pi0 − pi1 Tr{Λˆ0(ρˆ0 − ρˆ1)}+ (pi1 − pi0) Tr{Λˆ0ρˆ0} (B.13)
≥ pi0 − pi1 Tr{Λˆ0(ρˆ0 − ρˆ1)} (B.14)
≥ pi0 − pi1
2
‖ρˆ0 − ρˆ1‖1, (B.15)
where (B.14) follows since pi0 ≤ pi1 and Tr{Λˆ0ρˆ0} ≥ 0, and (B.15) follows by Lemma B.1.
When pi1 ≤ pi0, the same steps are used with substitution of Λˆ0 = Iˆ − Λˆ1 in (B.8)
instead of Λˆ1 = Iˆ − Λˆ0, and replacement of pi1ρˆ0 − pi1ρˆ0 with pi0ρˆ1 − pi0ρˆ1 inside the
trace operator in (B.12). This yields
P(w)e ≥ pi1 −
pi0
2
‖ρˆ0 − ρˆ1‖1, (B.16)
and the lemma.
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Thus, while Lemma B.2 demonstrates that additional information about the like-
lihood of Alice transmitting (in the form of unequal prior probabilities pi0 6= pi1) helps
Willie, the square root law still holds via the bounds on the trace distance ‖ρˆ0− ρˆ1‖1.
B.3 Quantum Entropy and Information Measures7
Amongst various measures of how mixed is a quantum state ρˆ, the most relevant
one information-theoretically is the von Neumann entropy S(ρˆ), which is defined as
S(ρˆ) = −Tr{ρˆ ln ρˆ} (B.17)
= H({λn}), (B.18)
where H({λn}) ≡ −
∑
n λn lnλn is the Shannon entropy of the eigenvalues λn of
ρˆ. Hence, it is obvious that the von Neumann entropy of a pure state is zero, i.e.,
S(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = 0. Most of quantum information theory is built around the von Neumann
entropy measure of a quantum state. We now review a few important properties of
von Neumann entropy.
B.3.1 Data Compression
In analogy with the role that Shannon entropy plays in classical information the-
ory, it can be shown that S(ρˆA) is the optimal compression rate on the quantum
system A in the state ρˆA ∈ B(HA). In other words, for large n, the density matrix
ρˆA⊗n has nearly all of its support on a subspace of H⊗nA (called the typical subspace)
of dimension 2nS(ρˆ
A). We will henceforth use the notation S(A) interchangeably with
S(ρˆA) to mean von Neumann entropy of the system A (or the von Neumann entropy
of the state ρˆA). If A is a classical random variable, we use the function H(A) to
denote the Shannon entropy of A.
7The content of this section was adapted from [38, Appendix A.2] with permission of the author.
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B.3.2 Subadditivity
The joint entropy S(A,B) of a bipartite system AB is always upper bounded by
the sum of the entropies of the individual systems A and B, i.e.,
S(A,B) ≤ S(A) + S(B), (B.19)
with equality when the joint state of AB is a product state, i.e., ρˆAB = ρˆA ⊗ ρˆB. We
use the subadditivity of von Neumann entropy in the proof of Theorem 6.5.1.
B.3.3 Joint and Conditional Entropy
The entropy of a bipartite system AB in a joint state ρˆAB is defined as S(A,B) =
−Tr{ρˆAB ln ρˆAB}. Even though there is no direct definition of quantum condi-
tional entropy as in classical information theory, one may define a conditional en-
tropy (in analogy to its classical counterpart) as S(A|B) = S(A,B) − S(B). The
quantum conditional entropy can be negative, contrary to its classical counterpart.8
However, like its classical counterpart, conditioning can only reduce entropy, i.e.,
S(A|B,C) ≤ S(A|B). Discarding a quantum system can never increase quantum
mutual information (see Section B.3.5, i.e., I(A;B) ≤ I(A;B,C).
B.3.4 Classical-quantum States
Here we define the notion of classical-quantum states and classical-quantum chan-
nels. We associate any classical set X with a Hilbert space HX having orthonormal
basis
{|x〉X}
x∈X . Thus, for any classical random variable X which takes the values
x ∈ X with probability p(x), we can write a density matrix
8For the bipartite two-qubit Bell state |ψ〉AB = (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2, S(A|B) = S(A,B)− S(B) =
0− 1 = −1. The joint state of the system AB is a pure state, hence S(A,B) = 0, whereas the state
of system B, ρˆB = TrA{ρˆAB} = (|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)/2 is a mixed state with entropy S(B) = 1.
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ρˆX =
∑
x
p(x)|x〉〈x|X ≡
⊕
x
p(x) (B.20)
which is diagonal in the orthonormal basis
{|x〉X}
x∈X . Similarly, an ensemble of
quantum states
{
ρˆBx , p(x)
}
can be associated with a block diagonal classical-quantum
(cq) state for the system XB:
ρˆXB =
∑
x
p(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρˆBx ≡
⊕
x
p(x)ρˆBx , (B.21)
where X is a classical random variable and B is a quantum system with conditional
density matrices ρˆBx . The conditional entropy S(B|X) is then
S(B|X) =
∑
x
p(x)S(ρˆBx ). (B.22)
B.3.5 Quantum Mutual Information
The quantum mutual information I(A;B) of a bipartite system AB is defined
analogously to Shannon mutual information as:
I(A;B) = S(A) + S(B)− S(A,B) (B.23)
= S(A)− S(A|B) (B.24)
= S(B)− S(B|A). (B.25)
A bipartite product mixed state ρˆA⊗ ρˆB has zero quantum mutual information. The
quantum mutual information of a cq-state (B.21) is given by
I(X;B) = S(B)− S(B|X) (B.26)
= S
(∑
x
p(x)ρˆBx
)
−
∑
x
p(x)S(ρˆBx ) (B.27)
, χ
(
p(x), ρˆBx
)
, (B.28)
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where χ
(
p(x), ρˆBx
)
is defined as the Holevo information of the ensemble of states{
p(x), ρˆBx
}
.
B.3.6 The Holevo Bound
Suppose Alice chooses a classical message index x ∈ X with probability p(x) and
encodes x by preparing a quantum state ρˆAx . She sends her state to Bob through a
channel E , which then produces a state ρˆBx = E(ρˆAx ) at Bob’s end, conditioned on the
classical index x. In order to obtain information about x, Bob measures his state ρˆBx
using a POVM
{
Πˆy
}
. The probability that the outcome of his POVM measurement
is y given that Alice sent x is p(y|x) = Tr{ρˆBx Πˆy}. Using X and Y to denote the
random variables of which x and y are instances, we know from Shannon information
theory that, when Bob uses the POVM
{
Πˆy
}
, the maximum rate at which Alice can
transmit information to Bob using a suitable encoding and decoding scheme is given
by the maximum of the mutual information I(X;Y ) over all input distributions p(x).
Holevo, Schumacher and Westmoreland showed [43, 40, 73] that for a given prior p(x)
and POVM
{
Πˆy
}
, the single-use Holevo information is an upper bound on Shannon
mutual information,
I(X;Y ) ≤ χ (p(x), ρˆBx ) , (B.29)
which is known as the Holevo bound. Maximizing over p(x) on both sides, one obtains
max
p(x)
I(X;Y ) ≤ max
p(x)
χ
(
p(x), E(ρˆAx )
)
. (B.30)
As the right-hand side does not depend on the choice of the POVM elements
{
Πˆy
}
,
the inequality is preserved by a further maximization of the left hand side over the
measurements,
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max
p(x),{Πˆy}
I(X;Y ) ≤ max
p(x)
χ
(
p(x), E(ρˆAx )
)
, or (B.31)
C1,1(E) ≤ C1,∞(E), (B.32)
where C1,1(E) is the maximum value of the Shannon Information I(X;Y ) optimized
over all possible symbol-by-symbol POVM measurements
{
Πˆy
}
. C1,∞(E) on the other
hand, is the maximum value of the Shannon Information I(X;Y ) optimized not only
over all possible symbol-by-symbol POVM measurements, but also over arbitrary
multiple-channel-use POVM measurements. As we see below, C1,∞(E) is the capacity
of the channel E for transmission of classical information if Alice is limited to single
channel uses (i.e., symbols ρˆAx ) and Bob may choose any joint measurement at the
receiver.
B.3.7 Ultimate Classical Communication Capacity: the HSW Theorem
The classical capacity of a quantum channel is established by random coding
arguments akin to those employed in classical information theory. A set of symbols
{j} is represented by a collection of input states {ρˆj} that are selected according to
some prior distribution {pj}. The output states {ρˆ′j} are obtained by applying the
channel’s TPCP map E(·) to these input symbols. According to the HSW Theorem,
the capacity of this channel, in nats per use, is
C = sup
n
(Cn,∞/n) = sup
n
{max
{pj ,ρˆj}
[χ(pj, E⊗n(ρˆj))/n]}, (B.33)
where Cn,∞ is the capacity achieved when coding is performed over n-channel-use
symbols and arbitrary joint-detection measurement is used at the receiver. The supre-
mum over n is necessitated by the fact that channel capacity may be superadditive,
viz., Cn,∞ > nC1,∞ is possible for quantum channels, whereas such is not the case for
classical channels. The HSW Theorem tells us that Holevo information plays the role
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for classical information transmission over a quantum channel that Shannon mutual
information does for a classical channel.
Neither (B.28) nor (B.33) have any explicit dependence on the quantum mea-
surement used at the receiver, thus, measurement optimization is implicit within
the HSW Theorem. To obtain the same capacity C by maximizing Shannon mu-
tual information we can introduce a positive-operator-valued measure (POVM) [69],
representing the multi-symbol quantum measurement (a joint measurement over an
entire codeword) performed at the receiver. For example, if single-use encoding is per-
formed with priors {pj}, the probability of receiving a particular m-symbol codeword,
k ≡ (k1, k1, . . . , km), given that j ≡ (j1, j2, . . . , jm) was sent is
Pr( k | j ) ≡ Tr
{
Πˆk
[
m⊗
l=1
E(ρˆjl)
]}
, (B.34)
where the POVM, {Πˆk}, is a set of Hermitian operators on the Hilbert space of
output states for m channel uses that resolve the identity (i.e.,
∑
k Πˆk = Iˆ). From
{ pj,Pr( k | j )} we can then write down Shannon mutual information for single-
use encoding and m-symbol codewords that must be maximized. Ultimately, by
allowing for n-channel-use symbols and optimizing over the priors, the signal states,
and the POVM, we would arrive at the capacity predicted by the HSW Theorem.
Evidently, determining capacity is easier via the HSW Theorem than it is via Shannon
mutual information, because one less optimization is required. However, finding a
practical system that can approach capacity requires paying attention to the receiver
measurement.
B.4 Basic Description of Optical Modes
An optical mode is an optical field function that couples an input at the trans-
mitter with an output at the receiver. To define the number of optical modes n
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available to Alice and Bob more formally, consider a free-space L meter line-of-sight
optical channel with areas of transmitter and receiver apertures At and Ar, respec-
tively. Let’s assume quasi-monochromatic transmission at center-wavelength λ. The
free-space Fresnel number product of this channel is Df =
AtAr
(λL)2
. When Df  1, the
channel is in the far-field regime, and only one spatial mode—the spatial optical field
function at the transmitter aperture—can couple any appreciable fraction of power
into the receiver aperture. In this case, the transmitter-to-receiver power transmis-
sivity η ≈ Df . On the other hand, when Df  1, the channel is in the near-field
regime, and there are approximately Df mutually-orthogonal transmitter-receiver
spatial modes, with each having near-unit receiver-to-transmitter power transmissiv-
ity. These spatial modes are analogous to parallel channels.
Suppose the transmitter employs M orthogonal spatial modes with transmissiv-
ities η1, η2, . . . , ηM . Now consider a time-bandwidth product K = WT , where T is
the length of the total transmission window (in seconds), and W is the total fre-
quency bandwidth (in Hz and determined by bandwidths of the transmitter and the
receiver). Thus, there are K mutually-orthogonal temporal modes that can be accom-
modated within that time-bandwidth product. A burst of communication that uses
K temporal modes on each of M spatial modes transmits using n = MK = MWT
spatio-temporal modes. Furthermore, both orthogonal polarizations of light can be
used to increase the total to n = 2MWT spatio-temporal-polarization modes.
Typically, single-mode fiber is used in commercial applications. A single-mode L
meter fiber link supports communication using a single spatial mode (M = 1) with
power transmissivity η = e−αL, where α denotes the fiber’s loss coefficient. In that
case n = 2WT , assuming the fiber can transmit both polarizations.
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APPENDIX C
QUANTUM COVERT COMMUNICATION
MISCELLANEA
C.1 Proof of Lemma 6.1
A beamsplitter can be described as a unitary transformation UBS from the two
input modes (Alice’s and the environment’s ports) to the two output modes (Bob’s
and Willie’s ports). Given a Fock state input |t〉A on Alice’s port and vacuum input
|0〉E on the environment’s port, the output at Bob’s and Willie’s ports is described
as follows [13, Section IV.D]:
UBS |t〉A |0〉E =
t∑
m=0
√(
t
m
)
ηmw (1− ηw)t−m |m〉W |t−m〉B .
Thus,
U⊗nBS |t〉A
n |0〉En =
n⊗
i=1
ti∑
mi=0
√(
ti
mi
)
ηmiw (1− ηw)ti−mi |mi〉Wi |ti −mi〉Bi ,
which implies
U⊗nBS |ψ〉A
n |0〉En =
∑
t∈Nn0
at
n⊗
i=1
ti∑
mi=0
√(
ti
mi
)
ηmiw (1− ηw)ti−mi |mi〉Wi |ti −mi〉Bi
≡ |φ〉WnBn .
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Now, the partial trace of the output state ρBW = |φ〉WnBn over Bob’s system reveals
Willie’s output state:
ρW
n
= TrBn
[
|φ〉WnBn WnBn〈φ|
]
=
∑
x∈Nn0
∣∣∣Bn〈x|φ〉WnBn∣∣∣2 ,
with
Bn〈x|φ〉WnBn =
∑
t∈Nn0
at
n⊗
i=1
ti∑
mi=0
√(
ti
mi
)
ηmiw (1− ηw)ti−mi |mi〉Wi Bi〈xi|ti −mi〉Bi
=
∑
t∈Nn0
at
n⊗
i=1
√(
ti
xi
)
ηti−xiw (1− ηw)xi |ti − xi〉Wi , (C.1)
where equation (C.1) is because the Fock states are orthogonal. Thus,
Wn〈s| ρˆWn |s〉Wn =
∑
x∈Nn0
∣∣∣Wn〈s| Bn〈x|φ〉WnBn∣∣∣2 , (C.2)
where
Wn〈s| Bn〈x|φ〉WnBn =
∑
t∈Nn0
at
n∏
i=1
√(
ti
xi
)
ηti−xiw (1− ηw)xiδsi,ti−xi
= ax+s
n∏
i=1
√(
xi + si
xi
)
ηsiw (1− ηw)xi , (C.3)
with δa,b =
 1 if a = b0 otherwise . Substituting k = x + s into equation (C.3) and substi-
tuting the right-hand side (RHS) of (C.3) into equation (C.2) yields
Wn〈s| ρˆWn |s〉Wn =
∑
k∈Nn0
∣∣∣∣∣ak
n∏
i=1
√(
ki
si
)
ηsiw (1− ηw)ki−si
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∑
k∈Nn0
|ak|2
n∏
i=1
(
ki
si
)
ηsiw (1− ηw)ki−si (C.4)
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where equation (C.4) is because ηw ∈ [0, 1).
C.2 Proof of Lemma 6.2
Express D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1) = −Tr{ρˆ0 ln ρˆ1} − S(ρˆ0), where S(ρˆ0) ≡ −Tr[ρˆ0 ln ρˆ0] is the
von Neumann entropy of the state ρˆ0:
S(ρˆ0) = ln(1 + n¯0) + n¯0 ln
(
1 +
1
n¯0
)
. (C.5)
Now,
Tr[ρˆ0 ln ρˆ1] = Tr
[( ∞∑
n=0
n¯n0
(1 + n¯0)1+n
|n〉 〈n|
)( ∞∑
n=0
ln
n¯n1
(1 + n¯1)1+n
|n〉 〈n|
)]
=
∞∑
n=0
n¯n0
(1 + n¯0)1+n
ln
n¯n1
(1 + n¯1)1+n
=
1
1 + n¯0
ln
1
1 + n¯1
∞∑
n=0
(
n¯0
1 + n¯0
)n
+ ln
n¯1
1 + n¯1
∞∑
n=0
n
1 + n¯0
·
(
n¯0
1 + n¯0
)n
= ln
1
1 + n¯1
+ n¯0 ln
n¯1
1 + n¯1
, (C.6)
where (C.6) is because the geometric series
∞∑
n=0
(
n¯0
1 + n¯0
)n
=
(
1− n¯0
1 + n¯0
)−1
and
∞∑
n=0
n
1 + n¯0
(
n¯0
1 + n¯0
)n
= n¯0
is the expression for the mean of geometrically-distributed random variable X ∼
Geom
(
1
1+n¯0
)
. Combining (C.5) and (C.6) yields the lemma.
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APPENDIX D
EXPERIMENTAL MISCELLANEA
D.1 Calculation of Bob’s Maximum Throughput
The Q-ary PPM signaling combined with Bob’s device for assigning symbols to
received PPM frames induces a discrete memoryless channel described by a con-
ditional distribution P(Y |X), where X ∈ {1, . . . , Q} is Alice’s input symbol and
Y ∈ {1, . . . , Q, E} is Bob’s output symbol with E indicating an erasure. Since Bob
observes Alice’s pulse with probability 1− e−n¯(b)det , P(Y |X) is characterized as follows:
P(Y = x|X = x) =
(
1− e−n¯(b)det
)Q−1∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
(
p
(b)
D
)i (
1− p(b)D
)Q−1−i
+ e−n¯
(b)
det
Q∑
i=1
1
i
(
p
(b)
D
)i (
1− p(b)D
)Q−i
P(Y = E|X = x) = e−n¯(b)det
(
1− p(b)D
)Q
P(Y = y, y /∈ {x, E}|X = x) = 1− P(Y = x|x)− P(Y = E|x)
Q− 1
The symmetry of this channel allows straightforward computation of its Shannon
capacity [75] Cs = I(X;Y ), where P(X = x) = 1Q for x = 1, . . . , Q and I(X;Y )
is the mutual information between X and Y . We use the estimates from Table 7.1
to compute Cs for each regime, and plot
Csζn
Q
in Figure 7.2 since ζn
Q
is the expected
number of PPM frames selected for transmission.
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D.2 Mathematical Details of Willie’s Hypothesis Test
Willie collects the click record : a binary sequence xw =
{
x
(w)
j
}n
j=1
, x
(w)
j ∈ {0, 1}
of his single photon detector’s (SPD’s) observations of the channel from Alice, where
“0” and “1” indicate the absence and the presence of a click, respectively. The
hypothesis test on Alice’s transmission state is between two point hypotheses, as
Alice is either not transmitting (H0) or transmitting (H1). Thus, the log-likelihood
ratio test minimizes Willie’s detection error probability P(w)e [59, Theorem 13.1.1].
Here we derive Willie’s test statistic.
The log-likelihood ratio is L = ln f1(xw)
f0(xw)
, where f0(xw) and f1(xw) are the likeli-
hood functions of the click record xw corresponding respectively to Alice being quiet
and transmitting. When Alice does not transmit, Willie only observes dark clicks.
Suppose that the dead time of Willie’s SPD td = 0. Then Willie’s detector readings
are independent, and xw is a vector of i.i.d. Bernoulli
(
p
(w)
D
)
random variables. The
likelihood function of xw under H0 is then:
f0(xw) =
(
p
(w)
D
)∑n
j=1 x
(w)
j
(
1− p(w)D
)∑n
j=1 1−x(w)j
(D.1)
=
n/Q∏
i=1
(
p
(w)
D
)∑Q
j=1 x
(w)
lij
(
1− p(w)D
)∑Q
j=1 1−x(w)lij , (D.2)
where lij = (i − 1)Q + j and in (D.2) we evaluate each PPM symbol separately, as
that would be convenient later.
When the dead time of the detectors td > 0, as is the case for our SPDs, the
observations are not completely independent. Since a click is always followed by
td observations without any clicks, each occurrence of “1” in xw is followed by td
occurrences of “0” with probability one. Thus, the likelihood function given in (D.2)
has to be adjusted as follows:
f0(xw) =
n/Q∏
i=1
(
p
(w)
D
)∑Q
j=1 x
(w)
lij
(
1− p(w)D
)∑Q
j=1 x
(w)
lij
, (D.3)
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where x
(w)
lij
= (1 − x(w)lij )(1 −
∑td
k=1 xlij−k), and the sum
∑td
k=1 xlij−k ∈ {0, 1} for i =
1, . . . , n/Q and j = 1, . . . , Q, since the clicks are at least td observations apart. We
note that, adopting the convention
∑0
i=1 f(i) = 0, equations (D.2) and (D.3) are
identical when td = 0.
Now consider the scenario when Alice transmits. Again, we first derive the likeli-
hood function assuming the dead time td = 0, and then adjust for td > 0. The secret
shared between Alice and Bob identifies the random subset S of the PPM frames
used for transmission, and a random vector k which is modulo-added to the code-
word. Modulo addition of k effectively selects a random pulse location within each
PPM frame. Note that, while both the construction in the proof of Theorem 7.1.1
and Alice’s encoder described in Section 7.2.1.1 generate S first and then k, the order
of these operations can be reversed: we can first fix a random location of a pulse in
each of n/Q PPM frames, and then select a random subset of these frames. Consider
Willie’s observation of the ith PPM frame, and assume that the mth mode is used
if the frame is selected for transmission. Denote the probability of Willie’s detector
observing Alice’s pulse by p
(w)
r = 1− e−n¯(w)det . By construction, frames are selected for
transmission independent of each other with probability ζ. Willie’s detector registers
a click on the mth mode of the ith PPM frame when one of the following disjoint
events occurs:
• The ith PPM frame is selected and pulse is detected by Willie in the mth mode
of this frame (probability ζp
(w)
r );
• The ith PPM frame is selected, but Willie, instead of detecting the pulse, records
a dark click in the mth mode of this frame (probability ζ
(
1− p(w)r
)
p
(w)
D ); and,
• Even though the ith PPM frame is not selected, Willie records a dark click in
the mth mode of this frame (probability (1− ζ)p(w)D ).
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The probability of the union of these events is
p(w)s = ζp
(w)
r
(
1− p(w)D
)
+ p
(w)
D . (D.4)
Therefore, assuming detector dead time td = 0, Willie observes an independent
Bernoulli
(
p
(w)
s
)
random variable in the mth mode of the ith PPM frame. Since
Alice only uses the mth mode for transmission, in modes other than the mth, Willie
observes a set of Q− 1 i.i.d. Bernoulli
(
p
(w)
D
)
random variables corresponding to dark
clicks, again, assuming td = 0. Thus, the likelihood function of xw under H1 when
td = 0 is
f1(xw) =
n/Q∏
i=1
1
Q
Q∑
m=1
(
p(w)s
)x(w)lim (1− p(w)s )1−x(w)lim (p(w)D )∑Qj=1j 6=l x(w)lij (1− p(w)D )∑Qj=1j 6=l 1−x(w)lij ,
where, as before, lij = (i− 1)Q+ j. Adjustment for td > 0 yields
f1(xw) =
n/Q∏
i=1
1
Q
Q∑
m=1
(
p(w)s
)x(w)lim (1− p(w)s )x(w)lim (p(w)D )∑Qj=1j 6=l x(w)lij (1− p(w)D )∑Qj=1j 6=l x(w)lij ,
where, as before, x
(w)
lij
= (1− x(w)lij )(1−
∑td
k=1 xlij−k).
The likelihood ratio is
f1(xw)
f0(xw)
=
n/Q∏
i=1
1
Q
Q∑
m=1
(
p
(w)
s
p
(w)
D
)x(w)lim (1− p(w)s
1− p(w)D
)(1−x(w)lim )(1−∑tdk=1 xlim−k)
. (D.5)
Now, when x
(w)
lim
= 1, the corresponding summation term in (D.5) is p
(w)
s
p
(w)
D
. When x
(w)
lim
=
0 and the no-click event is within the detector dead time (that is, 1−∑tdk=1 xlim−k = 0),
then the corresponding summation term is one; otherwise the corresponding summa-
tion term is 1−p
(w)
s
1−p(w)D
. Denote by y
(w)
i =
∑Q
m=1 x
(w)
lim
the number of clicks observed in
the ith PPM frame, and by y
(w)
i the number of no-click events in the i
th PPM frame
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within the detector dead time (where the click that triggered the detector reset may
not necessarily be in the same frame). Equation (D.5) can thus be simplified as
follows:
f1(xw)
f0(xw)
=
n/Q∏
i=1
1
Q
p(w)s y(w)i
p
(w)
D
+ y
(w)
i +
(
1− p(w)s
)(
Q− y(w)i − y(w)i
)
1− p(w)D

=
n/Q∏
i=1
[
1 + ζp(w)r
(
y
(w)
i
Qp
(w)
D
+
y
(w)
i
Q
− 1
)]
. (D.6)
where equation (D.6) is obtained by noting that p
(w)
s
p
(w)
D
=
ζp
(w)
r (1−p(w)D )
p
(w)
D
+ 1 and 1−p
(w)
s
1−p(w)D
=
1− ζp(w)r . Taking the logarithm of (D.6) yields the log-likelihood ratio
ln
f1(xw)
f0(xw)
=
n/Q∑
i=1
ln
[
1 + ζp(w)r
(
y
(w)
i
Qp
(w)
D
+
y
(w)
i
Q
− 1
)]
. (D.7)
For small ζ, the Taylor series expansion of the summand in (D.7) at ζ = 0 yields
ln
[
1 + ζp(w)r
(
y
(w)
i
Qp
(w)
D
+
y
(w)
i
Q
− 1
)]
≈ ζp(w)r
(
y
(w)
i
Qp
(w)
D
+
y
(w)
i
Q
− 1
)
. (D.8)
Since
∑n/Q
i=1 y
(w)
i = Y td, where Y =
∑n/Q
i=1 y
(w)
i is the total click count, the log-
likelihood ratio can be approximated as follows:
ln
f1(xw)
f0(xw)
≈ ζp
(w)
r
Qp
(w)
D
(Y (1 + p
(w)
D td)− np(w)D ). (D.9)
Since the approximation in (D.9) is an invertible function of the total click count Y ,
we use it as the test statistic for Willie. We also note that, because p
(w)
D td  1 in
our experiments, the dead time causes only a minimal performance degradation for
Willie’s detector.1
1We also conjecture that the availability of a detector with shorter dead time to Bob would
only increase the number of covert bits that Alice can reliably transmit by a multiplicative constant
related to Willie’s detector dead time and not affect the square root scaling law.
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D.3 Gaussian Approximation of P(w)e
At the end of the previous section we argued that the detector dead time does
not substantially impact Willie’s performance, as the dead time is short relative to
the average time between clicks. Here we show how setting td = 0 yields a useful
analytical approximation of P(w)e .
First consider the case when Alice does not transmit. Since td = 0, the to-
tal click count is a binomial random variable Y ∼ B
(
y; p
(w)
D , n
)
whose distribu-
tion, for large n, can be approximated using the central limit theorem by a Gaus-
sian distribution Φ (y;µ0, σ
2
0) with µ0 = np
(w)
D and σ
2
0 = np
(w)
D
(
1− p(w)D
)
, where
Φ (x;µ, σ2) = 1√
2piσ
∫ x
−∞ e
− |t−µ|2
2σ2 dt is the distribution function of a Gaussian random
variable N (x;µ, σ2).
Now consider the case when Alice transmits. Since S and k are unknown to Willie,
the total click count is the sum of two independent but not identical binomial random
variables Y = X + Z, where X ∼ B
(
x; p
(w)
D , n− nQ
)
is the number of dark clicks in
the n − n
Q
modes that Alice never uses in a PPM scheme and Z ∼ B
(
z; p
(w)
s , nQ
)
is
the contribution from the n
Q
modes that Alice can use to transmit, with p
(w)
s defined
in (D.4). By the central limit theorem, for large n, the distribution of X can be ap-
proximated using a Gaussian distribution Φ(x;µX , σ
2
X) where µX =
(
n− n
Q
)
p
(w)
D and
σ2X =
(
n− n
Q
)
p
(w)
D
(
1− p(w)D
)
. Similarly, the distribution of Z can be approximated
by a Gaussian distribution Φ (z;µZ , σ
2
Z) where µZ =
n
Q
(
ζp
(w)
r +
(
1− ζp(w)r
)
p
(w)
D
)
and
σ2Z =
n
Q
(
ζp
(w)
r +
(
1− ζp(w)r
)
p
(w)
D
)(
1− ζp(w)r
)(
1− p(w)D
)
. Thus, the distribution of
Y can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution Φ (y;µ1, σ
2
1) with µ1 = µX+µZ and
σ21 = σ
2
X + σ
2
Z via the additivity property of independent Gaussian random variables.
Willie’s probability of error is thus approximated by:
P˜(w)e =
1
2
min
S
(1− Φ(S;µ0, σ20) + Φ(S;µ1, σ21)). (D.10)
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The value of the threshold S∗ that minimizes the RHS of (D.10) satisfies |S
∗−µ0|2
σ20
−
log(σ21/σ
2
0) =
|S∗−µ1|2
σ21
.
D.4 Analysis of the Detector Dark Clicks
Here we provide the detailed analysis of detector dark clicks, focusing on how
their temporal variation affected our experiments. While we took great care in main-
taining uniform conditions throughout our experiments, controlling every aspect of
our environment was beyond our capabilities. However, we argue that the temporal
variation in the dark click probability that we experienced had no significant impact
on our results.
We maximize the logarithm of the likelihood function in equation (D.1) and obtain
the following maximum likelihood estimator of the dark click probability:
pˆD =
∑nD
i=1 xi
nD − td
∑nD
i=1 xi
, (D.11)
where x1, . . . , xnD is the sequence of nD observations where only the dark clicks can
be observed, i.e, it is the experimental click record that excludes the observations of
Alice’s transmissions as well as the dead time following the detected transmissions.
The entire click record contains 100 experiments at each value of n for both Alice us-
ing and not using the channel, totalling 2.72× 1010 observations when ζ = 0.25/√n,
and 3.0784 × 1010 observations when ζ ∈ {0.03/ 4√n, 0.003, 0.008}. For each of the
four communication regimes, we divide the click record (sorted by time) into seg-
ments of nDs = 3.2 × 107 consecutive observations. The estimates of Willie’s and
Bob’s dark click probabilities for these segments are denoted by pˆ
(w)
D,s(j) and pˆ
(b)
D,s,
j = 1, . . . , nS,s(ζ), where nS,s(0.25/
√
n) = 850 and nS,s(0.03/ 4
√
n) = nS,s(0.003) =
nS,s(0.008) = 962. The plots of pˆ
(w)
D,s(j) and pˆ
(b)
D,s(j) in Figure D.1 illustrate the tem-
poral variations in dark click probability. However, they also show homogeneity over
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Figure D.1: Temporal variation in dark click probability. The estimates of Willie’s
dark click probability are plotted using the left y-axis; the estimates of Bob’s dark click
probability are plotted using the right y-axis. Dark click probability is estimated using
equation (D.11) for consecutive segments, each containing nDs = 3.2×107 consecutive
observations, as well as for consecutive blocks, each containing nDb = 1.184 × 109
consecutive observations (with the exception of the last block for ζ = 0.25/
√
n in
panel (a) where nDb = 1.152× 109 observations).
relatively long periods of time. We thus estimate the dark click probability for blocks
of 37 consecutive segments using nDb = 1.184× 109 observations (except for the last,
23rd, block of the click record for ζ = 0.25/
√
n containing 36 (nDb = 1.152 × 109
observations) segments instead of 37). The estimates of Willie’s and Bob’s dark click
probabilities for these blocks are denoted by pˆ
(w)
D,b(k) and pˆ
(b)
D,b(k), k = 1, . . . , nS,b(ζ),
where nS,b(0.25/
√
n) = 23 and nS,s(0.03/ 4
√
n) = nS,s(0.003) = nS,s(0.008) = 26. The
block dark click probability estimate is close to the average of the estimates for its
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Figure D.2: Correlation in Willie’s and Bob’s dark click probabilities. A glitch in
the PCIe-6537 data acquisition card resulted in a slight change in setup between the
experiments corresponding to ζ = 0.25/
√
n and ζ ∈ {0.03/ 4√n, 0.003, 0.008}.
component segments, and over most of the 101 blocks, the segment estimates of the
dark click probability are homogeneous.2
We also plot pˆ
(w)
D,b(j) versus pˆ
(b)
D,b(j) in Figure D.2, revealing strong correlation be-
tween the dark click probabilities of Bob’s and Willie’s detectors. Thus the temporal
variations in the dark click probabilities likely stem from the external environmental
factors (such as laboratory temperature changes) rather than the detectors them-
selves.
Intuitively, clicks observed under less noisy channel conditions carry more evidence
for the hypothesis that Alice is transmitting than clicks observed when the channel
2Assuming that the dark click probability stays constant over the period of time corresponding
to a segment, the number of observed dark clicks would be binomially-distributed if our detectors
had zero dead time. However, we argue in Appendix D.2 that the dead time has a minimal impact
on our experiment, making the binomial distribution a good approximation for the distribution of
the number of observed dark clicks. Thus, for each of blocks, we performed the Pearson chi-squared
test for homogeneity [36] in the estimated dark click probability of its component segments. We
found that the test rejects the null hypothesis (that the estimates are homogeneous) in only 29 out
of 202 blocks, consistent with the visual inspection of Figure D.1.
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Figure D.3: Impact of variations in dark click probability on the estimates of Willie’s
detection error. The probability of detection error estimated from the block-weighted
test statistic given in equation (D.12) is plotted using the asterisks alongside the plots
from Figure 7.3 of the estimates using the (unweighted) total click count. Weighting
does not substantially change the detection error probability estimates.
is noisier. Indeed, in the derivation of the total click count Y as Willie’s test statistic
in Section D.2, the contribution to Y from the ith channel observation x
(w)
i ∈ {0, 1}
is effectively weighted by 1/p
(w)
D (we ignore the term corresponding to the detector
dead time for simplicity of exposition and since it has no tangible impact on our
experimental results). In the analysis of Section 7.2 we used the average dark click
probability, however, if the dark click probability p
(w)
D (i) is available for i = 1, . . . , n,
Yweighted =
∑n
i=1
x
(w)
i
p
(w)
D (i)
is a better test statistic. Since the exact p
(w)
D (i) is unavailable,
and since the estimates are (mostly) homogeneous over the duration of the blocks,
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we study the impact of temporal variation of dark clicks on Willie’s detection error
by weighting the observations by the block estimates pˆ
(w)
D,b(j). Denoting the set of
observations in the jth block by Wj, we block-weight Willie’s test statistic as follows:
Yblock-weighted =
nS,l(ζ)∑
j=1
1
pˆ
(w)
D,b(j)
∑
x
(w)
i ∈Wj
x
(w)
i . (D.12)
We plot the estimates of detection error probability that are calculated using the
block-weighted test statistic given by (D.12) in Figure D.3 alongside the estimates
from Figure 7.3 that are calculated using the (unweighted) total click count. While
the estimated probability of detection error decreases in some cases (and increases
or remains the same in others), the overall impact is small. The square root scaling
law is unaffected since Alice and Bob can design their covert communication using
a lower bound on p
(w)
D (e.g., the dark click probability for the best available photon
detector operating in near-ideal conditions). However, since the random fluctuations
in noise power have been shown to yield positive-rate covert communication in AWGN
channel setting [57, 58], Alice and Bob could potentially exploit the random process
governing p
(w)
D to transmit covert information at a positive rate.
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